Community Development and Justice Standing Committee

Are we there yet?

How WA Police determines whether traffic law enforcement is effective

Report No. 8
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Legislative Assembly
Parliament of Western Australia
Community Development and Justice
Standing Committee

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Presented by
Ms M.M. Quirk, MLA

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Chair’s Foreword

In business, the idea of measuring what you are doing, picking the measurements that count like customer satisfaction and performance ... you thrive on that.

– Bill Gates

Every week we hear tragic news of another life lost on our roads or a family’s future forever altered by involvement in a vehicle crash. Western Australia’s road fatality toll last year was the worst in four years, and critical injuries rose even more severely with 106 more than in 2013. The rate of deaths on WA roads – 7.2 per 100,000 people – is much higher than the national average of 4.9.

It was in the wake of these disastrous figures that the Committee decided to focus on road policing as the first in a series of reports on the way WA Police evaluates its performance.

At the end of such a year – or even at the end of what the media terms a “horror weekend” on the roads – many are left scratching their heads, including the police. What can be done to bring down the toll?

Making our roads safer involves input from a number of different agencies. It is an extremely complex and sometimes perplexing problem influenced by factors such as road engineering, vehicle design and education strategies.

Hence, WA Police is not the only agency responsible for the road toll. However, it is a key player. Police are given responsibility for enforcing road user behaviour by apprehending those breaking the law and deterring others from engaging in dangerous behaviour.

Deterrence is an important outcome of enforcement. If police are able to create the perception among drivers that they are at risk of being caught for speeding, drink driving or using a mobile device, for example, anywhere and at any time, then they have been successful in applying the theory of general deterrence.

But how do they measure success? WA Police needs to know whether what it is doing is effective. This is not only important from an accountability perspective, but also in the context of recently implemented reforms to the policing model.

Quite rightly, police services consume a significant portion of the State budget and the public needs to be assured that its tax dollars are being well spent.
Throughout the course of this inquiry we have heard that accessing data which would demonstrate police performance on road safety is difficult. Hence, it is not easy for interested parties and the public to determine whether WA Police strategies are working.

Do the police themselves know whether they are working? When faced with competing arguments about the importance of police visibility and what time of the day to conduct RBTs, for example, are they able to produce evidence that favours one strategy over another?

These measurements are not just required from an accountability perspective but also assist road trauma research and stimulate informed debate amongst members of the community. The latter is vital in changing driving culture which is a notoriously difficult outcome to achieve.

Moreover in the context of financial assessments made on the deployment of personnel in a particular role (a cornerstone of the WA Police’s Frontline 2020), useful performance and meaningful measurement of outcomes can lead to greater efficiencies without sacrificing service levels.

Since the focus of the inquiry was an examination of performance measures, consideration of appropriate levels of sworn officer staffing was not canvassed in detail. However, implicit in WA Police’s deterrence approach is the need to maintain existing levels of police staff. There was evidence before the Committee that traffic police were not deployed one hundred per cent of the time on traffic duties, that RBT teams had been stood down for periods of days to assist on general matters and the number of infringements issued personally by officers on the road has inexplicably dropped.

Reducing the road toll using strategies of general deterrence requires long term strategic planning, application of scientific evidence and significant resources. It is not easy. But I cannot imagine anyone opposing measures which would result in fewer lives being lost on our roads.

Our impression is that traffic police use evidence and intelligence well in the day-to-day operational activities – the type that apply to specific deterrence. Where WA Police seems to be lacking is in the collection and use of evidence to construct the big picture strategies that might in fact create the perception that drivers breaking the law could be caught anywhere at any time.

It was somewhat surprising to realise in the course of the inquiry that the issues we were investigating were novel or had not been widely canvassed elsewhere. It may well be that this report might stimulate and inspire further research to be conducted
such as that recently commissioned by WA Police to be undertaken by the Curtin-Monash Accident Research Centre.

Given this, I particularly appreciate the thoughtful contributions and vigorous analysis of data by my fellow Committee members in the conduct of this inquiry: Deputy Chair Dr Tony Buti MLA, Mr Mick Murray MLA, Mr Chris Hatton MLA and Ms Libby Mettam MLA.

I also thank the Principal Research Officer, Dr Sarah Palmer, and Research Officer, Ms Niamh Corbett, for their professional support of the Committee’s work.

MS M.M. QUIRK, MLA
CHAIR
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Executive Summary

In 2014, Western Australia recorded 22 more road fatalities and 106 more serious injuries than in the previous year. While the road toll has in fact been on an overall downward trend over the past decade, the State’s road fatality rate is currently the third worst in Australia.

Western Australia Police plays a key role in keeping our roads safe. Given that the Committee resolved in November 2014 to inquire into Methods Employed by WA Police to Evaluate Performance, it was considered timely to focus initially on how WA Police evaluates its performance in relation to road safety.

The inquiry was guided by three key questions:

- How does the agency know if it is making progress in this area?
- How does it use performance information to guide its practice?
- Do the reported measures give parliament, road safety stakeholders and the public an adequate indication of whether traffic enforcement is effective?

Police operations consume a large portion of the State budget and as such it is important that robust effectiveness measures are in place – particularly in the context of the largely untested Frontline 2020 police reforms being implemented.

This report does not set out to determine the best road policing strategies. Rather, it is about how WA Police determines the best strategies. Performance measurement should serve as a guide as to what strategies are working and what requires modification.

Road safety in WA

Governance and management of road safety is complex, as outlined in Chapter Two. WA is a signatory to a national plan for road safety (the National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020) which is in turn aligned with the Global Plan for the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020, an initiative of the United Nations.

The State’s Towards Zero Road Safety Strategy 2008-2020 is guided by the Safe Systems approach adopted by all Australian jurisdictions. WA Police contributes to two of the four cornerstones of the Safe Systems framework: “safe speeds” and “safe road use”.

A Ministerial Council with responsibility for road safety was established in 1995, but it was not until 2008 that road safety became a portfolio in its own right. A recent review of road safety governance (the Browne Review) recommended that a Commissioner for
Road Safety be established and that the current Office of Road Safety (which coordinates road safety and administers the Road Trauma Trust Account) become the Office of the Commissioner for Road Safety. The Road Safety Council, operating since 1997, is set to become the Road Safety Advisory Council and include road safety experts in its membership.

The Browne Review was prompted by the increase in funds from speed and red light camera infringements flowing to the Road Trauma Trust Account. The Road Safety Council has had responsibility for recommending to the Minister for Road Safety which projects (submitted by various bodies) should be funded. Currently, $80 million of RTTA funds has not been allocated.

Road trauma
Road trauma poses a significant cost to society both socially and financially. While the focus is often on road fatalities, the Committee was told that for every death around 11 people are permanently injured and another 50 spend a long period in hospital. In 2014 there were 184 fatalities and 298 critical injuries on WA roads – an increase on the preceding five-year average of 181 fatalities and 259 critical injuries.

Fatality rates in every regional police district were higher than in the metropolitan districts, with the Wheatbelt recording the highest rate. Vulnerable road users, such as motorcyclists and cyclists, featured prominently in the road toll, with motorcyclists accounting for 24 per cent of the overall toll (up from 14 per cent in 2013).

Police and responsibility for road safety
Road policing is central to modifying driver behaviour and enhancing road safety. In Australia it is shaped by a common theory applied in traffic psychology known as deterrence theory, which focuses on the effect of enforcement activities and legal sanctions on behaviour.

General deterrence uses fear of detection (and its consequences) to try to influence drivers not to offend, while specific deterrence relies on the experience of apprehension and its consequences to encourage drivers not to re-offend.

The WA Police traffic enforcement command has been guided by the Road Policing Strategy 2011-2014, which sets out three objectives:

- enforcement of traffic laws;
- targeting unsafe road user behaviour; and
- building road policing capability.

The strategy has expired and WA Police told the Committee a new draft strategy was being contemplated.
Police are involved in a number of strategies to reduce the road toll announced in the past six months, including a review of motorcycle crashes and a review of regional highway safety.

**Performance measurement and KPIs**

As detailed in Chapter Three, measuring and reporting on the performance of public sector organisations is a well-established practice aimed at delivering accountability and transparency (to both the parliament and taxpayers).

A common way to collect public sector performance information is to employ a set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which provide an overview of operations and material expenses. Agencies are required to create indicators to measure effectiveness for each outcome and efficiency for each output/service and to publish the results in an annual report.

Australian policing has been influenced by the “new era” of policing in the UK and the US, emerging from the New Public Management style of management which placed more emphasis on police being accountable to the community and achieving government outcomes.

Most Australian police organisations have implemented Operational Performance Review (OPR) systems (based on data-driven performance review processes such as Comstat in the US) which align closely with treasury performance reporting and the requirements of the Productivity Commission. There is some criticism of Australian police organisations for using performance management systems in a rigid and mechanistic way.

Researchers have noted that measuring the reactive element of policing is considerably easier than measuring the success of proactive policing (which works towards disrupting or preventing future crimes). Hence, while Australian police agencies have, in principle, adopted a philosophy of intelligence-led policing, intelligence products are not routinely used for their intended purpose of assisting decision making.

In the UK in particular, an evidence-based approach – which continuously tests hypotheses with empirical research findings – is increasingly used to determine “what works”.

While there is agreement that performance measures can have a positive impact on police work, there are also some drawbacks, such as: the difficulty of isolating the contribution of police from the work of other agencies with whom they regularly interact; the tendency to focus on KPIs which lend themselves most readily to auditing of efficiency and effectiveness; the risk that resources may be diverted to meet “false
targets”; and the potential for the publication of indicators to become a political exercise, potentially leading to distortions in data recording.

**Traffic law enforcement performance measurement**

Whilst there is a considerable body of research on ways to increase the safety of roads and ongoing debate about the most effective methods of traffic enforcement, very little has been written about the way police measure traffic enforcement performance.

A key challenge is in being able to determine whether a reduction in recorded offences is due to fewer people committing offences or to police failing to catch offenders. Another challenge is that traffic law enforcement is essentially about deterring road users from engaging in risky behaviour.

Road safety research suggests that general deterrence strategies are the most effective for changing both drink-driving and speeding behaviour, because they have the potential to influence all road users. Specific deterrence strategies should be used to a lesser extent. Measurement of effectiveness should therefore contain some way to determine whether behaviour change has taken place.

**How WA Police measures its traffic law enforcement performance**

In 2014-15, WA Police replaced two lawful road-use behaviour KPIs with a single KPI:

*Percentage of traffic law enforcement contacts made by police officers that target “Category A” offences (including drink driving, exceeding the lawful speed limit, careless/dangerous/reckless driving, no authority to drive/unlicensed vehicle, use of mobile phones whilst driving, and non-wearing of seatbelts/restraints/helmets).*

This is the only audited KPI. WA Police provided the Committee with one internal KPI.

WA Police also provide data for the Productivity Commission’s *Report on Government Services*, which compares the performance of public sector agencies across Australia. Five road safety measures are reported.

The Road Safety Council (of which WA Police is a member) reports on a set of Safety Performance Indicators (using data provided by police) and on the progress towards performance indicators for Road Trauma Trust Account projects.

**Adequacy of traffic law enforcement measurement**

In the past, there has tended to be a focus on measuring enforcement of speeding and drink/drug driving offences. As discussed in in *Chapter Four*, the intention of the new WA Police KPI is that it takes into account other safety risks such as not wearing a seatbelt, mobile phone use and careless driving. Focussing on the number of contacts
police make for these offences is said to complement the “anywhere, anytime” message that goes hand in hand with the strategy of general deterrence.

But can this one KPI really measure the effectiveness of this strategy, and how effective are other measures used by WA Police to evaluate traffic policing performance? Just as importantly, in the interests of transparency, how is its performance being reported?

**Measurement of effectiveness**

WA Police provided evidence of only one internal KPI and as such the Committee is uncertain to what extent police sets goal for its traffic officers to work towards.

Traffic police seem to be effectively using intelligence products to direct operations on a day-to-day, week by week and month by month basis. But while the use of tactical intelligence was evident, the extent to which intelligence guides longer term strategies is more difficult to determine.

There are only three lower level intelligence analysts in the traffic department and one level five in a centralised intelligence analysis role, indicating perhaps that use of intelligence at a more sophisticated level than guiding the deployment roster is not a priority.

WA Police has a history of commissioning research and has long-standing relationships with university-based centres (such as Curtin-Monash Accident Research Centre). But researchers involved with those centres had not seen action consistent with the results of their research. It seems that while there is an appreciation of the value of evidence-based policing, there is simply not enough time and resources devoted to considering evidence properly.

The audited KPI is designed to ensure that the majority of police contacts (i.e. police officers dealing with individuals in person) are for the most serious traffic offences. The Committee notes that, counter to expectations, there has been a decrease in the number of on-the-spot infringements and questions whether there are too few resources available to devote to traffic policing?

The audited KPI seems to fit the description of an efficiency indicator (a measurement of outputs) more so than an effectiveness indicator (a measurement of outcomes). It measures a service provided rather than the effect of the service. It does not tell us whether offences have risen or fallen, or whether the police are being effective in making the roads safer. If there are no KPIs which indicate whether public attitudes to speeding, drink driving, mobile device use, etcetera are changing, how can police monitor whether their road safety messages are having any effect?

The *Report on Government Services* contains some information on road safety that does not appear in the WA Police annual report, such as hospitalisations and use of
seatbelts. But public knowledge of the report is likely to be limited. Road safety performance indicators reported by other agencies (e.g. the Road Safety Council’s annual report and the Office of Road Safety’s Road Trauma Trust Account quarterly reports) do not clearly delineate the effectiveness of police in delivering road safety outcomes.

Reporting and publication of data
Given that a key purpose of KPIs is to demonstrate transparency, the question of what data is made available to the public through the annual report and/or other means is critical.

WA Police says that even with the paring back of the audited KPIs, it will continue to collect the same data as it always has and will make this information available to the public on its website. However, there is a difference between publishing figures on a website and including the data in the annual report where some kind of analysis and contextual narrative is generally included.

In addition, the omission of that data from the annual report may send the message to the public that the police do not take these measures as seriously when implementing strategies for traffic policing. The exclusion of intermediate indicators from the annual report is also counter to the recommendations of the Office of the Auditor General. Research papers viewed by the Committee also recommend publishing contextual indicators alongside a relatively small set of core performance indicators to promote transparency, comparison, accountability and communication. The Committee was mindful that excessive reporting obligations may impact on finite resources.

The RAC, the WA Police Union, the Road Safety Council and the WA Local Government Association have all raised concerns about access to police data. While WA Police says it is collecting the same traffic policing data that it has always collected, it does not appear that all of the data is accessible to other groups, and much less the public.

In terms of the prosecution data which some organisations have requested, police point to the problem of determining what a rise or fall in prosecutions actually means (which was why the previous KPIs were replaced). However, if WA Police only releases the data it thinks is reasonable and/or does not share data, this may invite accusations of having something to conceal.

A proposal for a comprehensive statistical database (the Enhanced Road Safety Information System) which would collect and integrate road safety data was put to the Road Safety Council but not supported because of concerns about cost and resources.

The availability of data through such a system would help end speculation about how police spend their time. Making more information available – not less – could also give police a basis for countering common claims by the public that speed cameras are only
located in places where they can raise revenue and that placement of breath and drug buses is only about meeting RBT targets.

**Issues affecting the judgement of performance**

There are a number of issues beyond the remit of policing which impact on the performance of WA Police in regard to traffic policing and road safety.

For example, unlike most other States, it is not mandatory in WA for a blood sample to be taken from people injured in motor vehicle crashes who are admitted to a hospital. A measured level rather than a “yes” or “no” response from a patient with regard to whether they had been drinking or taking drugs would enable trauma managers and researchers to compile evidence of the success of a new initiative. This would also be important data for police in assessing the success of drink and drug driving campaigns.

Another issue is that the number of roadside drug tests being performed by WA Police is less than in other States and significantly less than the number recommended in a report to the government by road safety expert Max Cameron. The Committee found that, given the high incidence of illicit drug use, an increase in funding would assist in the number of drug tests being performed.

WA Police applied to the Road Trauma Trust Account for almost $12 million to fund the project Increase Breath and Drug Testing in 2014-15, and the Road Safety Council recommended this amount be granted. However, only $4.6 million was approved. For 2015-16, the project has received $4.7 million.

A decrease in the amount of funding for advertising and education campaigns is also a concern, considering that a substantial commitment to community education is required to help reduce road trauma. According to a review of the Office of Road Safety’s mass media campaign, WA spends only 84 cents per capita on road safety advertising, compared to the national average of $1.29 per capita.

Community attitude surveys which measure drivers’ perceptions of enforcement on our roads have not been conducted since 2011, when it was determined that the money spent on the contract could be better spent on other initiatives. The Office of Road Safety notes the value of the surveys, however, and says it is in the process of organising a new contract so that they can resume. The surveys are important in supporting what would otherwise be merely an assertion that drivers are deterred by specific enforcement actions at specific times.

The Committee has some concern, along with sectors of the community, that there is still $80 million in unallocated funds in the Road Trauma Trust Account. The Minister for Police has said the money will be spent gradually. A deadline of June 2017 would be consistent with the Browne Review recommendation that funds in the account be spent within two years.
There is also some concern over what the funds are used for. Funds are not supposed to be used for an agency’s core activities, but there is some debate about what constitutes a core activity. The Committee supports calls to establish safeguards to ensure all RTTA funds are directed into road safety initiatives.

The Committee is also concerned that, given such a high proportion of road trauma occurs in regional WA, RTTA funding has been reduced or withdrawn from projects that have an impact on road safety in rural or remote areas – contrary to advice from the Road Safety Council. The WA Local Government Association would also welcome greater involvement from WA Police on the policing of local roads, given that almost two-thirds of serious crashes occur on local roads. Communication with police on local road policing issues was seen as lacking.

Conclusions
The Committee agrees that the road toll is not a reasonable KPI for police, given the complexities of joint responsibility for road safety, but it should still be included and referred to in annual reports.

The single traffic enforcement KPI WA Police is currently using as an audited reporting measure is not sufficient to provide an indication of effectiveness, nor is it a good outcome measure. It exposes police to the risk of emphasising quantified elements of performance at the expense of other aspects, pursuing short-term success at the expense of long-term success, and emphasising measures rather than underlying objectives.

WA Police should be using its performance data to support the strategy of general deterrence. But the rationale behind general deterrence is not readily understood, both by the public and by many police officers. Both groups call for a higher police presence on the roads, but the aim of general deterrence is to create the perception of being caught “anywhere at any time” by random deployment of police traffic resources.

Intelligence seems to be used effectively in everyday traffic policing (at the tactical level) but it is not clear that it is analysed at the higher level and applied to strategic decision-making. Road safety researchers say that WA Police often do not act on the findings and recommendations of academic research. However, this may be because research is not delivered in a way that is useful and practical for police. Research needs to be delivered to police in a more digestible form and police need to take more ownership of scientific research.

Reported measures do not give parliament, road safety stakeholders and the public an adequate indication of whether traffic enforcement is effective. The WA Police reported measures are few and the data provided to the public does not tell the whole road safety story. Road safety measures reported by other agencies are patchy at best.
in their ability to enlighten the public as to the effectiveness of initiatives and the impact that police may be having on our roads.

While police are not solely responsible for the road toll, they are key players in instituting the behaviour change that is critical to improving safety on our roads. Road policing is complex and police should be drawing on innovations in research and technology as much as possible to refine their strategies.
Ministerial Response

In accordance with Standing Order 277(1) of the Standing Orders of the Legislative Assembly, the Community Development and Justice Standing Committee directs that the Minister for Police and Road Safety reports to the Assembly as to the action, if any, proposed to be taken by the Government with respect to the recommendations of the Committee.
Findings and Recommendations

Finding 1
WA Police does not have a current Road Policing Strategy in place.

Finding 2
Intelligence-led policing is well understood and tactical intelligence is used to guide traffic policing on a daily basis. However, opportunities to translate intelligence and evidence into strategic and policy changes could be further developed.

Recommendation 1
WA Police should ensure that it has sufficient staff in senior intelligence analyst roles in order to make the best use of intelligence and evidence in guiding traffic-related strategies. There should be a direct nexus between traffic enforcement tasking and research findings.

Finding 3
It is difficult to define an effective measure of police performance. Accordingly, the traffic law enforcement KPI provides only a limited measure of the effectiveness of road policing.

Finding 4
There is some evidence to suggest that the perception of a police presence is an effective tool in modifying road user behaviour, hence the focus of the new police KPI on the number of contacts with road users.

Finding 5
The Report on Government Services contains useful comparative data for government planning purposes but has less value as a way for the West Australian community to evaluate the performance of its police force.

Recommendation 2
The Report on Government Services should not be considered a substitute for thorough reporting in the WA Police annual report.

Finding 6
Police-related performance indicators reported by the Road Safety Council and Office of Road Safety (in relation to Road Trauma Trust Account projects) do not provide a good indication of the effectiveness of the police in improving road safety. It is not clear whether post-funding evaluation is undertaken for Road Trauma Trust Account projects.
Finding 7
The limited information presented in the WA Police annual report means that parliament, stakeholders and members of the community are unable to make an informed assessment of police performance in relation to traffic law enforcement and road safety.

Recommendation 3
WA Police should publish relevant and contextual road policing indicators in addition to the Key Performance Indicator in its annual report, in order to provide a more comprehensive account of its performance in relation to road safety. Relevant information is that which would demonstrate outcomes in road safety.

Finding 8
There is not enough information presented on the WA Police website and the websites of road safety organisations to enable parliament, stakeholders and members of the community to make an informed assessment of police performance in relation to traffic law enforcement and road safety.

Finding 9
There is insufficient sharing of data related to traffic enforcement and road safety.

Recommendation 4
In the interests of public data sharing and transparency, the Enhanced Road Safety Information System should be established, and potentially funded by unallocated funds currently being held in the Road Trauma Trust Account.

Finding 10
The inability to lawfully collect blood samples from road trauma patients limits the ability of researchers to accurately assess the impact of alcohol and drugs on driving impairment and road trauma. This is also an important measure for police in assessing whether drink and drug driving campaigns are effective.

Recommendation 5
That the Minister for Police introduces an amendment to the Road Traffic Act (1974) to enable the lawful collection of blood samples from road trauma patients as a matter of priority.

Finding 11
The number of drug-driving tests currently being performed by WA Police is lower than in other States and significantly less than recommended in drug-driving studies.
**Recommendation 6**  
That WA Police performs at least 90,000 roadside drug tests per year, as per the expert advice provided in 2012.

**Recommendation 7**  
That more drivers who test positive for alcohol are also tested for drugs.

**Recommendation 8**  
That the Minister for Police introduces amendments to the *Road Traffic Act* (1974) to:
- establish an offence for the combined use of alcohol and illicit drugs; and
- provide for drug driving to attract the same penalty as drink driving.

**Finding 12**  
WA spends less on road safety advertising campaigns than most other states, leaving law enforcement to carry the burden of deterring risky driving behaviour.

**Recommendation 9**  
The Minister for Road Safety must ensure that sufficient funds are allocated from the Road Trauma Trust Account to ensure well-designed and effective road safety education and media campaigns are able to be consistently implemented.

**Recommendation 10**  
The Western Australian driver attitude surveys should be reinstated as a matter of priority.

**Recommendation 11**  
That the unallocated money in the Road Trauma Trust Account be fully allocated to projects by the end of the 2017 financial year.

**Recommendation 12**  
That safeguards be put in place to ensure that Road Trauma Trust Account funding is not substituted for regular core government agency funding.

**Finding 13**  
Police deployment and performance measures should take into account that almost two-thirds of crashes occur on local roads.

**Finding 14**  
The WA Local Government Association (WALGA) saw communication with police as lacking even though WA Police maintained that it had regular contact with WALGA, including an intelligence officer who consulted individual local government authorities.
Finding 15  
That the findings of the Regional Highway Safety Review being undertaken jointly by the Office of Road Safety, WA Police and Main Roads be used to inform deployment of police in the regions.

Finding 16  
WA Police are key stakeholders in road safety. However, in the absence of clear and unambiguous performance indicators, police are likely to be held solely responsible for matters that are the responsibility of others.
Chapter 1

Introduction

A brief background to the focus of the inquiry, its establishment and the report contents.

*It is a disgrace that Western Australia incurs such a road toll as we do.*

– Professor Murray Lampard, Chair, Road Safety Council

1.1 Inquiry focus

In 2014 184 people lost their lives on Western Australian roads and another 298 were critically injured. This was 22 more deaths and 106 more serious injuries than in 2013, prompting alarm from the community about the safety of the State’s roads. While there are encouraging signs of improvement in the metropolitan area, there are ongoing concerns about the disproportionate increase in the road toll in regional areas.

The 2014 toll was in fact more in line with 2012 (183) and 2011 (179), with the 2013 road death toll inexplicably lower than usual. Serious injuries, however, have been in steady decline for the previous five years, making the 2014 figure the highest since 2009.

While the number of people killed on WA roads is consistent with other States and Territories in showing an overall downward trend over the past decade, WA is the third worst performing State in terms of the road fatality rate (per head of population). The road toll in WA is not decreasing at the same rate as in other States.

Western Australia Police, whilst not the only agency responsible for road safety, plays a key role in keeping our roads safe. Given that the Committee resolved in November 2014 to inquire into Methods Employed by WA Police to Evaluate Performance, it was considered appropriate and timely to focus initially on how WA Police evaluates its performance in relation to road safety.

The Committee examined the performance measures WA Police uses to determine the effectiveness of traffic law enforcement and road safety initiatives. The inquiry revolved around three key questions:

- How does the agency know if it is making progress in this area?
- How does it use performance information to guide its practice?
Do the reported measures give parliament, road safety stakeholders and the public an adequate indication of whether traffic enforcement is effective?

WA Police, as with all government entities, is accountable for the public funds it is allocated. As such, it is required to report annually on its performance to the Parliament. A set of key performance indicators (KPIs) forms the backbone of the report. The success of the WA Police service is assessed on how well it has met the KPIs.

The Committee’s concern is that activities that do not form part of the audited KPIs (perhaps because they are not easily measureable) will not be given the attention and scrutiny they deserve. This concern is raised in the knowledge that the Frontline 2020 police reforms demand that police work more efficiently. Essentially, they are being asked to do more with fewer financial resources, and this could have an impact on performance evaluation. Furthermore there is a strong desire from the community and within police ranks to see a stronger police presence on our roads.

Given that police operations consume the third largest portion of the State budget after health and education (around five per cent), it is appropriate that at the same time as new (and in some cases untested) reforms are rolled out, robust measures are in place to gauge their effectiveness.

Considering the seriousness of the road toll, WA taxpayers need to be assured that WA Police has strategies in place to measure its effectiveness in road policing.

This report is not necessarily about determining the best road policing strategies, but about how WA Police go about determining the best strategies. Measuring performance should be a guide as to what strategies are working and what needs more attention.

1.2 Establishment of Inquiry

In accordance with its functions and powers (see Appendix 2), the Committee notified the Speaker of its intention to undertake an Inquiry into the Methods Employed by WA Police to Evaluate Performance on 26 November 2014.

The Committee resolved to produce a series of reports focussing on different aspects of police performance. Given across-the-board concern about the road toll in WA at the start of 2015, the Committee resolved to make the performance of WA Police in regard to traffic law enforcement and road safety initiatives the focus of its first report.

The Committee advertised for submissions in The West Australian newspaper on 31 January 2015. The advertisement specified that submissions were to pertain only to
matters relating to objective measurement of traffic law enforcement and road safety initiatives (and not to the broader Inquiry).

Letters inviting submissions were also sent to specific relevant organisations or agencies. The Committee received seven submissions (see list at Appendix 3). The Committee conducted 11 public hearings with 19 witnesses (see Appendix 4) and was briefed by WA Police during a visit to the Police Operations Facility in Midland.

1.3 Guide to report

Chapter Two begins with an overview of national road safety governance and strategies which WA is party to and then outlines the strategies guiding the state, the governance of road safety in WA, and the various road safety stakeholders in WA. It also provides an overview of road trauma in WA, and outlines the police responsibility for road safety.

Chapter Three explores performance measurement – in general, specific to policing, and then as applied to traffic law enforcement. The final section of the chapter outlines how WA Police measures its performance, and looks at other measures of WA’s police performance in relation to road policing.

Chapter Four examines the adequacy of traffic enforcement-related performance measurement used by police (internal and external) as well as the adequacy of the reporting of its performance. The third section of this chapter explores some of the issues that are beyond the control of police, such as insufficient funding and the withdrawal of road safety programs that would otherwise make the job of road policing easier. A final section provides a summary discussion of the issues raised in the report and offers some conclusions.
Chapter 2

Road safety in WA

This chapter provides an overview of the national strategy and approach to road safety, the State’s Towards Zero road safety strategy and the governance of road safety in WA. A summary of recent road trauma statistics is presented, and the role of WA Police in road safety and road policing is also outlined.

We have to change what we are doing. We have gone from being, as we would describe, the best in the class to the worst in the class.
— Will Golsby, RAC Corporate Affairs

2.1 Road safety governance in Australia

This year is the midpoint in the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020, an initiative of the United Nations’ General Assembly to reduce road trauma.¹

The initiative, outlined in the Global Plan for the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020, calls on each signatory to implement road safety activities, particularly in the areas of road safety management, road infrastructure, vehicle safety, road user behaviour, road safety education and post-crash response.²

2.1.1 National Road Safety Strategy

Australia’s National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020 (NRSS) is closely aligned with the Global Plan, and it forms an important part of Australia’s response to the Decade of Action. An agreed national framework, the NRSS presents a 10-year plan to reduce trauma on Australian roads by at least 30 per cent. In 2013-14 the Office of Road Safety assumed responsibility for management of the Austroads Safety program. The Austroads Safety Taskforce facilitated a review of the NRSS.³

In November 2014 a new action plan covering the period 2015 to 2017 was developed to support the implementation of the NRSS.¹

Nineteen actions were identified for priority in the next three years, including the strengthening of national police enforcement operations to improve road safety compliance. This was to be achieved by states and territories working with the Australian and New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency (ANZPAA) to identify and implement improvements to national enforcement operations.²

2.1.2 The Safe Systems approach


A Safe Systems framework recognises human fallibility and vulnerability. It accepts that people take risks that can lead to deaths and serious injury, and also acknowledges that there are physical limits to the amount of force the body can take before injury occurs.³

The cornerstones of the Safe Systems approach are:

- Safe Road Use – influencing road user behaviour;
- Safe Roads and Roadsides – improving road infrastructure;
- Safe Speeds – enhancing speed enforcement and reviewing speed limits; and
- Safe Vehicles – promoting the uptake of safer vehicles and key safety features.⁴


Main Roads has the lead responsibility for the Safe Roads and Roadsides cornerstone and the setting of safe speed limits component of the Safe Speeds cornerstone.⁵ WA Police contributes to the Safe Speeds and Safe Road Use cornerstones.⁶

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² ibid.
⁴ ibid.
⁵ Mr Des Snook, Executive Director, Road Network Services, Main Roads, Transcript of Evidence, 25 February 2015.
2.2 Road safety governance in Western Australia

2.2.1 Towards Zero

In 2009 the WA government released a new plan for road safety in Western Australia, with the ambitious aim of reducing road trauma by 40 per cent. The Towards Zero Road Safety Strategy 2008–2020 was described as a “living strategy”, in that it would continue to take advantage of new developments in technology and research in road safety in its bid to prevent 11,000 people from being killed or seriously injured in the 12-year period to 2020.\(^\text{10}\)

During the development of the strategy, the Road Safety Council estimated that full implementation of the strategy would require an additional investment of $200 million per year for 12 years.\(^\text{11}\)

2.2.2 Ministerial responsibility

It is now nearly 20 years since the Select Committee on Road Safety recommended establishing ministerial responsibility for road safety, a ministerial council, a road safety board, and an organisation identifiable by the community as having primary responsibility for road safety in Western Australia.\(^\text{12}\)

It was not until 2008 that road safety became a portfolio in its own right, with the then Minister for Police also taking on the role of Minister for Road Safety. Prior to 2008, ministerial responsibility for road safety had been assumed by the Minister for Transport, the Minister for Planning and Infrastructure within the portfolio of Community Safety (in 2001), and the Minister for Police (when responsibility for the Community Safety portfolio was transferred).\(^\text{13}\)

A Ministerial Council was established in 1995 comprising the Ministers for Health, Education and Local Government and chaired by the Minister for Transport. Its role was to liaise and co-ordinate the activities of agencies to ensure that the recommendations of the Road Safety Council were implemented.\(^\text{14}\)

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\(^\text{10}\) Hon Rob Johnson, Minister for Road Safety, WA, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 19 March 2009, p2179.


\(^\text{12}\) Select Committee on Road Safety, Administration and coordination of road safety in Western Australia (Chair: Ainsworth), Legislative Assembly, Perth, WA, 1995.

\(^\text{13}\) Peter Browne Consulting, Review of Road Safety Governance, Government of Western Australia, Perth, WA, March 2014.

Since then, membership of the ministerial council has expanded to include police, road safety, regional development and planning.\textsuperscript{15}

\subsection*{2.2.3 The Road Safety Council}

The Road Safety Council (RSC) was established in 1997 as a statutory body to coordinate the development and implementation of policy and strategies to improve road safety in Western Australia. It replaced the Road Traffic Board.

The role of the RSC is to identify and recommend measures to reduce road trauma in WA and to make recommendations to the Minister for Road Safety on how funds in the Road Trauma Trust Account (RTTA) should be expended.\textsuperscript{16}

The members of the RSC, appointed by the Minister, include a Chairman and representatives from the departments of education, health, planning and transport, the Insurance Commission of Western Australia, the Office of Road Safety, WA Police, a representative of road users (the Royal Automobile Club of Western Australia), and a representative of local government (Western Australian Local Government Association).

\subsection*{2.2.4 The Office of Road Safety}

Since its establishment in 1997, the Office of Road Safety (ORS) has had many host agencies including the Department of Transport, the Department for Planning and Infrastructure and the Department of the Premier and Cabinet (2002-09). Main Roads (which is part of the Department of Transport) took on administrative responsibility for ORS in July 2009.\textsuperscript{17}

The ORS supports and coordinates the road safety effort in WA. The ORS acts as the lead road safety agency responsible within government for leading, developing, coordinating, promoting and monitoring the \textit{Towards Zero} strategy.

The ORS is responsible for providing road safety advice based on research, evidence and community engagement. It manages road safety education campaigns, partnership programs and community consultation. It manages and provides administrative support to the RSC. The ORS is also responsible for administering monies allocated to the RTTA.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{ibid}.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Peter Browne Consulting, \textit{Review of Road Safety Governance}, Government of Western Australia, Perth, WA, March 2014.
\end{itemize}
2.2.5 The Road Trauma Trust Account

The Road Trauma Trust Account (RTTA) holds the revenue generated by photographic-based speed and red light camera infringements. Funds are used for road safety initiatives, as allocated by the RSC.

An amendment to the Road Safety Council Act 2002 in August 2011 increased the hypothecation of speed camera infringements into the RTTA to 100 per cent, effectively tripling the amount that previously flowed into the account.

According to the RSC:

This increased investment has enhanced the State’s ability to deliver quality road safety measures that will lead to significant and lasting improvement in road trauma.19

The RSC recommended that the majority of RTTA funds be directed into six key priority areas consistent with the Towards Zero strategy.20

Of the $111 million allocated in 2015-16, $18 million was allocated to WA Police projects. (See Appendix 7 for full list of RTTA funding for 2015-16.)

Concerns have been raised about the amount of funds in reserve which remain unallocated each year. The RAC has lamented that:

The current $80 million in unspent funds is not contributing to better road safety outcomes; despite WA having the worst fatality rate of any mainland state.21

There are also differing views as to whether RTTA funds should be used only for road safety measures or if they should allowed to be used for administration costs associated with road safety, such as the administration of fines by WA Police.22

2.2.6 The Browne Review

In 2013 the State Government commissioned a review of the road safety governance framework, in recognition of the fact that the structure had been in place since 1996 and had not been modified to manage the increase in funding resulting from the 100 per cent hypothecation of speed and red light camera infringements.

20 Ibid.
22 Mr Will Golsby, General Manager, Corporate Affairs, RAC, Transcript of Evidence, 23 February 2015.
The review, conducted by consultant Peter Browne (and hence commonly referred to as the Browne Review), was tabled in September 2014 and made 56 recommendations.

The Government released its response to the review in March 2015, broadly accepting all recommendations. A key recommendation was to establish the position of Commissioner for Road Safety, reporting directly to the Minister for Road Safety.

Under the new model to be adopted, the Office of Road Safety will become the Office of the Commissioner for Road Safety and the Road Safety Council will become the Road Safety Advisory Council and include road safety experts in its membership.

The appointment of an interim Commissioner for Road Safety, who will oversee the restructuring of the ORS, was announced on 3 June 2015.

The restructure does not materially alter the imperative for police to have unambiguous performance indicators – and in fact this may be demanded by the new commissioner.

2.3 Road trauma in WA

WA has an expansive road network: 13,490km of state roads, 130,820km of local roads, 5111km of national land transport routes and 127,000km of unsealed roads.23

Once lauded as the second best Australian jurisdiction in terms of road fatality rate per head of population, WA now stands as the third worst performing jurisdiction ahead of only the Northern Territory and Tasmania.24

2.3.1 People killed and seriously injured

The road toll is often discussed in terms of fatalities but also of concern is the high number of serious injuries arising from road trauma. Dr Sudhakar Rao, director of the State Trauma Unit at Royal Perth Hospital, told the Committee:

_We focus a lot on trauma deaths but for every death, about 11 people are permanently injured and never go back to normal life. For every death there are about another 50 who are admitted to hospital for the long term. There is a big health cost. There is a big societal cost as well._25

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25 Dr Sudhakar Rao, Director of State Trauma, Royal Perth Hospital, _Transcript of Evidence_, 11 March 2015.
WA has the highest rate of spinal cord injuries in Australia.\textsuperscript{26} Residual disability arising from head and spinal cord injuries has a profound impact on the WA community. Dr Rao told the Committee that despite 20 years of research into head injuries, there is still no single treatment that changes the outcome.

They are young, productive members of society who pay taxes but as soon as they have an injury, they go from being a productive person to actually being someone who depends on the state to keep them alive and well, and they become a huge cost to the state.\textsuperscript{27}

Road trauma poses a significant cost to society both socially and financially.\textsuperscript{28} This “ripple effect” impacts not only the crash victim, but also their friends, family, carers, employers, sporting clubs and the community in general.\textsuperscript{29}

Road trauma is estimated to cost Western Australia approximately $2.5 billion per annum.\textsuperscript{30} Figures from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare reveal that treatment associated with road trauma cost $38.8 million in 2006-7, rising to $50.6 million in 2012-13. The average cost per patient is estimated to be $9800.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{2.3.2 What do the statistics tell us?}

Despite recording the fewest fatalities since 1961 in 2013, WA’s road toll is reducing at a substantially slower pace than that of most other jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{32} While WA’s fatality rate has reduced significantly since 2001, it is still higher than the trend required to meet the goal identified in the Towards Zero strategy.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{26} Royal Perth Hospital, 2013 Trauma Registry Report, Department of Health: Perth, WA, 2014.
\textsuperscript{27} Dr Sudhakar Rao, Director of State Trauma, Royal Perth Hospital, Transcript of Evidence, 11 March 2015.
\textsuperscript{28} Ferris, J., Mazerolle, L., King, M., Bates, L., Bennett, S., & Devaney, M. ‘Random breath testing in Queensland and Western Australia: examination of how the random breath testing rate influences alcohol related traffic crash rates’. \textit{Accident Analysis and Prevention}, 2013, no.60, pp181-188.
\textsuperscript{30} This value is based on five-year data for the period 2008-2013. It is based on the ‘willingness to pay’ model which WA adopted in 2010. This WTP valuation was obtained using the New South Wales Road Traffic Authority’s ‘Economic valuation of Safety Benefits: Serious Injuries – Final report’. The figures were adjusted to account for Perth-specific CPI for the end of the June quarter 2013. \textit{Cited in}: Road Safety Council, \textit{Report on Activities 2013-14}, Government of Western Australia: Perth, WA, 2014, p31.
\textsuperscript{31} Hon Alyssa Hayden, Parliamentary Secretary representing the Minister for Health, WA, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 21 April 2015, p2430.
\textsuperscript{32} Peter Browne Consulting, \textit{A Review of Road Safety Governance in Western Australia}, March 2014, p2.
\end{footnotesize}
Regrettfully WA has more fatalities per 100,000 persons than the national fatality rate: 7.2 compared to 4.9.\textsuperscript{34}

In 2014 there were 184 fatalities and 298 critical injuries on WA roads.\textsuperscript{35} This represents an increase on the preceding five-year average (2009-2013) of 181 fatalities and 259 critical injuries.\textsuperscript{36}

**Table 1: Fatalities and critical injuries, WA, 2009-2014.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical injuries</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data sourced from: Office of Road Safety, Preliminary Fatal and Critical Injuries on Western Australian Roads: 2014 Summary.

### 2.3.3 Differences in metropolitan and country road trauma

The geographic characteristics of road trauma in Western Australia are worthy of note. While there have been decreases in the number of fatalities and critical injuries in recent years, this is not distributed equally across the metropolitan and regional areas.\textsuperscript{37}

In 2014, for example, 56 per cent of fatalities occurred outside the Greater Perth area, despite only 22 per cent of the population living there. The fatality rate in Greater Perth is approximately 4.4 whilst the fatality rate for the population outside Greater Perth is approximately 20.\textsuperscript{38}

The fatality rate in the Wheatbelt is particularly alarming. In 2014 the Wheatbelt police district had the highest fatality rate per 100,000 persons at 49.8. This is in stark contrast to the North West Metropolitan District which had the lowest rate at 3.2 fatalities per 100,000 persons.\textsuperscript{39}


\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36} The ORS report notes that this increase occurred at a time when Western Australia experienced population growth and an increase in the number of vehicle kilometres travelled, registered vehicles and licensed motor vehicle drivers.

\textsuperscript{37} Submission No.3 from RAC, 20 February 2015.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.

While location influences factors that will likely impact on the trauma outcome (such as distance from a hospital and medical assistance), Dr Rao notes also that “speeds seem to be higher, the rate of non-seatbelt use is higher… and the rate of alcohol use is high” in regional WA.  

Table 2: Indicative fatality rates per 100,000 persons and fatality counts by WA Police District, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police District</th>
<th>Fatality per 100,000</th>
<th>Fatalities (count)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheatbelt</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldfields-Esperance</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Southern</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberley</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid West-Gascoyne</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilbara</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metropolitan WA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Metropolitan</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Metropolitan</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Metropolitan</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West Metropolitan</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Rate denominators were prepared for the WA Police by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and are population counts for 2011 by WA Police district. Data sourced from: Office of Road Safety, Preliminary Fatal and Critical Injuries on Western Australian Roads: 2014 Summary.

2.3.4 Vulnerable road users

In 2014, vulnerable road users, such as motorcyclists, pedestrians and cyclists featured prominently in the road toll. While the proportion of motor vehicle occupant fatalities has decreased from 71 per cent (or 135 people) in 2009 to 63 per cent (or 114 people) in 2014, the trend has not been replicated in the overall number of road fatalities in 2014, due to the higher number of other types of fatalities.

Motorcyclists

The proportion of motorcyclist fatalities comprising the road toll has increased from 16 per cent in 2009 to 24 per cent in 2014. In 2014, 44 motorcyclists were killed and 61 were critically injured as a result of crashes in WA. Almost 60 per cent of the fatalities and 70 per cent of the critical injuries were due to crashes in the metropolitan area.

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40 Dr Sudhakar Rao, Director of State Trauma, Royal Perth Hospital, Transcript of Evidence, 11 March 2015.
41 Submission No.3 from RAC, 20 February 2015.
43 Ibid.
Almost all of the motorcyclist fatalities and critical injuries were male, with the majority aged 25 years or older. 44

Table 3: Fatalities by road user type, WA 2009-2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Road user type</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicle occupant</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcyclist (inc. pillion)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyclist (inc. pillion)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data sourced from: Office of Road Safety, Preliminary Fatal and Critical Injuries on Western Australian Roads: 2014 Summary.

Cyclists

Also increasing over time were the number of cyclist fatalities: from zero in 2009 to eight in 2014. 45 Eighteen cyclists were critically injured as a result of crashes on WA roads in 2014. This equates to an increase of 19 per cent on the five-year average.

All of the fatalities and 15 of the 18 critical injuries occurred in the metropolitan area. Three-quarters of the cyclist fatalities and 14 of those critically injured were male, and most were aged 20 years or older. 46

Pedestrians

While heartening to know that there was a reduction in the number of pedestrians who lost their lives over the past five years, it is concerning that in 2014, 17 people died on WA roads. 47

2.4 Police and responsibility for road safety

No one organisation or person is tasked with sole responsibility for road safety in WA. It is now widely acknowledged that this shared responsibility poses a challenge for the effectiveness of the road safety sector.

A government commissioned review (the Browne Review) tasked with assessing the “appropriateness and effectiveness” of the road safety structures in WA found that:

…the governance structure was in significant need of change in order to bring about a challenge to current thinking towards road safety,

45 ibid.
46 ibid., p15.
47 ibid., p6.
and to revitalise the current environment into one in which all road safety related agencies work collaboratively with an increased sense of commitment and accountability.48

As a representative of Main Roads pointed out, road safety in WA relies on “everyone doing their bit”49 – a sentiment echoed by the chair of the RSC –

One of my concerns ... is that so few do so much in the road safety space. The time is long overdue for more government agencies to put their shoulders to the wheel and show an interest in road safety.50

– and also the WA Police:

Firstly, can I say the road toll is a whole-of-government response, whole-of-community response; law enforcement is but one aspect of it.51

2.4.1 Frontline 2020 policing model

In 2011 the Department of Treasury and Finance commissioned Price Waterhouse Coopers to complete a value for money review of the WA Police. Arising from the review was a suggestion that WA Police redesign its operating model.52

A new policing model, Frontline 2020, was introduced to the Perth metropolitan region in December 2014 “...to address the increase in demand for policing services, improve frontline policing and build stronger links with local communities by addressing crime at its cause”.53 A roll-out of Frontline 2020 into regional areas is also underway.54

WA Police is also looking into its Service Definition and Resource Model (SDRM). Part of this process includes identifying cases where fully sworn officers are in positions that do not require sworn powers. WA Police executive director Anthony Kannis said the SDRM would deliver an evidence-based framework to assist with future resource allocations and deployment.55

48 Peter Browne Consulting, A Review of Road Safety Governance in Western Australia, March 2014, pp1-2.
49 Mr Des Snook, Executive Director, Road Network Services, Main Roads, Transcript of Evidence, 25 February 2015, p5.
50 Professor Murray Lampard, Chair, Road Safety Council, Transcript of Evidence, 23 February 2015.
51 Mr Nick Anticich, Assistant Commissioner Traffic and Emergency Response, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 3 March 2015, p3.
52 WA Police, Briefing, 14 November 2014.
53 Hon Liza Harvey, Minister for Police, WA, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 18 February 2015, p289.
54 Hon Liza Harvey, Minister for Police, WA, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 13 May 2015, p3616.
55 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 3 March 2015.
The Perth metropolitan region now comprises four policing divisions, each with a minimum of 500 officers and forecast to reach 550 officers by 2017. Officers in each district are organised into two large response teams, local policing teams and two detective teams.\(^56\)

Each district has a control centre that operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The district control centre oversees the operation of a district, develops and prioritises local strategies and directs police response. The response teams run on demand-based rosters and their activity is coordinated by the district control centre. The local policing teams focus on local problem solving in dedicated suburbs of responsibility.\(^57\)

Each of the policing districts is supported by the regional operations group and the traffic enforcement group, both of which have operational responsibilities for the entire metropolitan area.\(^58\)

### 2.4.2 Road policing

Road policing is central to modifying driver behaviour and enhancing road safety. The establishment of traffic laws, the policing of those laws and the application of penalties and sanctions to offenders serve to achieve the two functions of road policing: apprehension and deterrence.\(^59\)

Road policing is mainly concerned with a common theory applied in traffic psychology known as deterrence theory which focuses on the effect of enforcement activities and legal sanctions on behaviour.\(^60\)

Deterrence can be achieved in two ways: general and specific.\(^61\) There are many examples of the positive relationship between the principles of deterrence theory and risky driving behaviours, including drink-driving, drug-driving, driving an unlicensed vehicle and speeding.\(^62\)

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56 Hon Liza Harvey, Minister for Police, WA, Legislative Assembly, *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 18 February 2015, p289.
57 *ibid.*
58 *ibid.*
60 *ibid.*
61 Prof Max Cameron, Monash University Accident Research Centre, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 March 2015.
The Committee heard that there is a distinction between traffic law enforcement (which largely relies on general deterrence strategies) and non-traffic crime policing. Road policing focuses on detecting and deterring behaviours associated with risk, such as the risk of being involved in a crash. It does not, however, necessarily influence behaviours directly resulting in harm to people or property.

Non-traffic crime policing on the other hand is aimed at offences that generally involve behaviours directly resulting in harm to individuals or property (except in so-called “victimless” crimes).

The Committee heard that effective traffic policing must involve both covert and overt operations. Traffic law enforcement operations must be “sufficiently intensive, unpredictable in nature and conducted as widely as possible across the road network” to increase the perceived and actual risk of detection.

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63 Prof Max Cameron, Monash University Accident Research Centre, Transcript of Evidence, 25 March 2015.
65 ibid.
66 Prof Max Cameron, Monash University Accident Research Centre, Transcript of Evidence, 25 March 2015.
2.4.3 Road policing in WA

According to WA Police “…most traffic enforcement is undertaken by specialist traffic police attached to the local district traffic office or from units within State Traffic Operations, such as the Traffic Enforcement Group (TEG)”. 68

Road policing in WA has been guided by the Road Policing Strategy 2011-2014, which superseded the Traffic Policing Strategy 2008-2010. The Strategy (now expired) states that:

…the through WA Police efforts, road users will be made accountable for any unlawful road-user behaviour, anywhere and at any time. 69

The Road Policing Strategy identifies three objectives which WA Police are guided by:

- enforcement of traffic laws;
- targeting unsafe road user behaviour; and
- building road policing capability.

A new draft strategy is currently being contemplated by the board within WA Police as a matter of priority, according to Assistant Commissioner (Traffic and Emergency Response) Nick Anticich. 70

Finding 1
WA Police does not have a current Road Policing Strategy in place.

The Committee was advised that within State Traffic there are 540 personnel71 (constituting around 10 per cent of the WA Police workforce) who work across the various dimensions of traffic enforcement. Of this number, 230 sworn officers are employed in the Traffic Enforcement Group (TEG) and a small number are employed in other units. Unsworn officers are employed in areas such as camera operations and the Infringement Management Office. 72

Conducting RBTs to detect alcohol and illicit drugs is a major activity for the traffic command. WA Police has a target of one million RBTs per year, according to Deputy

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70 Mr Nick Anticich, Assistant Commissioner Traffic and Emergency Response, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 3 March 2015.
71 As at February 2015.
Commissioner Stephen Brown. In 2013 police conducted 1,130,519 random and preliminary tests, with 1,089,757 tests conducted in 2014.

According to the Office of Road Safety, this equates to roughly 0.66 tests per driver (or around two for every three licensed drivers). The Victorian rate is almost one for every licensed driver.

A study led by Monash University Accident Research Centre researcher Professor Max Cameron has found that “general deterrence through the perceived risk of detection is maximised by operations that appear to cover broad areas and both minor and major roads ... are highly visible and test a substantial proportion of passing motorists”. The cost-benefit study found that breath testing rates could increase to 1.5 per licensed driver per year and remain cost-effective.

However, Mr Anticich told the Committee that what police were doing currently was “more than sufficient”.

WA Police said placement of bus-based RBTs (“booze buses”) supported the strategy of general deterrence while more targeted car-based testing supported the strategy of specific deterrence. Determining where to conduct RBTs was based on a number of factors, including complaints from the public, the sites of fatal crashes (which might be linked to a specific drinking location), events likely to attract drinkers, and the practical considerations of where a bus could be placed safely and without causing congestion.

Since December 2014, the Minister for Police has announced a number of strategies aimed at reducing the road toll:

- a motorcycle safety review working group to assess motorcycle crashes from 2009-2013;
- the Regional Highway Safety Review (being trialed in the Wheatbelt), whereby representatives of road safety agencies travel notorious sections of highway and identify measures to improve safety;
- the purchase of four more speed cameras for the five fixed camera sites on the freeway and Roe Highway, which had shared one camera on a rotational basis.

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73 WA Police, Briefing, Operations Support Facility, Midland, 13 May 2014.
75 Mr Iain Cameron, Executive Director, Office of Road Safety, Letter, 6 March 2015.
77 Mr Nick Anticich, Assistant Commissioner Traffic and Emergency Response, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 3 March 2015, p20.
Chapter 3

Performance measurement

This chapter gives an overview of performance measurement, the role of evidence in evaluating police performance, and how it is applied in the context of traffic law enforcement. Performance indicators used by WA Police are outlined, as well as other measures used in assessing road safety effectiveness.

... well-designed systems of performance indicators are an essential part of holding the police accountable to government, civil society, and the public at large.

— Robert C. Davis, RAND Center on Quality Policing

3.1 What is performance measurement and why is it necessary?

MEASURING and reporting on the performance of public sector organisations is a well-established practice. Its importance increased during the 1980s and 1990s with a new style of public service (often referred to as New Public Management or NPM) which emphasised efficiency (doing more with less), better performance at the managerial level and increased accountability.  

The most commonly cited reasons for public sector performance measurement are:

- Accountability — being able to demonstrate to both the Parliament and the public (taxpayers) that funds provided by the government have been acquitted effectively and efficiently. Government agencies must be both financially accountable and accountable for program objectives.

- Transparency — ensuring the public availability of data that clearly shows the link between revenue and expenditure, and enables a comparison of planned and actual performance.

Performance measurement can also:

- Assist agencies to monitor their performance;

- Encourage improvements in service delivery and effectiveness;

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• Help to clarify objectives and responsibilities;

• Help governments to coordinate policy within and across agencies.

As noted in the National Commission of Audit’s *Towards Responsible Government* report published in 2014, while the private sector exists to maximise shareholder value (by satisfying the customer), the public sector aims to create public value – an outcome that is much more difficult to measure than shareholder value.

While “bottom line” financial accountability data can provide an indication of how well the government has managed public funds, it is not a measure of public value or public sector performance.

**Key Performance Indicators**

A common way to collect public sector performance information is by employing a set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). KPIs should provide a substantial overview of the operations and material expenses of the agency and its subsidiaries or related bodies.

In WA, public sector KPI reporting is based on a legislative and regulatory framework. KPIs must be submitted to and audited by the Auditor General, and be clearly identified in the annual report as the audited KPIs. Agencies are required to submit changes in outcomes, services and KPIs to the Under Treasurer for approval. This occurs during the budget process.

Compliance requirements on the creation and reporting of KPIs for State Government agencies are contained in Department of Treasury’s Financial Administration Bookcase.

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81 Ibid.


(FAB), under Treasurer’s Instructions. According to Treasurer’s Instruction 904 (Key Performance Indicators), KPIs should:

(i) be relevant - that is, logically related to the needs of stakeholders, and related to clearly defined agency-level outcomes and services that communicate what is to be measured and assist with resource allocation decisions;

(ii) be appropriate – that is, enable users to assess an agency’s performance; they should reveal whether an agency has achieved predetermined targets, trends in performance, and performance relative to similar service providers. Appropriate indicators “reduce the risk of distorting the incentives of agencies”, such as focusing on “a large number of less severe cases (e.g. health or criminal) where better results could be achieved by focusing on a smaller number of more severe cases”; and

(iii) fairly represent indicated performance – that is, be free from bias and be measurable so that they can be verified by independent experts.

The NPM focus on accountability has led to the development of performance measurement frameworks based around outputs (or goods and services provided) and outcomes (the effect of the goods and services provided). Agencies are required to create indicators to measure effectiveness for each outcome and efficiency for each output/service.

Key effectiveness indicators “provide information on the extent of achievement of an agency level government desired outcome through the delivery of a service or services; ... An outcome may be influenced by the services of a number of agencies, other levels of government and external influences such as cost pressures and demographic changes. Consequently, effectiveness needs to be reported with narrative and not simply in numerical form.”

Key efficiency indicators “relate a service to the level of resource input required to deliver it .... While the most common efficiency indicator focuses on financial resources,

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87 Australian Institute of Criminology, A tough nut to crack: Performance measurement in specialist policing, Technical and Background Paper 53, prepared by Zhivan Alach and Charl Crous, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 2012, p.3.

e.g. per unit cost and per capita cost, other examples could be improved service quality or timeliness.\textsuperscript{89}

Treasurer’s Instruction 903 (Agency Annual Reports) indicates that KPIs are to be reported on in an agency’s annual report. This section of the report should include (at least) a summary of actual performance relative to target performance. It should also contain an explanation of the results and describe the agency’s performance, including any material variations and the impact of any external factors.

Agencies are also at liberty to include other performance information, such as longer term trends and supporting footnotes, if considered useful in explaining the agency’s performance and financial results.\textsuperscript{90} In fact, this is something that has been actively encouraged, according to the Office of the Auditor General.\textsuperscript{91}

The Auditor General expects that annual reports will provide sufficient and clear information on KPIs to be useful to Parliament and the general reader.

\begin{quote}
They should clearly define the relationship between the KPIs, agency level outcomes and services, and government goals. Each KPI should be described and it should be clear how it measures performance against outcomes or services. The report should explain how the KPI was calculated, why a particular target was set and any material variance between expected performance and actual performance.\textsuperscript{92}
\end{quote}

3.1.1 Problems with performance measurement

It has long been recognised that performance measurement may result in “a concentration both on what is easily measured and what is susceptible to narrowly defined efficiency changes”.\textsuperscript{93}

It has also been suggested that performance measurement may be as much about appearances as about real improvement of performance, with organisations simply


\textsuperscript{90} ibid.

\textsuperscript{91} Mr Vincent Turco, Senior Director, Financial Audit, Office of the Auditor General, \textit{Transcript of Evidence}, 6 May 2015, p16.

\textsuperscript{92} Auditor General WA, \textit{Beyond Compliance: Reporting and managing KPIs in the public sector}, Government of Western Australia, Perth, April 2012, p15.

\textsuperscript{93} Australian Institute of Criminology, \textit{A tough nut to crack: Performance measurement in specialist policing}, Technical and Background Paper 53, prepared by Zhivan Alach and Charl Crous, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 2012, p4.
“dressing up” existing statistics as performance indicators, rather than developing specific frameworks.  

WA public sector KPI reporting was reviewed by the Auditor General in 2011-12 to determine whether agencies were making the best use of KPI information. According to the review, agencies often struggled to set well-based targets to measure against, and to make sure KPIs covered all areas of agency activity.  

Among the other findings:

- the one-size-fits-all approach of the outcomes-based and compulsory KPI framework might not be the most effective way for agencies to report on their performance. “In trying to meet the framework and report on outcomes, some agencies have ended up with KPIs that on the surface seem irrelevant or unhelpful. Such cases run the risk of reducing confidence in the overall KPI system.”  

- agencies struggled to provide information that could be easily understood by non-specialist readers, reducing the usefulness of annual reports for Parliament and the public.  

### 3.2 Measurement of police performance

While performance metrics provide some measure of the public value provided by police, efficiency is not the only criterion that the public uses to judge police performance. Citizens judge the success of policing strategies by their experience of crime, while politicians or the media may focus on cost or timeliness and the judiciary on reasonableness or process. Hence, there are a number of areas that performance measures could address and the selection could depend on who the police agency feels most accountable to.  

Australian policing has been influenced by the “new era” of policing in the UK and the US, emerging from the NPM style of management which placed more emphasis on police being accountable to the community and achieving government outcomes.

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96 ibid., p7  
97 ibid.  
The performance framework of the NPM approach required law enforcement agencies to set key objectives and to use relevant performance indicators as a basis for their organisational structures and for allocating resources.¹⁰⁰

The Operational Performance Review (OPR) system that developed from this – and has been implemented by most Australian police organisations – uses a method of measurement derived from New York’s renowned Compstat meetings.¹⁰¹ The high pressure Compstat meetings between executive police officers and commanders/regional superintendents monitor progress and performance in relation to the latest crime statistics. Strategies are discussed and targets are set for the next meeting. It is commonly described as a data-driven performance review process.¹⁰²

According to Fleming and Scott (2008), most Australian jurisdictions have aligned their OPRs closely with treasury performance reporting and the requirements of the Productivity Commission. The statistics collected for performance reporting – such as response times, reported crimes, arrest rates, clearance rates, traffic tickets issued and breath tests conducted – were used both for determining police operations and as a reporting mechanism.¹⁰³

Whilst Fleming and Scott’s (2008) review of police performance measurement across Australia is generally positive, they do caution that an OPR that looks at crime statistics alone may not be able to capture the activities that a police officer performs in the interests of creating a safe community:

*The purely quantitative data have to be supplemented with qualitative data. Qualitative data can reveal much of the process that is involved in effective policing. A closer link between output (for example number of arrests) and outcome (safe streets) is clearly important.*¹⁰⁴

But police organisations were still grappling with how to provide accurate measurements of their activities and achievements. While some Australian police services had tried to take into account more than simple statistical data and to “tease out the less tangible aspects of police work” in their application of performance management systems, in many cases it was used in a rigid and mechanistic way.¹⁰⁵

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¹⁰⁴ *ibid*, p329.
¹⁰⁵ *ibid*. 
A study of performance management in the WA Police in 2004-06 found that the existing approach did not adequately support agency outcomes identified in the strategic plan and related documentation and policies. If that was the case then, it may be even more now. At that time, WA Police reported on three outcome measures. Now there is only one, as documented in section 3.4.

3.2.1 Evidence-based policing and use of intelligence

While the terms evidence-based policing and intelligence-led policing are sometimes used interchangeably, one is a philosophy and the other a method. As Queensland-based police intelligence expert Janet Evans explained, evidence-based policing is a method which can be used (along with other methods) to carry out intelligence practice and assist in making decisions.

As Sherman (2013) writes: “In contrast to basing decisions on theory, assumptions, tradition, or convention, an evidence-based approach continuously tests hypotheses with empirical research findings.”

On the other hand intelligence-led policing is a philosophy which, if operating correctly, is integrated into every aspect of the policing culture. Intelligence-led policing involves the collection of raw information, which is then processed and used to inform decision making.

Australian police agencies have largely based their intelligence model – the Australasian Criminal Intelligence Model (ACIM) – on the UK’s National Intelligence Model (NIM), which provides a framework for assigning and managing policing priorities through Tasking and Coordination Group meetings. This is considered the most important aspect of the NIM as it articulates how intelligence-led policing can be implemented.

However, Evans and Kebbell (2012) have found that Australian agencies have adopted models such as the NIM in principle but less so in practice.

While it is apparent in the Australian context that there is high compliance to the generation of intelligence product, the product appears to not be routinely used for its designed purpose of assisting decision making. It has been argued that some of the reasons for this

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108 Ms Janet Evans, Intelligence Analyst, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015.
stem from a lack of organizational acceptance and philosophy of intelligence and the pervasive 'reactive' culture of police work.  

Intelligence was by its nature proactive, working towards disrupting or preventing future crimes. But measuring the reactive element of policing was considerably easier than measuring the success of proactive policing endeavours. In addition, the authors note that little time is made for evaluation “and police agencies frequently lack the skills for effective evaluation and fear that what they have done may not withstand scrutiny”. 

Intelligence and evidence-based policing overlap, in that data collected as part of intelligence gathering can be used in assembling evidence.

Evidence-based policing grew out of three strategic principles:

1. Police should conduct and apply good research to target scarce resources on predictable concentrations of harm from crime and disorder.

2. Once police choose their high-priority targets, they should review or conduct tests of police methods to help choose what works best to reduce harm.

3. Once police agencies use research to target their tested practices, they should generate and use internal evidence to track the daily delivery and effects of those practices, including public perceptions of police legitimacy.

These can be summarised as the “triple T” of targeting, testing, and tracking.

Police methods have also become far more subject to testing, with evaluation and debate over “what works” the core idea of evidence-based policing, according to Sherman. Increasingly, police have targeted their resources based on evidence of “large, predictable, and harmful statistical patterns” rather than on isolated cases.

3.2.2 Problems with police performance measurement

There is a substantial literature on the measurement of police performance, the breadth of which is reflected in Tiwana et al.’s (2015) annotated bibliography of more than 200 studies. Tiwana et al. note that while there is no consensus on what should be measured and how it should be measured, there is agreement that performance

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111 ibid., p84.


113 ibid., p379.
measures are a “potentially powerful policy instrument, with potentially tremendous impact on police work”.  

Whilst powerful, there is acknowledgement that the use of performance measures is problematic. Issues identified in recent studies collect around a number of themes:

**Police do not work in isolation:** It is difficult to isolate the contribution of police from the work of other agencies with whom they regularly interact. If performance outcomes are only linked to one organisation, frustration with the process may result. This issue is pertinent to road safety policing.

**Quantification:** As is often the case in other public sector organisations, police organisations have become focussed on tangible objectives which are easier to quantify and report on. KPIs which lend themselves most readily to auditing of efficiency and effectiveness are favoured. These measures are usually to hand and hence cheaper to produce (for example routinely-collected operational and administrative data). Police agencies were partly to blame, having readily embraced simple measures instead of “devoting the necessary resources to develop more rigorous, analytical and evidentially based frameworks”.

**Negative side-effects:** One of the side-effects of basing performance on things that can be readily counted rather than things that really concern the public is that resources may be diverted to meet “false targets”. A number of authors have documented evidence of manipulation of statistics and resources and even “perversion of practice” by police officers in an effort to meet performance targets or expectations.


Susceptibility to political influence: Fleming and Scott (2008) note that continued government funding for police is “at least in theory, dependent on results”. This affects the way measurement is conducted. According to Skogan and Frydl (2004), in the interests of image management, “governments are more inclined to accept what police do (outputs) as a measure of effectiveness than what they achieve (outcomes). Police are, after all, part of government, and therefore they share an interest in shaping appearances.” A national review of performance measurement in traffic policing noted how the publication of indicators provides transparency and helps raise standards, but at the same time can become a political exercise, potentially leading to distortions in data recording. It is easy to see how this might arise if police feel compelled to produce results which support a particular government policy or program.

3.3 Traffic law enforcement performance measurement

Whilst there is a considerable body of research on ways to increase the safety of roads and ongoing debate about the most effective methods of traffic enforcement, very little has been written about the way police measure traffic enforcement performance.

Similarly, the substantial literature on police performance measurement is largely focussed on crime policing and rarely mentions traffic policing, mainly because the rate of recorded and resolved crime has become the primary performance indicator for police around the world.

Nevertheless, many of the pros and cons of police performance measurement generally are applicable to traffic policing. Examining the way traffic enforcement performance is measured in other jurisdictions is also instructive.

In 2006 the Australasian Traffic Policing Forum published a study which reviewed and compared performance measurement models being used in Australasia and elsewhere in regard to traffic policing. It found that traffic policing performance indicators are used both strategically, as measures of the effectiveness of traffic policing, and administratively, as indicators of its activities and efficiency. Performance indicators

121 Australian Institute of Criminology, A tough nut to crack: Performance measurement in specialist policing, Technical and Background Paper 53, prepared by Zhivan Alach and Charl Crous, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 2012, p5.
used in traffic policing were seen as accountable, verifiable and easy to collect. They provided:

- intelligence for planning resource deployment;
- evidence of road user compliance levels;
- evidence of officers’ competence; and
- the enthusiasm and focus by supervisors and district officers.\(^{123}\)

Measures reported in police service annual reports for each State vary considerably. While NSW reports on only one measure – road fatalities per 100,000 people – Victoria, the Northern Territory and Western Australia do not include the road fatality rate as a KPI at all.

The number of measures reported range from one in New South Wales and WA to 19 in South Australia. KPIs typically include rate of injuries/people hospitalised following a road crash, the number of drivers detected exceeding the speed limit or alcohol/drug limit, the number driving without a licence, and in some cases self-reported measures (e.g. people who indicate they have been speeding, have been over the alcohol limit, have not been wearing a seatbelt).

### 3.3.1 Problems with traffic law enforcement performance measurement

Researchers note that a key challenge for measuring police effectiveness in enforcing lawful road use is that road safety is not completely within the control of police. Because road and vehicle engineering also play a critical role in road safety, it is not considered reasonable to fully attribute changes in the road toll only to the police.

As Southgate (2006) says, we cannot assume that policing outputs do in fact lead to road safety outcomes when other factors may come into play.\(^{124}\) This raises questions about who should be responsible for the road toll, and whether there is any value in using police traffic enforcement data as an indication of improvements in road safety.

However, if we accept the projection presented by the RAC that around half of those saved from fatal or serious injury over the life of the *Towards Zero* strategy (from 2008 to 2020) will be due to the two cornerstones of Safe Road Use and Safe Speeds\(^{125}\) – in which police enforcement has a primary role – then it seems reasonable to expect that police take some responsibility for the road toll.


\(^{124}\) ibid., p46.

\(^{125}\) Submission No.3 from RAC, 20 February 2015, p1.
Apart from this, there is long-standing evidence that seatbelt use, random breath testing (RBT) and speed cameras are factors in the decline in fatality rates nationally, – factors managed or enforced by the police.

There are known challenges associated with trying to measure the effect of RBT on drink driving and speed cameras on speeding. Firstly, using the percentage of drink driving charges as a measure is problematic, since a reduction in charges could mean either that fewer people are driving while over the legal limit or that police have failed to catch people driving while over the limit. An increase could mean simply that targeting has been successful, and not necessarily that more people are driving while drunk. The same logic applies to measuring drivers exceeding the speed limit, not wearing seatbelts or any other such traffic offences.

WA Police acknowledged this conundrum in its 2013-14 annual report, commenting on the meaning of an increase in the percentage of drivers who were found to exceed the lawful alcohol or speed limits:

> While such an increase is considered to be a positive indication of more effective road policing, it may also reflect an overall increase in unlawful behaviour due to population growth and/or cultural changes.

> Similarly, a decrease in the percentage of offending drivers may indicate that enforcement is having a positive impact on driver behaviour.  

Harrison (2003) notes that a different measure of drink driving will result depending on whether it is based on the numbers of alcohol-affected drivers on the roads (measured by RBT or by self-report driver surveys) or on the numbers of crashes involving drivers who have been drinking. Again, the same could apply to speeding, non-use of seatbelts and other offences.

Another challenge is that traffic law enforcement is essentially about deterring road users from engaging in risky behaviour, as outlined in Chapter Two. Road safety researcher Professor Max Cameron says that while crime policing is concerned with offences which directly result in harm to people or property, traffic policing is

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126 Submission No.3 from RAC, 20 February 2015, p1.
concerned with deterring behaviours that are risky (with the potential to cause harm) – which means convincing people that what they are doing is risky.\textsuperscript{129}

Hence, “it is important that all potential drink-drivers perceive that they individually run a risk of being breath tested at random on each journey, no matter whether or not they drive in a manner, place or time that is stereotyped as likely to involve drink-driving.”\textsuperscript{130}

Road safety research suggests that general deterrence strategies are the most effective for changing both drink-driving and speeding behaviour, because they have the potential to influence all road users. Specific deterrence strategies should be used to a lesser extent.\textsuperscript{131}

Measurement of effectiveness should therefore contain some way to determine whether behaviour change has taken place.

As Southgate (2006) notes:

\begin{quote}
First, the immediate cause of accidents is the attitudes and behaviour of road users; what policing can do is to help influence these, so that the link between policing and road trauma is a two stage relationship.\textsuperscript{132}
\end{quote}

But Southgate (2006) concedes that no one performance measure can capture all aspects of traffic policing, “and the things which clearly are important cannot necessarily be easily quantified – or even measured qualitatively”.\textsuperscript{133} For example, it was impossible to quantify the numbers of accidents which did not happen because they were prevented.

Performance indicators could lead to a focus on speed, drink driving and seatbelts to the neglect of other offences which were harder to measure – but even measuring these accurately can prove difficult, as discussed.

In their examination of the effectiveness of traffic policing in reducing traffic crashes, Bates, Soole and Watson (2012) conclude that police have been effective in reducing

\textsuperscript{129} Cameron, M., \textit{The role of traffic policing in road safety}, unpublished paper prepared for WA Police, April 2013.
\textsuperscript{130} ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} ibid., p42.
offence rates and traffic crashes. However, more scientifically rigorous research was needed to fully understand the impact of various enforcement operations.  

3.4 How does WA Police measure its performance?

As a State Government agency, WA Police is required to report its activity in an annual report, which is based on its KPIs.

At a meeting with WA Police personnel in May 2011, the Office of the Auditor General suggested that WA Police review its traffic law enforcement KPIs because of concerns that other factors also impacted the agency desired outcome. Following further consultation with the OAG, WA Police introduced a new suite of KPIs, taking effect from the 2014-15 reporting period.

**Previous traffic law enforcement KPIs**

Prior to 2014-15, “Lawful Road-User Behaviour” was listed as one of three outcomes. Two effectiveness KPIs were used to measure whether the outcome was being achieved:

- Percentage of drivers tested for drink-driving who were found to exceed the lawful alcohol limit.
- Percentage of vehicles monitored for speeding by speed cameras that were found to exceed the lawful speed limit.

The efficiency KPI was linked to “Service 7: Traffic Law Enforcement and Management” (one of seven services provided by the police service, as identified in the previous outcome-based management framework). The KPI was:

- Average cost per hour of traffic law enforcement and management

**New traffic law enforcement KPI**

The new KPI relevant to traffic law enforcement is:

- Percentage of traffic law enforcement contacts made by police officers that target “Category A” offences (including drink driving, exceeding the lawful speed limit, careless/dangerous/reckless driving, no authority to drive/unlicensed vehicle, use of mobile phones whilst driving, and non-wearing of seatbelts/restraints/helmets).

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135 Mr Colin Murphy, Auditor General, Letter, 22 May 2015.
Category A offences are ones which, according to evidence, have the biggest impact on road trauma and road deaths. Ninety per cent of the work of traffic officers focuses on Category A offences, according to the Police Commissioner.¹³⁶

According to WA Police, there are no further categories (i.e. category B or C).¹³⁷

A contact is a situation in which a police officer deals with an individual driver in person. This is apparently a “customer perspective” effectiveness measure, which (along with 10 others) feeds into the single outcome “Contribute to community safety and security”.

There are no efficiency KPIs specifically related to traffic enforcement in 2014-15. Efficiency will be broadly measured by:

1. Average cost of metropolitan policing services per person in the Perth metropolitan area.
2. Average cost of regional and remote policing services per person in regional WA.
3. Average cost of specialist policing services per person in WA.

Traffic enforcement is included in number three.

**Internal KPIs**

WA Police has an internal KPI and target associated with mobile speed camera operations. Operational mobile speed camera hours per month have been set at 3200.

The Committee asked for a list of all internal KPIs and this was the only one provided.

### 3.4.1 Other measures of police performance in relation to road safety

**Report on Government Services**

The *Report on Government Services* (ROGS), produced by the Productivity Commission, reports on the performance of public sector services across Australia, including police

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¹³⁷ Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Letter – Answers to Questions on Notice, 5 June 2015.
services. The stated primary purpose of the report is to provide comparative information about the equity, effectiveness and efficiency of government services, with public accountability a secondary (but important) purpose. It is released at the beginning of each year and published on the Productivity Commission website.

Police service performance is reported against four activity areas: community safety; crime; road safety; and judicial services. There is also a general section for performance across all police activity areas.

The ROGS compares data on road safety measures using data from the National Survey of Community Satisfaction with Policing (NSCP) as follows:

- **use of seatbelts**, defined as the proportion of people who had driven in the previous 6 months and who indicated that, in that time, they had driven without wearing a seatbelt;

- **driving under the influence**, defined as the proportion of people who had driven in the previous 6 months and who indicated that, in that time, they had driven when possibly over the alcohol limit;

- **degree of speeding**, defined as the proportion of people who had driven in the previous 6 months and who indicated that, in that time, they had driven 10 kilometres per hour or more above the speed limit.

For each state and territory, it also compares:

- the number of road deaths per 100,000 registered vehicles.
- the number of hospitalisations from traffic accidents per 100,000 registered vehicles.

**Road Safety Council reports**

One of the functions of the Road Safety Council (RSC) is to identify and recommend measures to reduce road trauma and to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of these measures. In August 2012, the RSC endorsed a more comprehensive set of Safety Performance Indicators which would report not only crash totals and behavioural causes of crashes but “seek to link interventions with results”. The indicators cover:

- Final crash outcomes in terms of reductions in killed and seriously injured (KSI);

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139 The 2013-14 figure was 4.9% in WA compared to the national average of 5.2%.

140 The 2013-14 figure was 8.1% in WA compared to the national average of 7.7%.

141 The 2013-14 figure was 59.9% in WA compared to the national average of 54.5%.
• Intermediate outcomes in terms of changes to mean travel speeds, enforcement hit rates, appropriateness of road and roadside infrastructure, community awareness of road safety messages and crashworthiness of vehicle fleet;

• Levels of effort and activity in program areas such as enforcement and education and road treatments. \(^{142}\)

WA Police (which is represented on the Council) provides the RSC with the data related to enforcement activity, including: \(^{143}\)

• Number of preliminary breath tests conducted in the metropolitan and regional areas;

• Number of preliminary oral fluid tests conducted in the metropolitan and regional areas;

• Number of charges preferred from breath testing conducted in the metropolitan and regional areas;

• Number of charges preferred from drug testing conducted in the metropolitan and regional areas;

• Number of vehicles monitored in the metropolitan and regional areas by fixed and mobile speed cameras;

• Number of hours fixed and mobile speed cameras are operated in the metropolitan and regional areas;

• Number of speeding infringements issued arising from vehicles monitored by fixed and mobile speed cameras in the metropolitan and regional areas;

• Number of contacts (i.e. charges laid and infringements or cautions issued) for failure to wear seatbelts/restraints;

• Number of contacts for failure to wear a motorcycle or bicycle helmet.

The Council reports quarterly on the Safety Performance Indicators for the road safety areas expected to contribute most to the overall reduction in road trauma.


\(^{143}\) G.E. Dreibergs, Deputy Commissioner, Specialist Services, WA Police, Letter – Answers to Questions on Notice, 18 March 2015.
Each year, as required by the *Road Safety Council Act 2002* and recommended by the National Road safety Strategy 2011-2020, the RSC reports to the Minister for Road Safety and the Minister tables the report in Parliament. The most recent report to be tabled is the *2013-14 Annual Report on Activities*.

**Road Trauma Trust Account project performance summaries**

Each year WA Police receives funds from the Road Trauma Trust Account (RTTA) for non-core activities. The agency is required to submit a quarterly project performance summary to the RSC which reports on progress towards performance indicators set out in the project application. This is another way in which WA Police can be held accountable for performance, although this information is not publicly available.
Chapter 4

Adequacy of traffic law enforcement measurement by WA Police

This chapter examines whether WA Police’s road policing and road safety performance measures are adequate, in terms of both measurement and reporting. Other agencies which report police performance are also covered. Issues which impact on the ability of police to carry out traffic enforcement effectively are also considered.

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Now they have moved to a KPI that I am sorry, I do not understand, or see its relevance to road trauma.

– Professor Max Cameron, Monash University Accident Research Centre

DISCUSSIONS of appropriate measures for assessing police traffic law enforcement generally revolve around the ways police detect and deter excessive speed and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This is because these are the traffic policing activities which consume the most resources and also because speeding and drink/drug driving are the behaviours which cause the most trauma on our roads.144

Hence, in the past there has tended to be a focus on measuring enforcement of these offences. But the intention of the new WA Police KPI is that it takes into account other safety risks such as not wearing a seatbelt, mobile phone use and careless driving.

Focussing on the number of contacts police make for these offences is said to complement the “anywhere, anytime” message that goes hand in hand with the strategy of general deterrence.

But can this one KPI really measure the effectiveness of this strategy, and how effective are other measures used by WA Police to evaluate traffic policing performance? Just as importantly, in the interests of transparency, how is its performance being reported?

The effective performance of police in regard to road safety is also influenced by a range of other factors outside of its control, and these are also considered in this chapter.

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144 Dr Sudhakar Rao, Director, State Trauma, Royal Perth Hospital, Transcript of Evidence, 11 March 2015; Cameron, M., The role of traffic policing in road safety, unpublished paper prepared for WA Police, April 2013.
4.1 Measurement of effectiveness

4.1.1 Internal performance measures

WA Police provided evidence of only one internal KPI (operational mobile speed camera hours per month) and as such the Committee is uncertain whether police sets its traffic officers goals to work towards, outside of the single corporate traffic policing measure. It may be that WA Police use traffic policing data to monitor performance, but it does not appear that this is formalised into any kind of measure.

Tasmania Police, for example, publishes a monthly performance report on its website, produced for internal purposes to measure the performance of its people, resources and systems. The report is made available to external stakeholders “as the figures contained may be of public interest”. The primary purpose of the report is “to measure internal performance, not provide official Departmental figures”.145

Fourteen pages in the Tasmania Police report are devoted to road policing tables and charts, including speed camera roadside hours, speed camera set-ups (number by speed zone, number of vehicles checked and percentage receiving notices), and random drug/alcohol tests by district. (See Appendix 6 for extracts from the report.)

Use of intelligence

The WA Police Road Policing Strategy 2011-2014 makes several mentions of intelligence and research. It says that the WA Intelligence Model (which is aligned closely with the Australasian Criminal Intelligence Model and is currently under revision) will be integrated into road policing –

".... through Traffic involvement with Tasking and Coordination Groups in all police districts, resulting in optimal use and application of resources (vehicles etc.), effective rostering and improved cooperation between the various parties involved in enforcement."

Having visited the Police Operations Facility and been briefed by intelligence and traffic enforcement personnel, the Committee was assured that this is being implemented. Traffic police seem to be effectively using intelligence products to direct operations on a day-to-day, week by week and month by month basis.

Information from various sources – such as Crimestoppers, the Police Administration Centre (which collects information about hoons, recidivist drivers, drink drivers and other offenders on the road), traffic counters, Main Roads crash data and the Incident Management System – are fed into a database which can filter and analyse the

145 Tasmania Police, Corporate Performance Report March 2015, Department of Police and Emergency Management, 29 April 2015, p(i).
information in various ways. The data is geocoded to produce “heat maps” which can graphically illustrate geographical hotspots for various offences.

This form of intelligence is regarded as tactical intelligence. Tactical intelligence involves collating and processing data from various sources to identify patterns and trends. This type of intelligence gathering originates with three level three\textsuperscript{146} analysts (unsworn) who work in the State Traffic Intelligence Planning and Coordination Unit (STIPCU).

The analysts can develop profiles of particular problem areas or people. These profiles are delivered to field intelligence officers (FIOs) who might set up a covert camera, for example, and build on the profile before passing it on to the Taskforce Nimrod staff who will conduct the prosecution.

A trend which cannot be managed by FIOs or Nimrod staff will be passed to other areas such as the local policing teams, gang crime or licensing enforcement, or to the State Intelligence Division (SID) office.

The tactical products from various areas inform operational decisions across the agency, and are eventually considered at the strategic level by the Operations Committee (chaired by Deputy Commissioner Brown) which sets traffic and crime priorities. Decisions about where the agency needs to target its efforts are communicated back to the Operational Commanders Group (of which the State Traffic Commander is a member) and that directs the activity of the various portfolios.\textsuperscript{147}

While it is easy to see how traffic police use intelligence to guide where and when they should target their traffic resources, the extent to which it guides longer term strategies is more difficult to determine.

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Taskforce Nimrod}\\
Taskforce Nimrod was created to tackle the rise in serious and fatal crashes. It focuses on recidivist offenders - those that drive without a valid licence, hoon, and people who repeatedly flout traffic laws and attempt to evade capture by trading demerit points or obscuring their number plates.

Police analysis showed that about a quarter of those at fault in fatal crashes from January to October did not have a valid licence and a third of them had at least one previous conviction for having no authority to drive.

Almost 70 per cent of those at fault in fatal crashes last year had two or more previous traffic infringements and in 85 per cent of those cases the penalties were for speeding.

In the first three months of its operation, the Taskforce has seized almost 300 vehicles from reckless or suspended drivers.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{146} Public service level.
\textsuperscript{147} WA Police, Briefing, 13 May 2014.
The Committee’s impression is in line with the research of Evans and Kebbell (2012), who interviewed intelligence agency directors across Australia and found that “intelligence products are not routinely used to guide decision making or further intelligence requirements”. 148

Intelligence analysts were often used in a support capacity rather than in a leading capacity, and directed to find the answer to one particular question, according to Ms Evans. 149

The fact that there are only three lower level intelligence analysts in the traffic department and one level five in a centralised intelligence analysis role is an indication that use of intelligence at a more sophisticated level than guiding the deployment roster is not considered a priority. The Committee was unable to verify how many intelligence analysts are employed in higher level roles across the agency, since WA Police was unwilling to disclose this information, describing it as operationally sensitive. 150

At the briefing, the Committee was told that intelligence analysts led the process of intelligence and perhaps even the thinking around it, but did not lead the operational decision-making itself. They were dealing with day to day prospects and could not wait a week or a month for the results of a study. The “analytical grunt” needed to be at the local level: what are we going to do today?

Ms Evans said that police officers in Australia had a very good understanding of intelligence-led policing, but getting the principles integrated into police work was very difficult unless it was supported at the highest level. 151

Intelligence units were often underrated. People who worked in intelligence were labelled the “broken biscuits” and there was a belief that you were moved to intelligence if you were “sick, lame or lazy”. 152 However, there is no indication that personnel deployed in this role in WA meet this profile.

State Traffic Command Inspector Ian Clarke said that traffic enforcement was one of the most intelligence-driven areas of the force and analysts were highly valued by traffic officers. However, he said more education would ensure there was a better understanding of its value in other parts of the agency. 153

149 Ms Janet Evans, Intelligence Analyst, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p8.
151 Ms Janet Evans, Intelligence Analyst, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p5.
152 ibid., p4.
153 WA Police, Briefing, Operations Support Facility, Midland, 13 May 2014.
Police from the intelligence portfolio said that a post-operational assessment of specific operations (such as Nimrod) was part of the intelligence cycle, but were vague when asked for examples of how such assessments had modified the way they do things.\textsuperscript{154}

WA Police has a history of commissioning research, with a long-standing relationship with C-MARC, MUARC and other university centres such as Edith Cowan University’s Sellenger Centre.\textsuperscript{155} But long-time MUARC researcher Professor Cameron said it seemed to make little difference to how traffic policing was conducted.

\textit{... in 2006 I was invited by the Office of Road Safety, in conjunction with the police, to develop a speed enforcement strategy. That is often referred to by the police, but when I look at what is actually being done, I have to say that I am disappointed. A key area was the escalation of mobile speed cameras with various forms of operation, depending on whether you were talking about Perth or rural WA, but that has hardly happened at all.}

\textit{I hear acknowledgement of the research, but I am sorry, I do not see action that is consistent with that research.}\textsuperscript{156}

This was not the case in Victoria, where a new drink and drug-driving enforcement strategy was “entirely consistent” with the research evidence put to Victoria Police. “I became more and more convinced that they really had been listening to us and really appreciated the research that we have done.”\textsuperscript{157}

Assistant Commissioner Anticich said WA Police had recently been in discussion with C-MARC to roll out a project to determine, firstly, whether WA Police are doing what they say they are doing, and secondly, to validate whether they are taking the right approach.\textsuperscript{158}

He said they had embarked on a significant campaign around research, recognising the need for scientific evidence to support what they were doing. Traffic was “quite intuitive” and everyone had a view about how to fix the problem (including police officers), but without proper verification this was nothing more than an opinion.\textsuperscript{159}

The Committee is left with the impression that while there is an appreciation of the value of evidence-based policing, there is simply not enough time and resources devoted to considering evidence properly. Management seems too consumed with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{154} WA Police, \textit{Briefing}, Operations Support Facility, Midland, 13 May 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{155} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{156} Professor Max Cameron, Monash University Accident Research Centre, \textit{Transcript of Evidence}, 25 March 2015, p7.
\item \textsuperscript{157} ibid., p9.
\item \textsuperscript{158} WA Police, \textit{Briefing}, Operations Support Facility, Midland, 13 May 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{159} ibid.
\end{itemize}
everyday policing demands to look at the bigger picture. More people employed in the research and intelligence areas might alleviate this problem.

**Finding 2**

Intelligence-led policing is well understood and tactical intelligence is used to guide traffic policing on a daily basis. However, opportunities to translate intelligence and evidence into strategic and policy changes could be further developed.

**Recommendation 1**

WA Police should ensure that it has sufficient staff in senior intelligence analyst roles in order to make the best use of intelligence and evidence in guiding traffic-related strategies. There should be a direct nexus between traffic enforcement tasking and research findings.

**4.1.2 External performance measures**

**The audited KPI**

The KPI that WA Police currently use to measure effectiveness of traffic law enforcement is:

\[
\text{Percentage of traffic law enforcement contacts made by police officers that target ‘Category A’ offences (including drink driving, exceeding the lawful speed limit, careless/dangerous/reckless driving, no authority to drive/unlicensed vehicle, use of mobile phones whilst driving, and non-wearing of seatbelts/restraints/helmets).}
\]

Category A offences are those which are regarded as having the biggest impact on road trauma and road deaths. Police will aim to ensure that 90 per cent of the contacts made by police officers are for these types of offences.

Contacts are situations in which a police officer deals with an individual in person, for example: stopping someone and administering a random breath test, pulling someone over for speeding, stopping an unlicensed vehicle, issuing an on-the-spot fine for using a mobile device while driving etcetera. The KPI does not include speed camera infringements issued by post, since these are not personal contacts.\(^{160}\)

The KPI is essentially a way of ensuring that the time traffic officers spend on patrol delivers the maximum benefit to road safety (without actually specifying how many hours this should be).

WA Police says it uses its KPIs for ongoing monitoring of performance to enable adjustments to be made throughout the year to meet outcomes. Data provided by the

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business intelligence area is discussed at monthly meetings of the corporate executive, according to the executive director. KPIs also had a role in resource allocation.\footnote{161 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p15.}

In reference to the above KPI, then, one would assume that if data produced at a monthly meeting showed that less than 90 per cent of the contacts made by police were for Category A offences, traffic police would be directed to spend more time pursuing those offences than the less serious ones. In this way the KPI does seem to be linked to resource allocation – if not necessarily increasing resources, then perhaps redirecting them.

The Committee notes that the number of on-the-spot fines issued by WA Police has decreased since 2012. By extrapolation (using the figure for the first quarter of 2015 as shown in Table 4) police could expect to issue around 110,000 infringements this year, compared to around 210,000 in 2012. The figures in Table 4 represent police contacts, and do not include speed camera or red light camera infringements.

Table 4: Number of on-the-spot infringements issued by WA Police for traffic offences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar year</th>
<th>Infringements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>193,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>210,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>182,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>159,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 (as 6 April)</td>
<td>27,476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WA Police says that the decrease in on-the-spot infringements should be considered in conjunction with the increase in speed camera monitoring hours, and suggested that the reduction in fines may be a result of increased public awareness of vehicle impoundments, instant disqualification notices and increased penalties for traffic infringement notices.\footnote{162 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Letter – Answers to Questions on Notice, 5 June 2015.}

The Committee suggests that another reason may be a lack of resources available to devote to traffic policing. If Category A offences are in fact being targeted (and police have indicated there are no other categories) then it seems there should be an increase in on-the-spot fines. If direct and personal contact with drivers is considered an important measure in traffic enforcement, then this decrease, not readily explicable to the Committee, is a matter of some concern. Could it perhaps be inferred that a fall in the number of on-the-spot infringements translates into a drop in road traffic hours by police? Or does it reflect a policy decision to move from general deterrence to specific deterrence?
WA Police executive director Anthony Kannis notes that the selection of the KPIs is a reflection of being “in a period where you cannot just continue to increase the patrol hours”, hence it was important to ensure “you are getting greater bang for your buck out of the patrol hours and the contacts”.  

In this way, the KPI seems to fit the description of an efficiency indicator (a measurement of outputs) more so than an effectiveness indicator (a measurement of outcomes).

The Committee acknowledges the ambiguity of the previous traffic law enforcement KPIs, and as such it is understandable that WA Police chose something they felt they could more easily measure.

“There is not a meaningful target or KPI that we can provide that demonstrates how we can affect (the road toll)... The best way that we can directly impact on the road toll is by targeting those offences, not just alcohol and speed, that create the greatest trauma.”

WA Police also did not want to include “something that we were not totally responsible for and could not totally influence” – a reference to the fact that the road toll is also influenced by factors outside police control such as the condition of roads and vehicle safety.

Unfortunately, while the KPI appears to be something that is measurable and has been endorsed as relevant and appropriate, it is not particularly meaningful. It is a KPI that seems to be more about business management.

In the words of the executive director, effective KPIs need to be “ones that we can manage to”. But the KPI does not really indicate whether the road policing strategies are effective. It does not tell us whether offences have risen or fallen, or whether the police are being effective in making the roads safer. It simply aims to ensure traffic police resources are directed to the most critical traffic offences.

As the literature discussed in Chapter Three tells us is often the case with police KPIs, this KPI is more of an output than an outcome measurement i.e. it measures a service provided rather than the effect of the service.

Unless this KPI is compared against killed and seriously injured figures, how can WA Police measure its effectiveness? If there are no KPIs which indicate whether public attitudes to speeding, drink driving, mobile device use, etcetera are changing, how can police monitor whether their road safety messages are having any effect?

163 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p6.
164 ibid., p9.
165 Mr Mark Stringer, Strategic Planning and Performance Analyst, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p12.
166 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p15.
Finding 3
It is difficult to define an effective measure of police performance. Accordingly, the traffic law enforcement KPI provides only a limited measure of the effectiveness of road policing.

Finding 4
There is some evidence to suggest that the perception of a police presence is an effective tool in modifying road user behaviour, hence the focus of the new police KPI on the number of contacts with road users.

WA Police has indicated that the new road policing KPI is what it wants to be judged by, but asserts that the removal of the previous audited KPIs does not change the day-to-day focus of police officers. “This is more us communicating to our stakeholders the things that we suggest they measure us by.”

Unfortunately this does not meet the expectations of advocacy groups, who have commented on the lack of road policing data available. This may be partly a consequence of the way performance measures are reported.

Other reported performance measures
The Report on Government Services (ROGS) was commissioned 20 years ago by COAG as a planning and evaluation tool for government, although it is now recognised that it also has a public accountability function.

The ROGS provides a comparison across the states and territories, promoting an understanding of strength and weaknesses of different approaches and (ideally) providing incentives for jurisdictions to improve performance. However WA Police is not held to account for its performance by the ROGS (or the Productivity Commission, which publishes it) in the same way as it is by its annual report.

The report contains some information on road safety that does not appear in the WA Police annual report, such as hospitalisations and use of seatbelts. Three of the measures reported in ROGS have appeared in previous WA Police annual reports (the proportion of people who indicated they had driven when possibly over the alcohol limit; the proportion of people who indicated they had driven 10 kilometres per hour or

167 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p11.
168 Submission No.3 from RAC, 20 February 2015; Submission No.4 from WA Police Union, 27 February 2015.
more above the speed limit; the rate of road fatalities per 100,000 people). Whether they will continue to appear is uncertain.

WA Police executives pointed out to the Committee a number of times that various road safety measures (particularly survey measures) appear in the ROGS, as if absolving themselves of the responsibility of reporting them. But public knowledge of the ROGS is likely to be small.

The ROGS asserts that it has a role in public accountability and transparency and makes a point of reporting its data in a way that is accessible to a broad audience, but it is difficult to believe that it would be accessed by anyone other than bureaucrats, politicians and researchers. Of course, it could be argued that the mere act of making it public (regardless of who views it) is sufficient to make government agencies feel somewhat accountable.

**Finding 5**

The Report on Government Services contains useful comparative data for government planning purposes but has less value as a way for the West Australian community to evaluate the performance of its police force.

**Recommendation 2**

The Report on Government Services should not be considered a substitute for thorough reporting in the WA Police annual report.

The Road Safety Council reports quarterly on a set of Safety Performance Indicators for the road safety areas expected to contribute most to the overall reduction in road trauma. WA Police provides data for this purpose. The indicators cover:

- Final crash outcomes in terms of reductions in killed and seriously injured (KSI);
- Intermediate outcomes in terms of changes to mean travel speeds, enforcement hit rates, appropriateness of road and roadside infrastructure, community awareness of road safety messages and crashworthiness of vehicle fleet;
- Levels of effort and activity in program areas such as enforcement and education and road treatments.\(^{170}\)

The Committee believes these are important indicators, but unfortunately it is not clear exactly where or how they are reported. The quarterly reports are presumably

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presented at meetings of the RSC but whether they are shared with anyone else is unclear. They do not appear on the RSC website.

The RSC annual *Report on Activities* does not report them either, except in the form of a dot-point summary (which barely changed between the 2012-13 and the 2013-14 reports). The only dot-point item related to police traffic enforcement (both years) was that enforcement efforts were having a positive effect on drink driving charge rates, with the number of breath tests rising and the number of charges laid falling.\(^\text{171}\)

The RSC says that it monitors police enforcement and crash statistics at its meetings (held almost monthly)\(^\text{172}\), but WA Police is not accountable to the RSC for its performance. It is only expected to account for the successful acquittal of projects funded by the **Road Trauma Trust Account** (RTTA).

WA Police submits quarterly reports to the Office of Road Safety (ORS), which outline performance against project KPIs created by the police when submitting RTTA project plan and fund applications. The indicators must meet the SMART criteria – that is, they must be Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound.

The Committee viewed the most recent quarterly reports for two RTTA-funded police projects: Enhanced Speed Enforcement Administration Costs and Increase Breath and Drug Testing.

Interestingly, some of the KPI targets for the Enhanced Speed Enforcement Administration Costs were different in the quarterly report (second quarter) to what had been proposed in the Project Plan and Fund Application. For example, performance indicator 4, “Percentage of detected red light incidents converted to infringements”, had a target of 80 per cent in the project plan and a target of 70 per cent in the quarterly report. Conveniently, this meant that the actual performance of 76.7 per cent now met the KPI.

The only explanation offered by WA Police was that “the targets were reviewed during negotiations between WA Police and the Office of Road Safety on available funding levels”.\(^\text{173}\)

The Committee has formed the view that some of the RTTA reporting KPIs may be arbitrary since they seem to be so easily adjusted. While they provide a measurable performance indicator for management purposes for the ORS, they do not necessarily measure effectiveness. Police have a target of a certain number of breath and drug

\(^{171}\) This assertion is problematical as the increase in volume of testing is not necessarily targeted and attitudinal surveys which would assist in interpreting the figures are no longer conducted.
\(^{173}\) Mr Craig Ward APM, Acting Deputy Commissioner (Specialist Services), Letter, 5 May 2015.
tests that need to be conducted each quarter for the Increase Breath and Drug Testing project. But how do police and the ORS know whether the RTTA funding for 20 breath and drug operations staff and additional hours for testing has actually achieved the project outcome of reducing the number of people killed and seriously injured in crashes resulting from impaired driving? Is the deterrence strategy (increased likelihood of being tested) paying off?

The project outcome for the Enhanced Speed Enforcement Administration Costs project is simply that infringement processing will be timely and accurate. WA Police is currently achieving beyond the target, with most infringements issued within 10 days and most speeding incidents converted to infringements. The contribution of this to road safety is less clear, and in fact has been questioned by bodies such as the RAC, which does not believe RTTA funds should be used for administrative purposes such as this.

The projects are then reported on in narrative form in the RSC Report on Activities. For projects which involve an intervention (for example increased breath and drug testing) there is no assessment of the impact on road safety, and this is probably not known. The summary of progress for the (discontinued) STEP program states that performance targets were exceeded but does not explain what these were.

Finding 6

Police-related performance indicators reported by the Road Safety Council and Office of Road Safety (in relation to Road Trauma Trust Account projects) do not provide a good indication of the effectiveness of the police in improving road safety. It is not clear whether post-funding evaluation is undertaken for Road Trauma Trust Account projects.

4.2 Reporting and publication of data

The only performance measures that agencies are required to report on in their annual reports are the audited KPIs. However, this does not mean that other intermediate performance indicators cannot be reported – and in fact, the OAG encourages agencies to do this.

WA Police says that even with the paring back of the audited KPIs, it will continue to collect the same data as it always has and will make this information available to the public on its website.174

However, there is a difference between publishing figures on a website and including the data in the annual report where some kind of analysis and contextual narrative is generally included.

174 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p9.
The question that might be asked is whether the omission of that data from the annual report renders it less important in the minds of the public. If the data is not presented as a key performance indicator, does this send a message that the police do not take these factors as seriously when implementing strategies for traffic policing? Perhaps more importantly, does it give the impression that police are hiding something?

Given that a key purpose of KPIs is to demonstrate transparency, the question of what data is made available to the public through the annual report and/or other means is critical.

WA Police acknowledges that a role of the KPIs is to inform the agency’s stakeholders about “how we are achieving or aiming to achieve the outcomes of government”, with stakeholders identified as the community, the media, parliament and the Minister for Police.

But in terms of road policing, WA Police has only one audited measure through which to convey its achievements. Unless it commits to providing additional unaudited information in its annual report, the ability to assess WA Police on its road traffic performance will be limited.

However, the judgement of the WA Police corporate executive, according to Mr Kannis, is that the annual report should refer to the formal KPIs, and that other information would not be included “to bulk up the annual report.”

This is counter to the recommendations of the Office of the Auditor General, which is that:

- ... this kind of information can go in the annual report of this or any agency as an unaudited KPI and still get the same level of exposure ... if something does not totally stack up for an externally audited KPI, we certainly do not encourage agencies to not report that information. So there is that next step down elsewhere in the annual report, which is open to scrutiny.

The Auditor General has expressed his concern regarding the narrow focus of the new KPI.

- We are yet to audit the new 2014-15 Police KPI ... however I am aware of the concern that the amendment to the KPIs has resulted in useful

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175 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p15.
176 Ibid., p4.
177 Mr Don Cunninghame, Assistant Auditor General, Financial Audit, Office of the Auditor General, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p11.
In its submission, the RAC points out that the traffic enforcement performance information in the annual report has declined in recent years and notes the loss of the statistical appendix.

It says that while the annual report continues to be a statement of WA Police’s financial position, it “is no longer delivering information that would allow a reader to gain a comprehensive understanding of traffic enforcement in WA”. 179 The RAC produced a list of information it believes should be published, including information about enforcement hours (traffic, RBT, drug testing, mobile, fixed and red-light camera operation hours) and more detailed information showing types of infringements and the role of speed, alcohol and other high risk behaviours in fatal crashes. (See Appendix 6 for full list).

WA Police advised the Committee that the following information from the RAC list is recorded but not regularly published: 180

- Traffic hours
- Random Breath Testing hours and deployments
- Random Drug Testing hours and deployments
- Mobile camera operation hours
- Fixed camera hours
- Fixed speed-red light camera hours
- Random Drug Tests
- Vehicle stops
- Speed, alcohol and other high risk behaviours in fatal crashes

Mr Kannis said that the road policing information relating to operations and outputs was released according to demonstrated need on a case-by-case basis.

The Auditor General advised that while most of the information suggested by the RAC did not meet the definition of a KPI under Treasurer’s Instruction 904, this did not prevent reporting in other parts of the annual report as “unaudited” information. 181

178 Mr Colin Murphy, Auditor General, Letter, 22 May 2015.
179 Submission No.3 from RAC, 20 February 2015, p5.
180 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Letter, 5 June 2015.
This is consistent with the advice of Tiwana et al. (2015), who advocate “making many contextual indicators widely available to promote transparency, comparison, accountability and communication, alongside a relatively small set of core performance indicators”.\(^{182}\)

**Finding 7**

The limited information presented in the WA Police annual report means that parliament, stakeholders and members of the community are unable to make an informed assessment of police performance in relation to traffic law enforcement and road safety.

**Recommendation 3**

WA Police should publish relevant and contextual road policing indicators in addition to the Key Performance Indicator in its annual report, in order to provide a more comprehensive account of its performance in relation to road safety. Relevant information is that which would demonstrate outcomes in road safety.

Another option, according to the Auditor General, is to report the other measures on the WA Police website “with appropriate contextual information including, for example, prior period comparative information”.\(^{183}\)

The WA Police website displays a fairly limited selection of traffic-related statistics. One page\(^{184}\) shows the fatalities and critical injuries (year to date) for the current and the previous three calendar years, as well as total deaths. There are also links to fatal crash statistics going back to 1999.

On a separate web page,\(^{185}\) road policing statistics for the previous five financial years are presented. These include the data previously reported for the audited KPIs (% of drivers tested who were found to exceed the lawful alcohol limit and % of vehicles monitored for speeding by speed cameras that were found to exceed the speed limit). Other data includes seatbelt contacts (briefs, infringement and cautions) and impounded vehicles. (See Appendix 6 for the full list).

This represents some of the data which the RAC suggests should be available to the community, but it still does not tell the whole road safety story. As the WA Police Union notes, the website information reflects the number of vehicles or drivers

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\(^{181}\) Mr Colin Murphy, Auditor General, Letter, 22 May 2015.


\(^{183}\) Mr Colin Murphy, Auditor General, Letter, 22 May 2015.


\(^{185}\) See [http://www.police.wa.gov.au/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qSpxEg3aoKs=&tabid=936](http://www.police.wa.gov.au/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qSpxEg3aoKs=&tabid=936)
monitored or tested for drink-driving, speeding, seatbelts and restraints and other traffic enforcement, but does not include specific infringement and conviction data.  

WA Police pointed out repeatedly to the Committee that despite the changes to the KPIs there has been no change in the data that is collected, and the Committee accepts this. The issue is with the accessibility of the data to the public and whether all of the data is made available to relevant stakeholders (such as the RAC).

WA Police maintains that it shares its data with Main Roads, the Office of Road Safety (ORS) and the Department of Health. Main Roads in turn shares that data with other groups (such as local government bodies) as part of an ongoing arrangement with the police. While the police used to provide monthly data to the RAC, it now provides quarterly data to the ORS which the RAC can access.

In recent times both the Road Safety Council (RSC) and the RAC have been dissatisfied with the provision of data by WA Police. In the case of the former, this was related to police providing data to the RSC which the RSC then used to question police performance in areas that are not funded through the RTTA (which the RSC oversees).

According to WA Police, it was not the RSC’s business to question police on statistics that were core policing activities (and hence the responsibility of the Minister for Police, not the RSC). The two parties had since come to an understanding that the police would provide data that is relevant to the decision-making functions of the RSC and that is useful in assessing the future directions of any road safety initiatives.

Mr Anticich said that police no longer provided data directly to the RAC because data production and reporting was a big draw on police resources and was becoming an onerous task, to which the RAC did not contribute. WA Police produced a plethora of reports which it had been rationalising over time.

The data available through the ORS website is contained in reports such as the Preliminary Fatal and Critical Injuries on Western Australian Roads 2014 Summary (published earlier this year), but this does not contain any road policing data. Web pages contain crash statistics showing demographic data, types of crashes and contributing factors to crashes (behaviours) within the various regions of the State, and

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186 Submission No.4 from WA Police Union, 27 February 2015, p12.
187 Mr Des Snook, Executive Director, Road Network Services, Main Roads Services Directorate, Transcript of Evidence, 25 February 2015.
188 Mr Nick Anticich, Assistant Commissioner Traffic and Emergency Response, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 3 March 2015, p14.
190 WA Police, Briefing, Operations Support Facility, Midland, 13 May 2014.
there are various statistics scattered throughout other pages on the website. But again, no road policing or traffic enforcement data are visible. Either it doesn’t exist or it is very difficult to find.

The information is not on the RSC web page either. The most recent RSC *Communiqué* (August 2014), which is essentially a record of the council’s most recent meeting, provides a summary of the quarterly progress report submitted by the ORS, but again this just documents the killed and seriously injured statistics.

The RSC annual report presents a table of KPIs which reports fatalities and serious injuries, people killed and seriously injured in crashes involving illegal behaviour (high speed, alcohol etcetera) and a number of other factors such as run off road crashes and crashes at intersections. This is in table form and there is no further analysis presented.

The RSC annual report also includes a section called “Evaluating and Monitoring the Effectiveness of Measures”, which sounds promising as a source of information on whether road safety measures (including policing) have been effective. But it only contains tables summarising the (on-time, on-budget) performance of RTTA projects and a summary of network travel speeds (derived from surveys of on-road compliance with speed limits conducted by Main Roads). In the 2012-13 report, this section also included the evaluation results of community education campaigns (mainly TV advertising campaigns).

If WA Police is providing the full set of data to the ORS on a quarterly basis, it appears that it is not automatically being shared. It is not clear to the Committee what data stakeholders are in fact receiving. While WA Police says it is collecting the same data it has always collected, it does not appear that all of the data is accessible to other groups (even via the ORS), and much less the public.

Even researchers at C-MARC are dependent on police for the data they need in order to conduct their research. Mr Anticich, who sits on the C-MARC board, said that so long as C-MARC projects were of benefit to them (the police), they were happy to commit resources to provide the data.192 Whilst “benefit” in this case was taken to mean “relevance to law enforcement and policing”, it is nevertheless worrying that researchers are at the mercy of police when it comes to accessing data for (independent?) projects.

RAC policy and research senior manager Anne Still does not feel that the RAC has access to enough information related to how enforcement translates into actual

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infringements or prosecutions. Data was critical to the monitoring strategy which underpins the Towards Zero safety strategy.

If you do not have the data, how can you be expected to make decisions about where to invest going forward? So, it is absolutely critical to have that information to know what is happening now, and then how any additional investment has impacted on road safety in the State.

WALGA also referred to a decrease in the availability of speed data and data showing hotspots. Local governments provide police with data from speed and volume classifiers (rubber strips across the road) that record the speed of all vehicles, but according to WALGA police said “they would not provide information back the other way”.193

Concern about access to data by stakeholders and interested parties is justified insofar as data assists in transparency of police operations and provides useful information for policy and operational decisions. Dutch road safety expert Fred Wegman cannot emphasise the importance of data enough in his 2012 report for the South Australian government, and suggests that “road safety data be made available to everyone (through the internet for example), paying appropriate attention to privacy issues”.194

The Committee has some sympathy with the reluctance of WA Police to commit to making data available which is difficult to collect or interpret. For example, traffic enforcement hours are difficult to measure because the meaning of a traffic patrol hour is subject to interpretation.

The capacity for us to actually accurately get data on where officers spend their time is very difficult.... Unless you have got an officer walking around each day with a button that says traffic or general duties or other things, you are not going to get to that point without imposing a significant administration requirement upon the officers.195

The OAG agreed that it could be challenging to report KPIs that rely heavily on an estimate by an officer of how much time they are spending on a particular type of service.196 Nevertheless, comparative data or trends (i.e. from year to year) might be useful in showing whether patrol hours were increasing or decreasing.

193 Ms Terri-Anne Pettet, WALGA RoadWise Program Manager, WALGA, Transcript of Evidence, 25 February 2015, p8.
195 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 3 March 2015, p14.
196 Mr Don Cunninghame, Assistant Auditor General, Financial Audit, Office of the Auditor General, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, pp2-3.
However, police management can track how traffic officers have spent their time to some degree. Traffic patrol hours are electronically recorded by WA Police in the metropolitan area (but not regional districts) using the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, which logs tasks and jobs attended by all police vehicles. We also know that breath and drug (BAD) bus officers were deployed to Sandstone to assist in a search for missing prospectors in April and to Northcliffe for a week in February to assist with the bushfire response. WA Police maintained that BAD bus personnel were only used for other duties on special occasions, but if sufficient resources existed it would be unnecessary to take one of only four of these special buses out of circulation.

The Committee was also told that of the 1000 CAD system tasks given to traffic officers per month, around half related to non-traffic jobs. While this represents only 1.75 per cent of non-traffic jobs, it does mean that traffic officers are not available for traffic duties.

Almost two-thirds of WA Police Union members believed they should be spending more time on the road performing traffic duties, but many said they were unable to do so because they were attending to administrative issues, did not have enough time in their work day, or did not have enough staff or resources.

In terms of the prosecution data which some organisations have requested, police point to the problem of determining what a rise or fall in prosecutions actually means (which was why the previous KPIs were replaced).

However, if WA Police only releases the data it thinks is reasonable and/or does not share data, this surely risks accusations of having something to conceal.

**Finding 8**

There is not enough information presented on the WA Police website and the websites of road safety organisations to enable parliament, stakeholders and members of the community to make an informed assessment of police performance in relation to traffic law enforcement and road safety.

An RTTA-funded project conducted by C-MARC in 2011 laid the groundwork for establishing a comprehensive statistical database which would collect and integrate road safety data from a range of bodies (WA Police, Main Roads, Department of Transport, Department of Health etcetera).

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199 *ibid.*
200 Submission No.4 from WA Police Union, 27 February 2015, pp3-4.
The Enhanced Road Safety Information System (ERSIS) would be accessed by key government road safety agencies and partners (including the RAC and WALGA) who would be able to provide a consistent response to public requests for information and requests by other Government agencies. The ORS had suggested that the online system also include a query tool designed for access by members of the public.  

Following on from this, in October 2013 a business case for the ERSIS was presented to the RSC which concluded that, despite in principle support, concerns about the cost and the “capacity of supporting agencies to prioritise resources” meant it was unable to support the project. Nevertheless ERSIS was listed on the RTTA 2014-15 budget as a new project, with an RSC recommended budget of $821,250. This was not approved.

Mr Anticich has expressed his disappointment that the database has been put on the backburner, since it would obviously ease the burden of data requests which WA Police currently has to manage.

It would also “facilitate all stages of road safety management including problem identification, monitoring of relevant trends and outcomes, selection, formulation and implementation of appropriate countermeasures and countermeasure evaluation”, assisting in the translation of Safe System principles into practice.

Such a system would include enforcement hours for specific traffic policing duties, as well as hours of general road safety enforcement delivered. The availability of such data through a system such as ERSIS would help end speculation about how police spend their time.

Making more information available – not less – would also give police a basis for countering common claims by the public that speed cameras are only located in places where they can raise revenue and that placement of breath and drug buses is only about meeting RBT targets.

Selling the message of general deterrence to the public is partly about education, and statistics which show, for example, that random placement of mobile speed cameras has an impact on the number of speeding drivers is a convincing way to do this.

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201 D’Elia, A. and Newstead, S., An Enhanced Road Safety Information System for Western Australia, Curtin-Monash Accident Research Centre, School of Public Health, Curtin University, September 2011, p13.
203 WA Police, Briefing, 13 May 2014.
204 D’Elia, A. and Newstead, S., An Enhanced Road Safety Information System for Western Australia, Curtin-Monash Accident Research Centre, School of Public Health, Curtin University, September 2011, p39.
205 ibid., pp12-16.
Finding 9
There is insufficient sharing of data related to traffic enforcement and road safety.

Recommendation 4
In the interests of public data sharing and transparency, the Enhanced Road Safety Information System should be established, and potentially funded by unallocated funds currently being held in the Road Trauma Trust Account.

4.3 Issues affecting the judgement of performance

There are a number of issues beyond the remit of policing which impact on the performance of WA Police in regard to traffic policing and road safety. Some of those issues are discussed here.

4.3.1 Lack of mandatory blood testing

In WA, whilst not mandatory, it is lawful for police to request that a driver or the person in charge of a motor vehicle gives a blood sample within four hours of having driven, or attempting to drive.206

Mandatory blood alcohol content sampling has been in place in jurisdictions other than WA, Queensland and Tasmania for many years.207, 208 According to Dr Sudhakar Rao, director of State Trauma at Royal Perth Hospital, WA is “completely out of step with most of the country”.209 South Australian legislation, for example, stipulates that blood samples must be taken from all persons (including passengers) who are 14 years or older and, as a result of a motor vehicle accident, have suffered an injury and attend at (or are admitted to) hospital for the purpose of receiving treatment for that injury.210

The Committee heard that proposed legislative amendments are being considered which would oblige doctors (and their delegates) to take a blood sample in road trauma patients in WA hospitals.211 The WA Police would take custody of the samples and would be responsible for liaising with the patient.

206 Road Traffic Act 1974, section 66 - Breath, blood or urine sample, police powers to require etc (WA).
207 Dr Sudhakar Rao, Director of State Trauma, Royal Perth Hospital, Transcript of Evidence, 11 March 2015.
208 Note that the resistance in WA was from the medical fraternity and this has been largely overcome.
209 Dr Sudhakar Rao, Director of State Trauma, Royal Perth Hospital, Transcript of Evidence, 11 March 2015, p2.
210 Road Traffic Act 1961, section 471, South Australia.
211 Dr Sudhakar Rao, Director of State Trauma, Royal Perth Hospital, Transcript of Evidence, 11 March 2015.
Dr Rao predicts that mandatory testing in WA would result in approximately 2000 more samples being taken per year.\textsuperscript{212} At present, the RPH trauma database records only voluntary admission by the patient, meaning that there is likely to be a “significant underestimation” of the prevalence of drugs and alcohol in road trauma in WA.\textsuperscript{213}

“We would like to see better systems that allow us to measure, quantify and record the type of drug, whether it is alcohol or any other type of substance,” Dr Rao said. “We do not have the ability at the moment to test every victim that comes through.”

Dr Rao said that having the extra level of data would enable trauma managers and researchers to compile evidence of whether a new initiative or piece of legislation was working “rather than have armchair experts who get up and say it does not work or it does work”.

A measured level rather than a “yes” or “no” response from a patient with regard to whether they had been drinking/taking drugs may show that even at lower levels there is still an effect on reaction time. This in turn could influence road traffic laws.

Any assertion by WA Police that they are making in-roads into drink/drug driving must be qualified in the absence of this data.

\textbf{Finding 10}

The inability to lawfully collect blood samples from road trauma patients limits the ability of researchers to accurately assess the impact of alcohol and drugs on driving impairment and road trauma. This is also an important measure for police in assessing whether drink and drug driving campaigns are effective.

\textbf{Recommendation 5}

That the Minister for Police introduces an amendment to the \textit{Road Traffic Act (1974)} to enable the lawful collection of blood samples from road trauma patients as a matter of priority.

\textsuperscript{212} Dr Sudhakar Rao, Director of State Trauma, Royal Perth Hospital, \textit{Transcript of Evidence}, 11 March 2015.

\textsuperscript{213} ibid., p2.
4.3.2 Insufficient funding

Inadequate resourcing has been implicated in the low numbers of drug tests being performed, the scaling back of community education campaigns and the suspension of community attitude surveys.

Number of drug-driving tests performed

The Australian Crime Commission has assessed that methylamphetamines poses the greatest threat to the Australian public of all illicit drug types.\(^\text{214}\) WA’s methamphetamine-usage rate is close to double the national average.\(^\text{215}\)

A recent report by C-MARC for the RSC found that nearly two-thirds of WA road fatalities during the period 2008-2012 tested positive to illicit drugs, with cannabis the most prevalent drug detected by WA Police, followed by methylamphetamine.\(^\text{216}\)

Researcher Professor Cameron spoke of an “escalation in drug-driving” in all Australian states\(^\text{217}\) and ORS executive director Iain Cameron acknowledged that there was increasing evidence that it was a problem in WA. He suggested that a “change in tactics” may be warranted, since the emphasis thus far had been on drink driving.\(^\text{218}\)

Mr Anticich said WA Police has “a realistic aspirational target of 10,000 drug tests in the metropolitan area and about 9000 in regional WA”.\(^\text{219}\) But an extensive review of drug driving enforcement in WA by Professor Cameron in 2012 concluded that roadside drug tests should be increased to between 90,000 and 160,000 tests per annum.\(^\text{220}\)

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\(^{217}\) Prof Max Cameron, Monash University Accident Research Centre, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 March 2015, p6.

\(^{218}\) Mr Iain Cameron, Executive Director, Office Road Safety, *Transcript of Evidence*, 23 February 2015, p6.


\(^{220}\) Prof Max Cameron, *Development of a strategy for enhanced drink and drug driving enforcement in Western Australia*. Unpublished report to the WA Office of Road Safety, 2012.
The evidence presented in the recently released C-MARC investigation also supports increasing the number of roadside drug tests among WA drivers/riders. C-MARC analysed WA Police records of drivers/riders charged with Section 64AC offences of the Western Australian Road Traffic Act (driving with prescribed illicit drugs in oral fluids) for the period 2008-2012.

The study found that the number of roadside tests remained relatively stable over the period 2008-2012 while the number of motor vehicle driver licences issued increased.

The Committee was told by police of some technical difficulties associated with performing drug tests, but is also concerned that a lack of funding for drug testing may be responsible for what it considers to be a low number of tests being performed.

WA Police applied to the RTTA for almost $12 million to fund the project Increase Breath and Drug Testing in 2014-15, and the Road Safety Council recommended this amount be granted. However, only $4.6 million was approved. (A similar amount – $4.7 million – was approved for 2015-16. See Appendix 7.)

They also applied for $842,832 for the Expansion of Drug Testing Capabilities but received only $576,832 (a lesser amount than in 2013-14). Funds allocated for this project in 2013-14 enabled the procurement of 20 Dräger Drug Test 5000 Analysers. It also provided for the training of police officers in the use of the new equipment, paid for related consumables, and covered the costs associated with analysis of positive drug tests by the ChemCentre. The amount approved for 2015-16 is $866,139, in line with the RSC recommendation. (See Appendix 7)

Despite being in their possession, WA Police was apparently frustrated by legalities and the new drug testing equipment could not be utilised until after the gazettal of the

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221 Palamara P, Broughton M, Chambers F., Illicit drugs and driving: An investigation of fatalities and traffic offences in Western Australia, C-MARC: Bentley, WA, November 2014.
222 Section 64AC offences specifically relate to the detection of three prescribed substances: THC (related to the use of cannabis), methylamphetamine (ice, crystal meth, crank) and MDMA (ecstasy).
224 Ibid.
225 Note that a 2009 review of WA drug driving laws (conducted following the 2007 amendment to the Road Traffic Act 1974 to provide for two new offences related to drug driving) found that the drug testing team was well-equipped and the drug testing bus was working as well as intended. Source: Woolley, J.E. and Baldock, M., Review of Western Australian Drug Driving Laws, CASR Report, April 2009.
Road Traffic (Drug Driving) Amendment Regulations 2014 which occurred in July 2014.\textsuperscript{227, 228}

WA Police was also allocated RTTA funds in 2013-14 for the continued employment of additional full-time police, recruited specifically for breath and drug testing operations and to manage the additional workload associated with this.\textsuperscript{229} This resulted in an extra 256,072 alcohol and drug tests being conducted by metropolitan and regional police districts and the Traffic Enforcement Group. A further 147,931 tests were undertaken by the breath and drug bus.\textsuperscript{230} Figures provided to the Committee by WA Police reveal that overall, 1,130,519 random and preliminary breath tests were conducted in 2013 and 1,089,757 in 2014.\textsuperscript{231, 232}

However, the proportion of these tests that are for detecting drugs is very small. During the period 2008 to 2012, WA Police conducted 43,176 drug-driving tests\textsuperscript{233} \hspace{1mm} (see Table 5). There have been suggestions that this is linked to the much higher cost of conducting drug tests,\textsuperscript{234} but the fact that the penalty for an alcohol driving offence is higher than for a drug offence has also been identified as a contributing factor.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Roadside Screenings} & \textbf{Section 64AC Offences} & \textbf{Offence Rate} & \textbf{Screenings\*} & \textbf{MVDL\textsuperscript{^b}} \\
\hline
2008 & 9325 & 21.6 & 307 & 3.3 & 32.92 & 17.89 \\
2009 & 7496 & 17.4 & 235 & 3.1 & 31.35 & 13.12 \\
2010 & 9711 & 22.5 & 331 & 3.4 & 34.09 & 19.73 \\
2011 & 7598 & 17.5 & 355 & 4.6 & 46.72 & 20.41 \\
2012 & 9046 & 21.0 & 496 & 5.4 & 54.83 & 27.64 \\
2008-2012 & 43,176 & 100 & 1,724 & 4.0 & 177.53 & 102.77 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Roadside Oral Fluid Sample Screening Tests for Prescribed Illicit Drugs 2008-12}
\textsuperscript{\* per 1000 oral fluid screenings undertaken; \textsuperscript{^b} per 100,000 Motor Vehicle Driver Licences issued in WA. Source: C-MARC report.}\textsuperscript{235}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{228} These issues were also canvassed in a recent Estimates hearing. (\textit{Transcript of Evidence}, Assembly Estimates Committee B, p42b-68a, 9 June 2015, p21.)
\textsuperscript{230} ibid., pp16-17.
\textsuperscript{231} Note that this data is preliminary and is subject to revision. Data sourced from TEACEIS on 12 March 2015.
\textsuperscript{232} G.E. Dreibergs, Deputy Commissioner, Specialist Services, WA Police, Letter – Answers to Questions on Notice, 18 March 2015.
\textsuperscript{234} Professor Max Cameron, Monash University Accident Research Centre, \textit{Transcript of Evidence}, 25 March 2015, p4.
Table 6: Number of roadside drug tests conducted per year (by State, 2013-14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number of drug tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>47,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria^</td>
<td>42,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>23,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>1,819</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2013-14 annual reports for the police services of each State.

^Note, Victoria announced in January 2015 that it would increase the number of drug tests to 100,000 per year by the end of October 2015.  

Once a driver is found to have exceeded the legal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit for their licence class, WA Police automatically exclude them from drug testing.  

As the C-MARC report explains:

This is because the penalty for an alcohol offence is greater than that for an illicit drug offence and secondly, because of the additional cost involved in drug testing the driver who is already subject to a penalty.

If indeed this is the practice of WA Police then it is likely that a high proportion of drivers who test positive for alcohol in a random breath test will have used an illicit substance, but will not be detected or charged by WA Police. This is concerning given that C-MARC’s evidence points to a “very strong association” between illegal BAC levels and illicit drug use in its latest study of fatally injured drivers.

According to C-MARC, Victoria Police has recognised this issue and plans to impose stronger sanctions for alcohol and drug-driving related offences, including a new offence for the combined use of alcohol and illicit drugs. Victoria Police also plans to drug-test the majority of drivers who test positive for alcohol – a practice which C-MARC recommends WA Police adopt, along with the “combined impairment” offence.

Finding 11
The number of drug-driving tests currently being performed by WA Police is lower than in other States and significantly less than recommended in drug-driving studies.

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238 ibid., pp68-69.

239 ibid., p69.

240 ibid.
Recommendation 6
That WA Police performs at least 90,000 roadside drug tests per year, as per the expert advice provided in 2012.

Recommendation 7
That more drivers who test positive for alcohol are also tested for drugs.

Recommendation 8
That the Minister for Police introduces amendments to the *Road Traffic Act (1974)* to:
- establish an offence for the combined use of alcohol and illicit drugs; and
- provide for drug driving to attract the same penalty as drink driving.

**Advertising campaigns and community education**

It has been established that advertising in conjunction with police enforcement builds on the perception of detection and the risks associated with drink and drug driving much earlier than would be achieved by enforcement alone.\(^{241}\)

According to the RSC, media expenditure was reduced pending the outcome of an independent review of the effectiveness of mass media campaigns.\(^{242}\)

In 2013-14 WA invested $1.7 million in road safety media campaigns funded by the RTTA (down significantly from the previous year) and in 2014-15 the budget for road safety community education was only $2 million. The executive director of ORS, which manages the community education campaigns, said there had been both a reduction in the budget and a requirement to cover more issues.\(^{243}\) The approved budget for 2015-16 has doubled to $4 million, but is still well below the amount spent by New South Wales and Victoria on road safety messages.

WA’s investment per capita is in stark contrast to the Victorian Transport Accident Commission (TAC) which invests more than double the WA amount\(^{244}\) (see Table 7). The TAC has applied significant resources to understanding what works in road safety advertising and why it works. It has identified that there is a commercially viable return on investment in reduced claims from road safety promotion.\(^{245}\)

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243 Mr Iain Cameron, Executive Director, Office Road Safety, *Transcript of Evidence*, 23 February 2015, p17.
245 ibid.
Table 7: Road safety spend per capita 2009-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Road Safety Spend $</th>
<th>Spend per Capita $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>7,218,500</td>
<td>8,931,000</td>
<td>$1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>5,537,900</td>
<td>11,361,000</td>
<td>$2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>4,476,700</td>
<td>2,931,000</td>
<td>$0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>1,639,600</td>
<td>2,203,000</td>
<td>$1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>2,353,400</td>
<td>1,975,000</td>
<td>$0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>21,226,100</td>
<td>27,401,000</td>
<td>$1.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Committee is concerned that the reduction in spending on road safety community education makes the job of WA Police more difficult, given that safe driving messages are not being broadcast to the same degree.

*In Victoria, there is a genuine desire to drive responsibly, and for two reasons. Firstly because the message is so broadly and frequently broadcasted in the public eye it becomes second nature, there is no avoiding the message. Enforcement comes a close second.*

— Tom Davies, Enough is Enough WA

Mr Anticich said that WA Police was not affected by the RTTA program cuts inasmuch as it runs its own road safety media campaigns with no money.

*We run a high-profile media campaign, albeit it is not funded and it is not paid for, but essentially it is trying to get messages out there... tragically it is often off the back of some disaster on the road.*

However, TV advertising campaigns such as “You Deserve It” and “Enjoy the Ride” have been shown to be effective in terms of awareness and message interpretation, and post-campaign evaluations provide an important insight into the public’s attitudes and behavioural intentions.

**Finding 12**

WA spends less on road safety advertising campaigns than most other states, leaving law enforcement to carry the burden of deterring risky driving behaviour.

**Recommendation 9**

The Minister for Road Safety must ensure that sufficient funds are allocated from the Road Trauma Trust Account to ensure well-designed and effective road safety education and media campaigns are able to be consistently implemented.

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248 Mr Iain Cameron, Executive Director, Office Road Safety, *Transcript of Evidence*, 23 February 2015, p3.
Community attitude surveys

While the advertising evaluations provide an indication of behavioural intention (e.g. after seeing “Enjoy the Ride” almost half said they were less likely to drive over the speed limit\textsuperscript{249}), they are not linked to actual behaviour and perceptions of road safety and police enforcement.

Community attitude surveys used to measure this, as well as other things such as the likelihood of being breath-tested and or having your speed checked at various times of the week.

But the ORS has not administered community attitude surveys since November 2011, when the contract expired and was not renewed. It was determined that the cost of the contract (up to $840,000 per year) would be better spent on other road safety

initiatives. While there is no legislative requirement for the community attitudinal surveys to be conducted, they had been carried out since March 1994.

ORS executive director Mr Cameron agreed that the qualitative information captured by monitoring the attitudes and behaviours of motorists was useful for the ORS and it informed and guided road safety campaigns.

...it is also important for us monitoring quarterly performance to know what the public is thinking. It is not the strongest measure. The strongest measures are things like alcohol-related crashes and things but it is another input to how we are going.

Mr Cameron confirmed that the ORS was in the process of organising a new contract and he hoped that the surveys would be reinstated “in the near future”.

The Committee supports the reintroduction of the surveys as a valuable evaluation and strategic planning tool. If, for example, the surveys showed that 80 per cent of people thought it was unlikely that they would be stopped for an RBT on a Tuesday night, it would be an indication that the “anytime, anywhere” message (and strategy) was not as effective as it should be. These surveys support what would otherwise be merely an assertion that drivers are deterred by specific enforcement actions at specific times.

In the absence of the WA driver attitude survey, the Community Attitudes to Road Safety (CAS) informs the ORS. CAS is an Australia-wide longitudinal study, now in its twenty-third iteration (WAVE 23, 2013), that monitors perceived and actual attitudes to a variety of road safety issues, evaluates specific road safety countermeasures, suggests new areas for intervention and identifies significant differences between jurisdictions. Given its broader scope, it does not provide as much data specific to WA.

**Recommendation 10**

The Western Australian driver attitude surveys should be reinstated as a matter of priority.

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252 Mr Iain Cameron, Executive Director, Office Road Safety, *Transcript of Evidence*, 23 February 2015, p3.
253 ibid., p16.
254 Mr Iain Cameron, Executive Director, Office Road Safety, *Transcript of Evidence*, 23 February 2015, p3.
4.3.3 Unallocated Road Trauma Trust Account funds

There has been considerable comment in the media and in evidence presented to this inquiry about the fact that not all of the funds held in the RTTA are allocated each year.

The RAC is not alone in its view that the money going into the account should be flowing out to road safety initiatives.\(^\text{256}\) WALGA was also disappointed that there was money sitting in the account, yet people were still being killed and seriously injured on the roads.\(^\text{257}\)

Road Safety Minister Liza Harvey said that the money would be allocated once the overhaul of the State’s road safety organisations – as recommended by the Browne Review – was complete. The money would likely be spent gradually, rather than in one “massive spending spree”, she said.\(^\text{258}\)

One of the recommendations of the Browne Review is that money held in the account be spent within two years of being collected.

Funding of $81,134,981 (including carryovers) was allocated to 45 approved projects in 2013-14.\(^\text{259}\) This increased to $107 million in 2014-15 and $111 million for 2015-16. But as of June 2015 there is still $80 million left in the account (see Table 8).

Table 8: Funds held in the Road Trauma Trust Account ($m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unallocated from previous year</th>
<th>Money from fines</th>
<th>Total available</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Unallocated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014-15</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015-16</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures sourced from Budget Paper No.3 – Economic and Fiscal and Outlook, 14 May 2015, p263.

Recommendation 11

That the unallocated money in the Road Trauma Trust Account be fully allocated to projects by the end of the 2017 financial year.

Who can access RTTA funds and how can they be used?

Currently only Road Safety Council (RSC) agencies are permitted to access RTTA funds. In practice this means that road safety community organisations, such as Enough Is

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\(^{256}\) Mr Will Golsby, General Manager, Corporate Affairs, RAC, Transcript of Evidence, 23 February 2015.

\(^{257}\) Ms Terri-Anne Pettet, WALGA RoadWise Program Manager, WALGA, Transcript of Evidence, 25 February 2015.

\(^{258}\) O’Connor, Andrew, ‘Speed camera revenue to be spent on WA road safety after overhaul: Minister’, ABC Online, 20 May 2015.

Enough WA or other relevant organisations that are not members of the RSC cannot apply.

As one of the agencies that sits on the RSC, WA Police is eligible to identify priority road safety initiatives that are “over and above” current core areas of responsibility, and apply for specific project funding from the RTTA.²⁶⁰

But there has been some debate as to what constitutes the core business of an agency. For example, some might argue that traffic enforcement is core to the business of policing, and that applying to the RTTA for funds for this purpose is “double-dipping”. But the WA Police executive director defended the practice, stating that:

... they were initiatives by the Road Safety Council to increase the effort in these areas on top of our normal business. This is the Road Safety Council agreeing that, over and above our normal business, this sort of money should be spent on this enforcement.²⁶¹

There are also differing views as to whether WA Police should be able to use RTTA funds for the administration costs associated with processing infringements. The police and the ORS justify it on the basis that the fund should meet the costs associated with the management of the enforcement process that raises the RTTA funds. WA Police executive director Anthony Kannis said that his understanding of the original intention of the fund was that the net revenue would go into the fund.

Peter Browne (author of the Browne Review) also did not see any problem with using the fund in this way, but the RAC and the RSC are both opposed, saying the funding of administration projects takes significant funds away

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²⁶¹ Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 3 March 2015, p12.
from road safety initiatives. Note, while the official RSC stance is to oppose this use of funds, the RSC chair was more equivocal:

\[ \text{I hear the argument, I hear the fact that people say that it is cost shifting—and the RAC have talked about that a lot—but, to my mind, the $9 million or $10 million that we spend on the back end is worthwhile for the return of over $100 million to spend on road safety initiatives.} \]

The RAC has called for safeguards and standards to be embedded into RTTA funding agreements so that the money spent is on road safety initiatives that are “over and above” what currently happens. This would ensure that RTTA funding is not substituted for standard annual agency budgets derived from consolidated funds.

**Recommendation 12**

That safeguards be put in place to ensure that Road Trauma Trust Account funding is not substituted for regular core government agency funding.

The Committee was also apprised of the RTTA-funded Strategic Traffic Enforcement Project (STEP) that provided for WA Police to undertake traffic enforcement “above baseline levels”. Subsequent to the project being approved and RTTA funds allocated, the Commissioner of Police ceased paying overtime to police officers who were engaged in STEP effective 30 June 2014. The RTTA STEP funds were returned to the ORS.

Mr Kannis explained the rationale behind the decision:

\[ \text{The position taken was that paying the officers overtime was not the best way of spending the Road Trauma Trust Account moneys, and we agreed that the money could go back to the fund so that the Office of Road Safety could determine a better way of achieving its objectives, through the sorts of examples you referred to earlier, such as} \]

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266 Submission No.4 from WA Police Union, 27 February 2015, p7.
It would be better spent on advertising than on officers being paid overtime to do more patrols.  

The Committee was told that police should aim for at least 1.5 tests per driver per year to act as an effective deterrent. Such a target should not be subject to the vagaries of budget negotiations whilst dipping into the RTTA for “core police business”. It is important the target be routinely met.

**Prevent Alcohol and Risk-related Trauma in Youth (PARTY)**

While it seems there was flexibility in the definition of “core business” with regard to police projects, this was not the case with Royal Perth Hospital’s award-winning PARTY program, which was ruled ineligible for RTTA funds.

RPH State Trauma program manager Maxine Burrell told the Committee that the program, which makes teenagers aware of the consequences of road trauma, could not be funded by the RTTA because it was seen as a core business of the hospital.

A 2012 study found that the PARTY program was a cost-effective way of modifying the behaviour of juveniles who had committed traffic-related offences and had been referred by juvenile justice court magistrates:

...attendance of the PARTY youth injury awareness program was associated with a change in the attitudes of the juvenile justice offenders about risk-taking behaviour and significantly reduced their subsequent risk of injuries and committing traffic or violence-related offences.

State Trauma director Dr Sudhakar Rao told the Committee that many of the participants of the PARTY program had provided positive feedback and valued the program.

Ms Burrell told the Committee that the program was so popular that sessions routinely booked up in advance and there was now a waiting list.

Royal Perth Hospital has been able to fund the PARTY program until June 2015, but funding arrangements for the hospital have been transferred to a Commonwealth

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270 Dr Sudhakar Rao, Director, State Trauma, Royal Perth Hospital, *Transcript of Evidence*, 11 March 2015.
system which does not cater for prevention programs, putting the future of the program in doubt.

While the rural extension of the PARTY program is funded by RTTA, the metropolitan program is not eligible. In 2014-15 the RTTA provided $118,000 to run the program in regional WA. This has been reduced to 100,817 in 2015-16.

**Prevent Alcohol and Risk-related Trauma in Youth (PARTY)**

PARTY is an award-winning injury prevention program that demonstrates to school children and young offenders the consequences of road trauma, within a hospital setting. It assists teenagers in making informed decisions about adopting behaviours and actions that minimise the risk of injuries to themselves and others. This includes risk-related driving behaviour such as impaired driving or driving without a seatbelt.

Royal Perth Hospital was the first hospital in Australia to introduce the PARTY program, which is based on a similar program in Canada. Since launching in 2006, more than 8000 teenagers have participated in the evidence-based program, receiving first-hand exposure to the consequences of trauma.

PARTY partners with St John Ambulance, Headwest WA, Paraplegic Benefit Fund, WA Police Juvenile Justice Team and representatives of a family impacted by road trauma. Participants visit the Emergency Department, the Intensive Care Unit and trauma wards. They speak to patients about their experiences and the impact that serious injury and long term rehabilitation have on their day-to-day lives.

Participants are also given the opportunity to use a wheelchair and crutches, giving them insight into previously unconsidered consequences of risk-taking behaviour.

The success of the program has led to the launch of regional PARTY programs in Bunbury, Denmark, Geraldton and Manjimup.

The Committee has received advice from the Minister for Health that funding has been secured for the metropolitan component of PARTY beyond June 2015. Details of how much and for long were not provided.\(^{272}\)

The Committee is relieved to hear that funding has been secured, but queries why such a successful, evidence-based program would not qualify for RTTA funds given the quantum in reserve.

\[^{272}\text{Dr Kim Hames, Minister for Health, Letter, 9 June 2015.}\]
Application process

Applications are assessed by the RSC on their ability to support the Towards Zero strategy, the total funding available and past performance. The RSC then recommends a budget to the Minister for Road Safety.

The current road safety governance structure gives rise to allegations of actual and perceived conflicts of interest. This is supported by the findings of the Browne Review.

There appears to be a lack transparency in determining which submissions are granted, not granted, or granted in part. No explanations are given as to why an application is unsuccessful. This lack of feedback makes it difficult for an applicant to improve its submission for future bids.

The Committee was also told that each year the RTTA application process was onerous and labour intensive.

The Committee is cognisant that some of these issues may be addressed in the changes to the administration of road safety in Western Australia announced recently by the Minister for Road Safety.

4.3.4 The role of local government

According to the WA Local Government Association (WALGA), local governments have an important role to play in road safety as owners and managers of an extensive road network, representing 88 per cent of WA roads. Almost two-thirds of serious crashes occur on local roads, therefore local governments have a significant responsibility for ensuring their roads are safe.

WALGA has expressed concern at the lack of traffic enforcement on local roads. Residential streets are now the scene of nuisance hoon activity – including speeding, excessive revving of car engines and loud tyre screeches and burnouts.

274 Peter Browne Consulting, A Review of Road Safety Governance in Western Australia, March 2014.
275 Professor Murray Lampard, Chair, Road Safety Council, Transcript of Evidence, 23 February 2015, p4.
276 WA Police, Briefing, Operations Support Facility, Midland, 13 May 2014.
278 Ms Terri-Anne Pettet, WALGA RoadWise Program Manager, WALGA, Transcript of Evidence, 25 February 2015.
Congestion on main thoroughfares has meant that “rat runs” have sprung up in the metropolitan area. These local roads have not been built to handle large volumes of traffic. This is likely to continue given that Perth’s traffic congestion is forecast to become the worst in the nation by 2031, according to Infrastructure Australia.\footnote{279}

However, as noted in an editorial in *The West Australian*, “the official focus is usually on highways and other major roads … the state of local roads — where most of us live and work — is often far from the minds of authorities dealing with how to spend money on road safety initiatives”.\footnote{280}

While the State Government allocated local governments $2 million in 2009 for the installation of speed humps and various road treatments in bid to combat hoon drivers and “rat runs”\footnote{281} (with varying success), WALGA says that local authorities would like to see WA Police take more interest in local roads.

A C-MARC report commissioned by WALGA in 2011 recommended a model for the participation of local government in the management of speed enforcement in WA in partnership with WA Police, which involved local governments supplying information on local area vehicle travel speeds for use by police in the strategic enforcement of speeding. Local government would report to WA Police only those roads where at least 15 per cent of monitored vehicles exceeded the posted speed limit.\footnote{282}

The partnership was seen as “offering a more formalised approach to the sharing and use of local area speed data to replace the ad-hoc arrangement that presently exists between some local governments and WA Police”.\footnote{283}

WALGA’s representative on the RSC, Cr Geoff Amphlett, said it was a successful initiative. Local governments reported roads which recorded a high number of speeding vehicles to police, who targeted the area. Cr Amphlett said feedback regarding trouble spots was then provided to the relevant council.

*That was great. That worked… Unfortunately, since about 2013 we have not been getting that feedback from the police, and that was the relevance of it, I thought.*\footnote{284}

\footnote{279} *Australian Government. *Australian Infrastructure Audit - Our Infrastructure Challenges, Infrastructure Australia, Sydney, April 2015.  
\footnote{280} Editorial, ‘Priority needed to fix dangers on local roads’, *The West Australian*, 1 September 2014, p18.  
\footnote{281} Hon Dean Nalder, Minister for Transport, WA, Legislative Assembly, *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), 19 May 2015, p3961.  
\footnote{283} ibid., p(xiv).  
The C-MARC report noted that WA Police did not consider that it had the physical and financial resources required to process and review the speed data supplied by local government and to deliver the required additional hours of speed enforcement on identified local area roads, but suggested the RTTA as a potential source of funding.\(^\text{285}\)

But WALGA has been largely unsuccessful in acquiring funds from the RTTA and receiving more funding for road safety would be local government’s number one wish, according to WALGA’s deputy member on the RSC, Terri-Anne Pettet.\(^\text{286}\)

WALGA saw communication with police as lacking, even though WA Police maintained that it had regular contact with WALGA, including an intelligence officer who consulted individual local government authorities.\(^\text{287}\)

If this is the case it is not something Cr Amphlett was aware of. He said WALGA executives did not meet with senior police to discuss road rule enforcement but he would welcome a police presence at City of Joondalup meetings, where he is a councillor.

*We have strategy sessions, and if the police could come and just tell us what they were doing in the local area. We did have a talk from the local policeman about the new community policing model that they were doing, and that struck me as being an ideal forum—if they could come in and tell the council where they were and what they were doing, because, I will say it again, one of the most common complaints we get is traffic issues.*\(^\text{288}\)

WALGA also partners with police and the community to improve road safety on rural and regional roads. Through the grassroots RoadWise program, WALGA encourages communities to focus on priority areas and strategies that will be effective in reducing road trauma. It does this through its Local Government and Community Road Safety Network, which extends throughout WA.

Officers coordinate 65 local road safety committees across the State, which bring together all the players in road safety at a local level to consider local issues and come up with actions that will address those issues (for example, the Driver Reviver campaign to combat driver fatigue).


\(^{286}\) Ms Terri-Anne Pettet, WALGA RoadWise Program Manager, WALGA, *Transcript of Evidence*, 25 February 2015, p11.


However, RTTA funding allocated to the RoadWise program was halved in 2013-14, which means that instead of having a road safety officer to serve each region of the State, one officer now services three regions. Ms Pettet said that the level of service that local governments and communities get from the RoadWise program has diminished.

Ms Pettet said RoadWise officers valued the local police input at road safety committee meetings, as did the local governments and the communities that they worked in. But the Committee notes that fewer meetings means less opportunity for police to be involved.

In 2013, WALGA commissioned an independent report to assess the RoadWise program and to measure the health of the RoadWise Local Government and Community Road Safety Network. The evaluation found that RoadWise was effective in engaging road safety stakeholders in the community and that it provided opportunities to facilitate community involvement in the implementation of the Towards Zero strategy.289

It is concerning that given such a high proportion of road trauma occurs in regional WA that, RTTA funding has been reduced or withdrawn from projects that have an impact on road safety in rural or remote areas – contrary to advice from the RSC.

In addition to RoadWise, WALGA cites the lack of funding for the Regional Run-off Road Crash Program for local roads and the School Drug Education and Road Aware (SDERA) programs as examples. All of these programs delivered road safety messages regionally.290

**Finding 13**

Police deployment and performance measures should take into account that almost two-thirds of crashes occur on local roads.

**Finding 14**

The WA Local Government Association (WALGA) saw communication with police as lacking even though WA Police maintained that it had regular contact with WALGA, including an intelligence officer who consulted individual local government authorities.

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Finding 15
That the findings of the Regional Highway Safety Review being undertaken jointly by the Office of Road Safety, WA Police and Main Roads be used to inform deployment of police in the regions.

Finding 16
WA Police are key stakeholders in road safety. However, in the absence of clear and unambiguous performance indicators, police are likely to be held solely responsible for matters that are the responsibility of others.

4.4 Discussion and conclusions

In a briefing with the Committee, senior members of WA Police indicated that they had been contemplating the question: What does success look like?

It is a critical question. Until WA Police defines what success should look like, it will struggle to find valid ways of measuring it. The Committee has formed the view that WA Police is still grappling with how it wants to define success in relation to traffic enforcement and road safety. It is a significant challenge.

The ultimate indicator of success is surely a fall in the number of people killed and seriously injured on our roads. But the police rightly point out that they are not the only government agency with responsibility for the road toll.

Perhaps figures that show whether there has been a change in road safety behaviour are a good indication of effectiveness. If so, effectiveness has been negligible. According to the RPH State Trauma director, there has been no change in some of the poor road user behaviour for the past 20 years.

I often joke that I can write the next 10 years’ reports. They are about the same, so about 10 per cent of drivers do not wear seatbelts; about 20 per cent of front-seat passengers do not wear seatbelts; up to 30 per cent of back-seat passengers do not wear seatbelts; about nine per cent of motorcycle riders do not wear a helmet; and anywhere from 20 to 30 per cent of cyclists do not wear helmets...

But he is aware of the challenges police face in trying to influence road user behaviour. Is it fair to judge them on this record?

The Committee’s views are outlined with reference to the three main questions outlined in the Chapter One.

291 Dr Sudhakar Rao, Director of State Trauma, Royal Perth Hospital, Transcript of Evidence, 11 March 2015, p12.
4.4.1 How does WA Police know if it is making progress?

While some other jurisdictions (and the ROGS) include road toll figures as KPIs, the OAG suggests that this would be a more appropriate measure for a coordinating agency such as the Office of Road Safety (or the new Commissioner for Road Safety). The Committee agrees that the road toll is not a reasonable KPI for police, given the complexities of joint responsibility, but it should still be included in and commented on in annual reports.

Interestingly, WA Police included a chart showing road fatalities per 100,000 people in its 2013-14 annual report, with an acknowledgement that “Ultimately, the outcome of lawful road-user behaviour should contribute to a reduction in road fatalities and serious injuries”. But throughout the Inquiry WA Police seemed to distance itself from effectiveness measures linked to the road toll.

The Committee does not believe that the single traffic enforcement KPI WA Police is currently using as an audited reporting measure is enough to provide an indication of effectiveness, nor is it a good outcome measure.

As Fleming and Scott (2008) noted, a closer link between outputs and outcomes was important when measuring police performance. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, governments were more inclined “to accept what police do (outputs) as a measure of effectiveness than what they achieve (outcomes)”.

This is partly because outputs are simpler to measure than outcomes, as suggested by Southgate (2006). While it is nine years since the publication of Southgate’s review of traffic policing performance measurement models in Australia, some of the statements made in the report still appear relevant. For example:

> Unfortunately, the relationship between enforcement activities (outputs) and accident reduction (outcomes) is not as direct as is often claimed or implied. First, the immediate cause of accidents is the attitudes and behaviour of road users; what policing can do is to help influence these, so that the link between policing and road trauma is a two stage relationship.

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The RAC concurs:

... to evaluate the impact on driver attitudes of community education campaigns on drink driving, the deterrence effect of enforcement and other attitudinal influences must be isolated and examined. In essence robust outcome monitoring, that identifies a causal link between activities and behaviour change, is critical to facilitating informed choices between alternate strategies and to enabling the more effective use of scarce road safety financial resources.296

WA Police appears to have fallen victim to the well-documented tendency to measure the thing that is most easily measured.297 The WA Police executive director acknowledged that the new KPIs dealt with “things we can influence”.298 It covered “the wider scope of things that can affect trauma” and that was the basis for its inclusion. For internal management purposes, other data would be kept, but this was not something they believed they should be measured by.299

By extension, this could imply that the police do not believe the attitudes and behaviour of road users is something they can influence. It may also give the impression that they do not want their performance on a range of traffic enforcement measures scrutinised.

A limited set of KPIs (one in this case) may also result in police officers being encouraged to focus only on achieving the KPI, a risk often raised in police performance literature and summed up by Fleming and Scott:

... as with the classic ‘teachers will teach to the test’, so police officers will tend to perform to an indicator that may distort the overall balance of their policing activities.300

Even if other internal measures are in place, do police place less importance on these than on the audited measure? If there is no KPI linked to a particular strategy (e.g. education campaigns) is there a risk it will receive less attention?

As outlined by Smith (1995), some of the negative effects of publishing KPIs are that agencies will: place an emphasis on the quantified elements of performance at the expense of other aspects; pursue narrow objectives at the expense of greater success;

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296 Submission No.3 from RAC, 20 February 2015, p6.
298 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p3.
299 ibid., p8.
pursue short-term success at the expense of long-term success; and emphasise measures rather than underlying objectives. In the Committee’s opinion, the current traffic enforcement KPI is at risk of realising all of these effects.

Police have participated in research projects designed to evaluate practices and interventions, and they indicated that they would be undertaking further evaluations. Studies such as those undertaken by C-MARC can provide valuable insights into police performance – but how police use it is another matter.

4.4.2 How does WA Police use performance information to guide its practice?

WA Police should be using its performance data to support the strategy of general deterrence. But the rationale behind general deterrence is not readily understood, both by the public and by many police officers. Both groups call for a higher police presence on the roads, but the aim of general deterrence is to create the perception of being caught “anywhere at any time” by random deployment of police traffic resources.

The goal of general deterrence is not necessarily to catch offenders, which introduces a potential conflict for police officers who may derive considerable job satisfaction from making an arrest. Professor Max Cameron noted that police officers who had been accustomed to crime policing may have difficulty adapting to the different way of measuring success in traffic policing.

Nevertheless, if general deterrence is well understood by officers at the strategic level, it should be possible to determine from the performance data whether the strategy is working.

The Committee is not convinced that this is occurring. Intelligence seems to be used effectively in everyday traffic policing (at the tactical level) but it is not clear that it is analysed at the higher level and applied to strategic decision-making. The Committee believes that WA Police does not yet know whether its traffic enforcement strategies are effective, in light of Mr Anticich’s comment that they were commissioning research to find out if WA Police were doing what they said they were doing and whether it was the right way to go.

More evaluation may also help WA Police determine the impact of the Frontline 2020 reforms on traffic policing. For example, is it better to quarantine traffic police or to allow local policing teams to conduct more traffic enforcement? The WA Police Union


302 Professor Max Cameron, Monash University Accident Research Centre, Transcript of Evidence, 25 March 2015, p3.
indicated that since the metropolitan policing districts had been combined (from seven districts into four) members considered them to be too large for traffic officers to effectively monitor. The majority of members also did not believe local policing knowledge was taken into consideration when determining traffic enforcement and road safety initiatives.

**Visible presence of police on our roads**

Opinion is divided on the value of a visible police presence on the roads. The community generally sees it as highly desirable, while police point out the difficulty of maintaining an effective presence. Some comments representing both points of view are presented.

**In favour:**

Our Members indicated that spending more hours on the road meant that police had a far more visible presence, which acted not only as a deterrent to those who were repeat traffic offenders or those considering committing an offence, but demonstrated to members of the public the important presence of police in the community. – WA Police Union submission

Whilst the use of cameras is an important enforcement measure, a shift away from traditional methods may reduce the deterrence effect associated with highly visible policing. – RAC submission

We need more Police and physical enforcement on the roads to encourage WA road users to do the right thing, and to catch those who simply aren’t. – Tom Davies, Enough is Enough WA

... nothing, I believe, has greater effect on the minds of people than when they see high-visibility road policing out there. – Professor Murray Lampard, Road Safety Council chair

**Against:**

While more police having a visible presence on our roads is certain to cause an immediate reduction in fatal and serious crashes, the reduction will only be temporary, lasting only as long as the increase physical presence of police on our roads is maintained. Simply putting more police on the roads is an old fashioned attitude that is not the only or even best solution in our times. – Bernie Masters, former MP, submission

... the realities are when you look at the size of our state ... in order to have a true high visibility, we would need hundreds if not thousands of police on the roads.... I think whilst the person sees the police vehicle and perhaps the behaviours are modified, there is every possibility that once they are outside of that range, perhaps their behaviour is not as good as it should be. What we do want to do and what we want to try to create, for example with our unmarked motorcycles, is the belief that any vehicle on the road could be a police vehicle. – Nick Anticich, Assistant Commissioner (Traffic and Emergency Response), WA Police

It is clearly a cost-effectiveness argument. We can do things much more cost effectively through automatic surveillance, especially in the case of speeding, than the cost of putting a policeman at the roadside. – Professor Max Cameron, road safety researcher

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303 Submission No.4 from WA Police Union, 27 February 2015.
According to road safety researchers, WA Police often do not act on the findings and recommendations of academic research. However, this may be because research is not delivered in a way that is useful and practical for police. Several researchers have acknowledged that research needs to be delivered to police in a more digestible form and that police should take more ownership of scientific research.

4.4.3 Do the reported measures give parliament, road safety stakeholders and the public an adequate indication of whether traffic enforcement is effective?

The short answer to this question is “no”. The accessibility of data is limited, and the reporting (by way of the annual report) has decreased in recent years.

The WA Police reported measures are few and the data provided to the public does not tell the whole road safety story. Road safety measures reported by other agencies are patchy at best in their ability to enlighten the public as to the effectiveness of initiatives and the impact that police may be having on our roads.

**RBT placement**

There is considerable public speculation regarding when and where “booze buses” are placed. There is a common community perception that RBTs are conducted at times of the day when there are unlikely to be many alcohol affected drivers on the road, leaving road users vulnerable to drunk drivers who are not being detected at other more critical times of the day.

A WA Police Union survey revealed that its members believed that:

“Many alcohol and drug testing activities are being conducted during the daytime in order to increase the statistics relating to numbers of drivers tested. Members indicated that testing was occurring in the middle of the week or in the middle of the day, when more vehicles are present on the road but fewer drug and alcohol affected drivers are likely to be using the road.”

There was also a perception that RBTs were avoidable by taking back roads, and Royal Perth Hospital State Trauma director Dr Rao highlighted evidence from South Australia which revealed that back road crash numbers went up 40 per cent after the introduction of RBTs.

However, WA Police policy, in line with the theory of general deterrence, is that in order to be truly random, RBTs should be conducted at any time of the day or week. Assistant Commissioner Nick Anticich said:

“It is not our intention not to catch people drink-driving, but rather our primary focus, and what it is that those buses are set up to do, is to get the message out to the general public that there is a likelihood that they will be caught for driving if they drink.”

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304 Ms Janet Evans, Intelligence Analyst, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p6.
Websites and reports either present much of the same limited data as police, or provide narrative without the support of evidence in the way of statistics and evaluations.

Given that there is no central repository for information and the data that is published is difficult to find, it is likely, as EIEWA representative Tom Davies notes, that “only those truly interested will ever go looking and find the various reports, statistics and information packs”. 306

Police performance researchers and the public sector auditing bodies seem agreed on the merits of reporting intermediate performance indicators alongside the KPIs, and of including narrative and not simply reporting in numerical form.

Others (e.g. Davis (2012)) also recommend including survey measures, since they are often easier to interpret than police data, which tends to focus on policing outputs. 307

Wegman (2012) and others emphasise the importance of making police performance transparent through the publication of data. The Committee notes that WA Police was reluctant to supply data to the RSC because the council might ask questions about police operations, and not just about the RTTA funded projects. But in the interests of transparency and accountability, shouldn’t the council, and for that matter the public, be questioning police operations?

4.4.4 A final word on the issue of responsibility

Road safety is without doubt the responsibility of multiple agencies. The Towards Zero strategy recognises this and the membership of the RSC reflects this. If the agencies themselves will not include the road toll as a performance indicator, should it be a performance measure for the CEOs of the relevant agencies?

Recommendation 42 of the Browne Review was that consideration be given to following the Victorian road safety model, in which CEO commitment to road safety is secured by requiring relevant CEOs to collaborate and to present to the Minister for Road Safety six-monthly reports on progress towards reducing road fatalities.

In the Western Australian context, the relevant CEOs were identified as the Commissioner of Police, the director general of Transport, the director general of Planning and the executive director of the Office of Road Safety (or the newly appointed Commissioner of Road Safety), and could potentially include the heads of Education and Health.

306 Submission No. 6 from Mr Thomas Davies, 13 April 2015, p1.
The ORS executive director and the Chair of the RSC agreed that CEOs should be held accountable for road safety, and the RAC outlined in its submission the need for KPIs to be held by the Minister for Road Safety and senior WA Police. However, when asked whether road safety was part of the Police Commissioner’s personal KPIs, the Committee was told that the Commissioner does not have a performance agreement.308

The other group responsible for road safety is of course drivers, as we are constantly reminded of by senior police and the Minister for Police and Road Safety.

Drivers are urged constantly to take more responsibility for their actions. After a particularly bad weekend on the roads in March 2015, the Police Commissioner was quoted in the media as saying he was “running out of ideas”.

This comment was probably made in exasperation, but if it is true it is truly alarming. Police should not be running out of ideas. Whilst road policing is a complex business and police work in a very challenging environment, it is not acceptable to keep blaming the public. This is a dynamic environment in which new research and technological innovations regularly offer opportunities for innovation and strategic refinement. There is a wealth of research on the psychology of road users, and instituting behaviour change is key. This is, as Professor Cameron notes, a police responsibility.

... in terms of short-term behaviour change, the police have a key role to play. I know that the government is looking at improving the road system and accelerating the availability of safer cars, but if you want short-term change, there are very few other known effective things you can do apart from appropriately managed traffic enforcement supported by powerful mass media publicity.309

308 Mr Anthony Kannis, Executive Director, WA Police, Transcript of Evidence, 6 May 2015, p13.
309 Professor Max Cameron, Monash University Accident Research Centre, Transcript of Evidence, 25 March 2015, p6.
Appendix One

Inquiry Terms of Reference

The initial focus of the Inquiry into Methods of Evaluating WA Police Performance was to investigate:

*Performance measures used by WA Police to determine the effectiveness of traffic law enforcement and road safety initiatives.*
Appendix Two

Committee’s functions and powers

The functions of the Committee are to review and report to the Assembly on:

a) the outcomes and administration of the departments within the Committee’s portfolio responsibilities;

b) annual reports of government departments laid on the Table of the House;

c) the adequacy of legislation and regulations within its jurisdiction; and

d) any matters referred to it by the Assembly including a bill, motion, petition, vote or expenditure, other financial matter, report or paper.

At the commencement of each Parliament and as often thereafter as the Speaker considers necessary, the Speaker will determine and table a schedule showing the portfolio responsibilities for each committee. Annual reports of government departments and authorities tabled in the Assembly will stand referred to the relevant committee for any inquiry the committee may make.

Whenever a committee receives or determines for itself fresh or amended terms of reference, the committee will forward them to each standing and select committee of the Assembly and Joint Committee of the Assembly and Council. The Speaker will announce them to the Assembly at the next opportunity and arrange for them to be placed on the notice boards of the Assembly.
## Appendix Three

### Submissions received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr Colin Scott</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Reece Waldock</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>Department of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Liz Carey</td>
<td>Senior Manager, Media and Government Relations</td>
<td>RAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr George Tilbury</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>WA Police Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Bernie Masters</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Max Cameron</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Monash University Accident Research Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Thomas Davies</td>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>Enough is Enough WA</td>
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# Appendix Four

## Hearings

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>23 February 2015</td>
<td>Mr Iain Cameron</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Office of Road Safety</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professor Murray Lampard</td>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>Road Safety Council</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr Will Golsby</td>
<td>General Manager, Corporate Affairs</td>
<td>RAC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ms Anne Still</td>
<td>Senior Manager of Policy and Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 February 2015</td>
<td>Mr Des Snook</td>
<td>Executive Director, Road Network Services, Main Roads Services Directorate</td>
<td>Main Roads</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cr Geoff Amphlett</td>
<td>WALGA State Council, Road Safety Council Member</td>
<td>WALGA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ms Terri-Anne Pettet</td>
<td>WALGA RoadWise Program Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 March 2015</td>
<td>Mr Stephen Brown</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner - Operations</td>
<td>WA Police</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Anthony Kannis</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Nick Anticich</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner Traffic and Emergency Response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Ian Clarke</td>
<td>Inspector, State Traffic Operations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11 March 2015</td>
<td>Dr Sudhakar Rao</td>
<td>Director, State Trauma</td>
<td>Royal Perth Hospital</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ms Maxine Burrell</td>
<td>State Trauma Program Manager</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 March 2015</td>
<td>Professor Max Cameron</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Monash University Accident Research Centre [via videoconference]</td>
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### Briefings

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<td>24 November 2014</td>
<td>Mr Stephen Brown</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner</td>
<td>WA Police</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr Jon Tuttle</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ms Tara Doyle</td>
<td>Acting Superintendent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Brad Royce</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May 2015</td>
<td>Mr Stephen Brown</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner, Specialist Services and Reform</td>
<td>WA Police</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Chris Hannan</td>
<td>OIC, State Traffic Intelligence Planning and Coordination Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Brian Hunter</td>
<td>OIC, Major Crash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Ian Clarke</td>
<td>Insp, State Traffic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Michael Peters</td>
<td>Supt, State Traffic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ms Narelle Woods</td>
<td>OIC, Breath and Drug Operations</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr Nigel White</td>
<td>Supt, Intelligence Operations - covert</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr Charl Crous</td>
<td>Commander, State Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Paul Steel</td>
<td>Acting Assistant Commissioner for Intelligence Portfolio</td>
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<td>Mr Craig Donaldson</td>
<td>Commander, State Traffic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Nick Anticich</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner, Specialist Services and Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Mark Gilbert</td>
<td>Supt, State Intelligence Services</td>
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<td>Mr Mick Emmanuel</td>
<td>Supt, Metropolitan Traffic Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Rick Corkill</td>
<td>Supt, Metropolitan Traffic Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Stephen Temby</td>
<td>Traffic Policy Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Tony O’Donoghue</td>
<td>Infringement and Camera Operations</td>
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## Appendix Five

### Acronyms

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<th>Description</th>
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<td>ANZPAA</td>
<td>Australian and New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Blood Alcohol Concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Community Attitude Surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-MARC</td>
<td>Curtin - Monash Accident Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COAG</td>
<td>Council of Australian Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIEWA</td>
<td>Enough is Enough WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERSIS</td>
<td>Enhanced Road Safety Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
<td>Financial Administration Bookcase</td>
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<td>FIO</td>
<td>Field Intelligence Officers</td>
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<td>KPI</td>
<td>Key Performance Indicators</td>
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<td>KSI</td>
<td>Killed and Seriously Injured</td>
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<td>MDVL</td>
<td>Motor Vehicle Driver Licences</td>
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<td>MUARC</td>
<td>Monash University Accident Research Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Intelligence Model</td>
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<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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<td>NRSS</td>
<td>National Road Safety Strategy</td>
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<td>NSCSP</td>
<td>National Survey of Community Satisfaction with Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAG</td>
<td>Office of the Auditor General</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OPR</td>
<td>Operational Performance Review</td>
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<td>ORS</td>
<td>Office of Road Safety</td>
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<td>PARTY</td>
<td>Prevent Alcohol and Risk-related Trauma in Youth</td>
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<td>PI</td>
<td>Performance Indicators</td>
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<td>Royal Automobile Association</td>
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<td>RBT</td>
<td>Random Breath Test</td>
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<td>ROGS</td>
<td>Report on Government Services</td>
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<td>Road Trauma Trust Account</td>
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<td>RTTF</td>
<td>Road Trauma Trust Fund</td>
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<td>SCRGSP</td>
<td>Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision</td>
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<td>SDERA</td>
<td>School Drug Education and Road Aware</td>
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<td>SDRM</td>
<td>Service Definition Resource Model</td>
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<td>STEP</td>
<td>Strategic Traffic Enforcement Project</td>
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<td>STIPCU</td>
<td>State Traffic Intelligence Planning and Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>TAC</td>
<td>Transport Accident Commission (Victoria)</td>
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<td>TEACEIS</td>
<td>Traffic Enforcement and Crash Executive Information System</td>
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<td>TEG</td>
<td>Traffic Enforcement Group</td>
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<td>THC</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Treasurer’s Instructions</td>
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<td>Western Australian Local Government Association</td>
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<td>WTP</td>
<td>Willingness to Pay</td>
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Appendix Six

Types of traffic enforcement data

6A: List of figures the RAC says should be available to the public

From RAC submission, page 5:

Publishing the following range of information in a consolidated and consistent form would be a significant step forward in the community understanding the nature and delivery of traffic enforcement. The information could include:

- **Primary enforcement inputs and activities**
  - Traffic hours,
  - Random Breath Testing hours, deployments,
  - Random Drug Testing hours, deployments,
  - Mobile camera operation hours,
  - Fixed camera hours, and
  - Fixed speed-red light camera hours.

- **Secondary enforcement output measures**
  - Speed- briefs, infringements, cautions,
  - Seatbelts- briefs, infringements, cautions,
  - Other traffic- briefs, infringements, cautions,
  - Mobile camera- vehicles monitored, exceeding limit, infringed,
  - Fixed speed camera- vehicles monitored, exceeding limit, infringed,
  - Fixed speed-red light camera- vehicles monitored, exceeding limit, infringed,
  - Non camera speed infringements,
  - Random Breath Tests,
  - Random Drug Tests,
  - Other preliminary breath tests conducted,
  - Vehicle stops,
  - Work orders issued, and
  - Impoundments.

- **Outcome measures**
  - Fatality counts and rate,
  - Serious injury count and rate,
  - Speed, alcohol and other high risk behaviours in fatal crashes, and
  - Driver attitudes as measured by National Survey of Community Satisfaction with Police Services (NSCSP) survey questions relating to speed, alcohol, restraints, and other behavioural variables.
6B: Data provided on WA Police website

Crash statistics
Provided for your information and to raise awareness in our community to the waste of our most valuable resource.

Fatalities (year to date) - as at 11:59pm, 18 May 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Metro</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>2015</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>26</td>
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Critical Injuries (year to date) - as at 11:59pm, 18 May 2015

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Metro</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>2015</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>107</td>
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<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>75</td>
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Total Fatalities and Critical Injuries - as at 11:59pm, 18 May 2015

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<th>Total Fatalities &amp; Critical Injuries (year to date)</th>
<th>Total Deaths for Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>153</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>170</td>
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<td>2013</td>
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### WA POLICE STATISTICS

#### Road Policing

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<td><strong>Drink-driving</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of preliminary breath tests</td>
<td>753,522</td>
<td>767,226</td>
<td>882,705</td>
<td>1,126,956</td>
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<td>Number of drivers who were found to exceed the lawful alcohol limit</td>
<td>19,339</td>
<td>17,117</td>
<td>15,217</td>
<td>13,456</td>
<td>11,670</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of drivers tested who were found to exceed the lawful alcohol limit</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Speeding</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of vehicles monitored for speeding by speed cameras</td>
<td>11,272,701</td>
<td>13,756,096</td>
<td>22,920,921</td>
<td>27,219,428</td>
<td>26,428,509</td>
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<td>Number of vehicles monitored that were found to exceed the lawful speed limit</td>
<td>1,814,478</td>
<td>3,593,065</td>
<td>4,242,424</td>
<td>4,416,267</td>
<td>4,491,144</td>
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<td>Percentage of vehicles monitored that were found to exceed the lawful speed limit</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
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<td>Number of vehicles monitored by traffic light speed and red light cameras that were found to exceed the lawful speed limit</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>1,042,153</td>
<td>2,292,100</td>
<td>1,851,923</td>
<td>1,099,685</td>
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<td>Non-camera speed contacts – briefs, infringements and cautions (BIC)</td>
<td>179,466</td>
<td>155,549</td>
<td>140,875</td>
<td>132,859</td>
<td>111,821</td>
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<td><strong>Seatbelts and restraints</strong></td>
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<td>Seatbelt contacts (BIC)</td>
<td>12,972</td>
<td>14,304</td>
<td>15,380</td>
<td>12,055</td>
<td>9,832</td>
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<th>2013-14</th>
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<td><strong>Other traffic enforcement</strong></td>
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<td>Other traffic contacts (BIC)</td>
<td>291,089</td>
<td>265,206</td>
<td>207,942</td>
<td>245,513</td>
<td>216,719</td>
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<td>Impounded vehicles</td>
<td>10,013</td>
<td>9,716</td>
<td>9,666</td>
<td>10,107</td>
<td>16,012</td>
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<td>Vehicle Compliance Notices</td>
<td>21,076</td>
<td>18,299</td>
<td>21,915</td>
<td>23,505</td>
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Available at: [http://www.police.wa.gov.au/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qSgxEg3aoKs=&tabid=936](http://www.police.wa.gov.au/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qSgxEg3aoKs=&tabid=936)
6C: Extracts from Tasmania Police Corporate Performance Report, March 2015

---

Road Policing

**TOTAL TRAFFIC INFRINGEMENT NOTICES (TINS) ISSUED**
(includes cautions)

Source: Fine and Infringement Notice Database

---

**TOTAL TRAFFIC INFRINGEMENT NOTICES (TINS) ISSUED**

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<th>DISTRICT</th>
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<td>CURRENT YTD</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>14,633</td>
<td>14,274</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>6,924</td>
<td>6,947</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEST</td>
<td>4,049</td>
<td>5,456</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
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<td>160</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASPOL</td>
<td>25,627</td>
<td>26,837</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Fine and Infringement Notice Database

---

**RPOS TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOUTH</th>
<th>NORTH</th>
<th>WEST</th>
<th>STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPEEDING TINS</td>
<td>11,879</td>
<td>4,592</td>
<td>4,754</td>
<td>21,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER TINS</td>
<td>1,715</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>3,933</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRINK DRIVING OFFENDERS DETECTED</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RANDOM BREATH TESTS CONDUCTED</td>
<td>98,791</td>
<td>58,006</td>
<td>38,763</td>
<td>193,542</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORAL FLUID TESTS CONDUCTED</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1,125</td>
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<tr>
<td>DISQUALIFIED/UNLICENSED DRIVERS DETECTED</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>1,703</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNREGISTERED VEHICLES DETECTED</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>1,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEHICLES CLAMPED/CONFRIGATED</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>110</td>
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</table>

Source: RPO1 Activity Report
### Drink Driving Offenders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOUTH</th>
<th>NORTH</th>
<th>WEST</th>
<th>STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Last YTD</td>
<td>1,099</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>2,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current YTD</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>1,508</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Drug Driving Offenders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Last YTD</th>
<th>Current YTD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>1224</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Both Drink and Drug Driving Offenders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Last YTD</th>
<th>Current YTD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEST</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Refused Breath/Blood Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Last YTD</th>
<th>Current YTD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Drink Driving Offenders: Occurrence Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Crash</th>
<th>Manner of Driving</th>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>Static Operation</th>
<th>Mobile Patrol</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>1,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>1,977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (all on page): Breath Analysis System
### SPEED CAMERA ROADSIDE HOURS

![Bar graph showing speed camera roadside hours](source: Speed Camera Setup Log Sheets)

### SPEED CAMERA INFRINGEMENT NOTICES

![Bar graph showing speed camera infringement notices](source: Fine and Infringement Notice Database)

**Note:** Includes infringements that are awaiting return of a Notice of Demand.

### SPEED CAMERA SETUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPEED ZONE</th>
<th>SETUPS</th>
<th>VEHICLES CHECKED</th>
<th>% RECEIVED NOTICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>369,785</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>855,618</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>197,925</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>193,214</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36,064</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>226,126</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>461,858</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>2,342,751</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Traffic Infringement Processing System

**Note:** Due to the time required to download sessions, adjudicate images and process infringements, data on this page may not be complete at time of publication.
6D: Extracts from community attitude survey, Oct-Dec 2010

Available from the Office of Road Safety website:
In Peel there is a reduction perceived in likelihood of speed checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Very / quite likely</th>
<th>Likelihood of having speed checked on a typical day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug '08 - Dec '08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perth Metro</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Southern</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SouthWest</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Belt North</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Belt South</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldfields Esperance</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberley</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MidWest</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gascoyne</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilbara</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GR85: On a typical day, how likely do you think it is that a driver will have their speed checked either by a hand held radar or multiradar?

Total declines in the number of self-reported RBTs is driven by declines in certain areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Yes</th>
<th>Breath-tested at an RBT in the last 3 months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug '08 - Dec '08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perth Metro</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Southern</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SouthWest</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Belt North</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Belt South</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldfields Esperance</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberley</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MidWest</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gascoyne</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilbara</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GR18: Have you been breath-tested at an RBT in the past 3 months? (wording changed from 12 months to 3 months in April 2010)
In Peel, perception that a driver will be stopped for RBT on a weekend night has increased

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Quite / very likely</th>
<th>Weekend night</th>
<th>Weekend day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 08 - Dec 08</td>
<td>Jan 09 - Dec 09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perth Metro</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Southern</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SouthWest</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Belt North</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Belt South</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldfields Esperance</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberley</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MidWest</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gascoyne</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilbara</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While perceptions of being stopped for a RBT on a week night has decreased in Goldfields Esperance and Gascoyne

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Quite / very likely</th>
<th>Week night</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 08 - Dec 08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perth Metro</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Southern</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SouthWest</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Belt North</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Belt South</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldfields Esperance</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberley</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MidWest</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gascoyne</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilbara</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

© Genesis 2011
- Indicates a significant difference to last rotation at the 95% confidence interval
The perceived likelihood of being picked up for not wearing a seatbelt on a typical day has decreased considerably for the second consecutive wave.

Knowledge of the penalties for not wearing a seatbelt remains low.
Appendix Seven

Road Trauma Trust Account project funding 2015-16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>Submitting agency</th>
<th>RSC recommendation</th>
<th>Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Intersection Crashes - State &amp; Local Roads</td>
<td>MRWA</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyclist Safety &amp; Urban Design Study</td>
<td>MRWA</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Intersection Crash Project</td>
<td>WALGA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional &amp; Remote Road Improvements - State &amp; Local Roads</td>
<td>MRWA</td>
<td>45,930,000</td>
<td>45,930,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety Performance Report &amp; Mapping</td>
<td>MRWA</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Run-off Road Crash Project for Local Roads</td>
<td>WALGA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase Breath &amp; Drug Testing</td>
<td>WA Police</td>
<td>4,736,813</td>
<td>4,736,813</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expansion of Drug Testing Capabilities</td>
<td>WA Police</td>
<td>866,139</td>
<td>866,139</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repeat Drink Driving Strategy Implementation</td>
<td>DoT</td>
<td>1,563,296</td>
<td>1,563,296</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy Vehicle Enforcement Program</td>
<td>MRWA</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Driving Education Campaign</td>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol Interlocks - Assessment &amp; Treatment Services</td>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>773,066</td>
<td>773,066</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electronic School Zone Sign Project</td>
<td>MRWA</td>
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<td>12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed Monitoring Project</td>
<td>MRWA</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Speed Enforcement Administration Costs- WAPOL</td>
<td>WA Police</td>
<td>7,834,231</td>
<td>7,834,231</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhanced Speed Enforcement Administration Costs- DOT</td>
<td>DoT</td>
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<td>WA Police</td>
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<td>2,251,825</td>
</tr>
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<td>Enhanced Speed Enforcement Program - Phase II</td>
<td>WA Police</td>
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<td>2,228,000</td>
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<td>DoT</td>
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<td>ORS</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Wide Road Crash Rescue Lithium Ion Expansion Tool</td>
<td>DFES</td>
<td>234,600</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Rescue Air Cache Expansion Program</td>
<td>DFES</td>
<td>392,000</td>
<td>392,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Responder Road Crash Rescue Manage Injuries Training</td>
<td>DFES</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project title</td>
<td>Submitting agency</td>
<td>RSC recommendation</td>
<td>Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informing &amp; Mobilising Road Safety Action</td>
<td>ORS</td>
<td>5,504,590</td>
<td>5,504,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Safety Community Education &amp; Engagement</td>
<td>ORS</td>
<td>4,050,000</td>
<td>4,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Safety Community Grants</td>
<td>ORS</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Safety Research Development &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>ORS</td>
<td>970,000</td>
<td>970,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Linkage &amp; Road Safety Analysis Project</td>
<td>DOH</td>
<td>334,750</td>
<td>334,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTY Program</td>
<td>DOH</td>
<td>100,817</td>
<td>100,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RoadWise</td>
<td>WALGA</td>
<td>2,074,992</td>
<td>1,541,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Aware</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>1,582,000</td>
<td>1,582,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Services</td>
<td>WAPOL</td>
<td>131,000</td>
<td>131,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Trauma Support Service</td>
<td>DOH</td>
<td>768,750</td>
<td>768,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA Injury Prevention aided by State Trauma Registries</td>
<td>DOH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neurotrauma Research Program of Western Australia</td>
<td>DOH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Road Safety Programs Expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>108,317,066</strong></td>
<td><strong>110,888,159</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>