

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND JUSTICE STANDING COMMITTEE

INQUIRY INTO THE PROTECTION OF CROWDED PLACES FROM TERRORIST ACTS



**TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE
TAKEN AT PERTH
WEDNESDAY, 20 JUNE 2018**

Members

**Mr P.A. Katsambanis (Chairman)
Mr M.J. Folkard (Deputy Chairman)
Mr Z.R.F. Kirkup
Mr A. Krsticevic
Mr D.T. Punch**

Hearing commenced at 10.54 am

Mr GRAHAM COLEMAN

Superintendent, Queensland Police Service, examined:

Mr DANNY BAADE

Head of Security, Gold Coast 2018 Commonwealth Games Corporation, examined:

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you for agreeing to appear today to provide evidence in relation to the inquiry we are conducting into the protection of crowded places in Western Australia from terrorist acts. My name is Peter Katsambanis, I am the Chair of the Community Development and Justice Standing Committee. I would like to introduce the other members of the committee. The Deputy Chair, Mark Folkard; member for Dawesville, Zak Kirkup; member for Bunbury, Don Punch; and member for Carine, Tony Krsticevic. It is important that you understand that any deliberate misleading of this committee may be regarded as a contempt of Parliament. You have agreed to provide evidence to the committee. Your evidence is protected by parliamentary privilege in Western Australia and protected by uniform defamation laws in Australia against actions in defamation; however, this privilege does not apply to anything that you might say outside today's proceedings. If in the course of the hearing you believe that some committee questions require answers containing sensitive or confidential information, you can request that the committee take that evidence in a closed session. You will need to explain briefly why you feel that it is necessary to close the hearing. If the committee accepts your explanation we will take your evidence in closed session and Hansard will continue to make a transcript, but the transcript will not be made publicly available unless the committee or the Parliament resolves to do so. And if we were going to go down that path, we would liaise with you. We would have a conversation; we do not want to have any surprises for anybody. Before I ask you to introduce yourselves, I should point out that at the moment, the hearing is being conducted in public and members of the public and journalists are present. Perhaps, that is one and the same. I would like to ask you to introduce yourselves for the record and the capacity in which you appear today.

Mr BAADE: Danny Baade, I am head of security for the Gold Coast 2018 commonwealth games.

Mr COLEMAN: My name is Graham Coleman, I am a superintendent for the Queensland Police Service. I currently am the program manager for games operations, so I am responsible for police planning for the 2018 Commonwealth Games until the end of next week, after that I will be superintendent in the security and counter-terrorism command responsible for policy and capability development.

The CHAIRMAN: Excellent. Thank you. Before we begin our questions, do you have any questions about the procedures today or your attendance before the committee?

The WITNESSES: No.

The CHAIRMAN: Did you have any brief opening statement you wanted to make or should we proceed to questions?

Mr COLEMAN: No, I think it is best if we proceed with questions so we know exactly what you are after from us.

The CHAIRMAN: A lot of focus on our inquiry has been around the interface between agencies such as yourself and the use of outside security, contracted security firms. In your experience in relation

to the Commonwealth Games, from each perspective, what were the issues that raised the most concerns for you in relation to the security that was offered at the games?

Mr COLEMAN: I will start, I think, because Dan has probably got more to say on this than I do. In my experience, generally, and then specifically with the games, when you are talking about our contracted security workforce, there is a very large margin of difference in the services provided and the quality of the services provided. We find, in the policing sphere in Queensland, that different events have different levels of contracted security and it really boils down to the company you do business with and the negotiations that take place in the planning stage with regard to roles and responsibilities and how well they are performed. That is a general comment from the police. As far as the Commonwealth Games is concerned, I think Dan is best poised to make comment.

[11.00 am]

Mr BAADE: For us, going on what Graham has just said, it was important for us to demonstrate that we were able to understand—my role was to put in mitigations against the risks and vulnerabilities that were identified by police. I used physical equipment like fencing and cameras et cetera and I also used a workforce. The key for us, and the learning out of it, which worked well for us, was being able to talk about risk ownership. Police owned a number of risks and other agencies owned risks, but we always make a connection between what we were asking the guard force to do and what the risk was and who the risk owner was so that we were able to keep the confidence of all people in that integrated approach. We used a couple of theoretical frameworks, which I will not go into, because it is not part of your question, but the key for us was being able to draw a line between the vulnerability or the risk directly to what the guard was being asked to do. So much so that when Graham was doing the venue tours, if he asked a guard what they were doing in a particular location, the guard should have been able to say, “Look, I’ve got this card that I know that I have to look at, but I can do these types of things in this location.” So they were directly linked to what the vulnerability was and how we wanted that guard to operate. The uniqueness of that is we maintained total control of the guard force. Essentially, we contracted four primes—four prime security companies—who had 66 sub-primes. But we contracted them to supply guard force numbers, not to control them. So we actually controlled the guard force with a range of permanent staff supervising the venues. That gave us the control and flexibility to move them around and also to have them trained and instructed on exactly what they were meant to do at the venue. That was a really big difference in the way we implemented it. We had total control of what we wanted them to do and we also implemented about 100 000 hours of training before they even started doing their work. Trying to keep that connection between what was a vulnerability or a risk, directly to what you are asking a guard to do, so that when Graham was out doing his inspections, he was confident the guards knew what they were meant to do and then on top of that, once we agreed on what we call the “quality of the treatment”, or the mitigation, we also put in a quality-assurance process where we were all checking on each of those performance criteria to ensure the guards were up to speed every single day.

The CHAIRMAN: With respect, there was a lot of media focus on perhaps issues relating to security at the games. Would you like to comment on that and perhaps to guide us as well —

Mr BAADE: I will go first. Graham is going to have something to say as well.

Mr COLEMAN: I was just going to make the comment that as members of Parliament you know you do not believe everything you read in the papers. We will talk about the issues and how they were blown up.

Mr BAADE: The first one, widely reported in the media, is up to 600 guards left. We flew home 130-odd guards that either we found unsuitable or they felt the work was not what they thought it would

be. We definitely flew home some guards and we expected that. Of the 4 000 guards that we needed for the games—we had additional guards outside the games venues, but of the 4 000 we needed inside the fence—3 800 of them were on the ground. What we experienced is that you always have an attrition rate. To get that number of guards we had nearly 8 000 guards in our pool of which we were able to accredit 5 000 of them. The attrition rate really kicks in there to make sure that you can get to the number that you need at games time. We experienced a secondary attrition rate when guards came to the coast and they indicated that they would work a set number of shifts—it might have been eight, 10 or 12, depending on how long they stayed—and we found that they really enjoyed the conditions of the Gold Coast. They enjoyed the beaches and the theme parks and we had a secondary attrition rate where they selected a couple of extra rest days than what they agreed to take. So we had an internal attrition rate. That certainly made it a challenge each day to keep everything going exactly to what our levels of service expected, but we achieved that. The media were able to get some guards and talk to them, particularly if they posted on a social media page and particularly if there was a negative comment that they made, and they were able to take those statements and make it sound like our entire guard force was marching out the door or in revolt. In actual fact, we achieved every single one of our performance criteria, particularly in regard to people getting access to the games. Our wait time at most venues was no more than four to five minutes, so that was exceptional. I will let Graham comment on the overall level of safety and security.

Mr COLEMAN: Again, from a policing perspective, the quality of the guard force is an issue, generally, not just for the games. And we certainly experienced during the games different levels of competency for the guards that were there. There were some exceptional, exceptional guards, very, very good at what they do, and then there were others who were not so good. A lot of the media reporting were around a couple of incidents—the social media post that Danny referred to. Another one the media made a lot of mileage out of was a couple of guys had worked a 12-hour shift, the bus was not there to take them home so they lay down on the grass under a tree and were getting some rest before the bus picked them up. It was reported that there was no accommodation and these blokes had to sleep in the park.

Mr BAADE: They missed the bus.

Mr COLEMAN: Yes, it really was that they had to wait for the next bus because they did not get out in time. Simply, the reporting did not reflect the issues that we had. Yes, there were some issues that Danny had during the event in relation to getting tier 1 security guards into some venues at some times. But we worked closely together; the police service in Queensland covered his shortfalls by relocation of resources on a short-term basis to cover when they were not there. That happened a little bit earlier on. Once we go into a rhythm and once Danny had the processes of managing these, particularly the interstate guards, in place, we were less and less having to assist him to cover-up any shortfalls. One of the biggest mistakes that we made—and when I say “we”, it is a conjoined mistake—was we came up with some above optimal figures for guards which needed to be at each venue at a particular time. And management in those venues were treating that number as the number they needed to maintain safety and security. That was not what was needed. We came up with a number, which if we had attrition or an issue, that would be sufficient, but on a situation where it was just day-to-day running the venue without threat, we would not have needed those numbers. Once we took the actual numbers away from the planning process and then started talking about safety and security and not the number of guards, we were actually much better positioned to continue to provide the safety and security regardless of the fact that the above optimal level that we said was going to be there, was not there, we could still provide the safety and security that was needed.

Mr BAADE: It is an interesting scenario in a games environment. You have to put in the maximum number, because of things such as catering—looking after a workforce, if you end up having the maximum there, you cannot have them turn up and then there is no food. So you essentially have to over-cater with your numbers just in case there is a heightened level of security. What Graham is saying is that we did not have that heightened level of security so we operated on the required number of guards. That was an important learning for us.

The CHAIRMAN: Just to clarify, you said you set a sort of optimal number or a maximum number. What process was utilised to set that number? Who set it? Was it the—I stumble across your acronym, but the GOLDOC, the Gold Coast Commonwealth Games committee, was it the Queensland police or was it a combination coming together; and, if so, if there was an agreed framework, was it under a memorandum of understanding? How did it come together from a supervisory point of view?

Mr BAADE: It was definitely a joint decision. All of the agencies and three levels of government, we operated on a national security overlay. We all came together to determine what was safety and security at a venue, what did it look like, both from a physical aspect and also from a workforce aspect. And then we combined our workforces on dock planning, so that we got an understanding of where they needed to be to get coverage. That was the first round and we planned at the highest level that we thought we would need under any circumstances.

Mr COLEMAN: Just to clarify, while the national security assessment level is at probable, we had planned to an expected level. We learned that out of the 2014 G20 summits where in September 2014, the ratings in those days were low, medium and high. It went from medium to high in September 2014, some seven weeks out from the leaders' summit in Brisbane. Luckily for us, at that point in time we had been planning to high, so for major events now we always try to plan for the next level up, so we planned to the expected level.

Mr M.J. FOLKARD: Thank you, gentlemen. Are there any changes with the standardisation of the licensing for the guards that did turn up? Were there any discrepancies on their actual licenced standards, for want of a better term? We know that licensed security guards, the standards for say the Northern Territory, are very different from here in WA, which I would suggest are very different from Queensland. Was that a problem for you?

Mr BAADE: It was not a problem in regard to the difference between the levels of training and standards of training between the states. I do not think that was the issue. I think it is more the issue that Graham pointed out, that there is a lot of really good guards out there but there are a lot of people who use the industry as a gap, a filler, for them. They might be short of money or they might be between careers, so they choose to be guards as a gap filler, and those people are not always as dedicated as someone who is using that industry as their primary income. I think that is really the issue—how dedicated the person is to being a guard—rather than what are the standards between states. Having said that, I think it is an obvious issue that the states should all be in line with each other, so that everyone has got the same standard of training and capability.

Mr COLEMAN: I think the nature of the question in the first instance talked about the liquor licensing requirements. If you did, or did I mishear you?

Mr M.J. FOLKARD: No, that is liquor licensing and licensing as such of the guards. There are two types of security guards. Obviously we have crowded places with our liquor license obligations and you have got static guards for buildings et cetera.

Mr COLEMAN: Danny's team negotiated with—what part of government here?—the office of gaming and liquor, in relation to the requirements around providing the appropriately accredited

security guards in the licensed venues. And the negotiation was around the fact that we had police in there as well as the security guards, but there was still a requirement to have the appropriately trained security guards around the licensed part of the venue. Whilst there was some negotiation there, and there was some reduction in the overall requirements due to having the presence of police, the requirement to still be appropriately trained was there.

Mr M.J. FOLKARD: Have I got it right that you are saying that you had to make some exemptions? Say, for example, you had a security guard who was licensed in liquor licenses and when he came to Queensland to apply his craft up there, you had to recognise the license or his licenses back in the other states?

Mr BAADE: That is right. We asked fair trading; we agreed on a mutual recognition agreement.

Mr A. KRSTICEVIC: Just on that same point, you have obviously got a process and standards in Queensland and if a guard came from say the Northern Territory, and they have got their processes and standards, but under your system, that guard would not be accredited, because your system—it may well be you have a higher benchmark or have a different system because obviously they are all different in every state—so, if they say, “Here’s an accredited guard”, in Queensland, if they came in off the street and wanted to apply, you might say, “No, that does not meet our standard.” Did you take that into consideration at all or did you not worry about the fact that they may have come from another state or territory, they may not meet the benchmark in Queensland; however, they have met the benchmark in that particular location so therefore we will take it as given that we will allow them to do the role?

Mr BAADE: The advantage we had was the workforce was significant so we were able to blend levels of skill, or what we thought was a different approach from another state, as you just pointed out. We always made sure that there were enough experienced people in Queensland regulations at all of the sites. We were able to track that with our onboarding database, so we were able to look at the skill sets of each person coming through.

[11.15 am]

Mr COLEMAN: But your previous comment was there was a negotiation with—what did you say?

Mr BAADE: The Office of Fair Trading, so liquor licensing.

Mr COLEMAN: Office of Fair Trading around recognising the skills then so that they could come in for this event only and their skills would be recognised or their licence or their qualifications from other states would be recognised. But as I understand, it was for this event only —

Mr BAADE: And then we gave them the initial training before they started with us. We covered off on human rights and liquor licensing and all those sorts of issues.

Mr A. KRSTICEVIC: I found this really was not so much on the skill set. It is more about the checks and balances for accreditation. For example, if they are from overseas, you might want to check their history from overseas. But another jurisdiction may say, “We don’t care about that. We’re not interested in that level of checking.” When someone applies to you, you might say, “We’re going to do these 30 checks before you can be accredited.” Another state might have only 15 checks before they get accredited and then they come to you and say, “We’re accredited here. We’ve done these 15 checks. Can we work here?” You say, “If you came to Queensland to live here and wanted to get a job, you would have to do another 15 steps. But you don’t have to do those 15 steps in this case; we’ll just accept it as given that those other 15 steps will be waived in this process.”

Mr COLEMAN: Let us talk about accreditation generally and not specifically for the security guards. The Queensland Police Service took responsibility for the background checking component of the

accreditation process. We were responsible for conducting background checks on about 87 000 or 88 000 people—that is family, workforce, the whole lot. Everyone went through the standard background check. The background check we did was in excess of what is required to get a security guard licence in Queensland. We gave a recommendation to GOLDOC through Danny's team saying whether we recommend for accreditation or recommend against accreditation. We have a "recommended against" rate of around 1.1 per cent, but in the security industry it was more like five per cent we recommended against. That simply shows that the level of background checking we did was certainly above what was done in Queensland. But I would suggest to you it was above what was done for any security guard licence across Australia. That was independent to this role, but that gives you an indication that it is 1.1 per cent of the entire population but five per cent for security guards, or thereabouts—rough figures.

The CHAIRMAN: You have done this extra level of checking. By what process did you determine that you required this extra level of checking? Did you conduct a specific risk management plan for the event that showed that you had a requirement for these higher standards? As you pointed out earlier, you itemised in your framework a threat level that is higher than the average Australian threat level. What process did you use to determine those criteria, which seem to be higher criteria than what are usually applied?

Mr COLEMAN: Going back to something Danny said earlier about the joined-up process of our planning, we had a security executive steering committee, which overviewed the security planning for the event. It was co-chaired by Danny and my boss, assistant commissioner Peter Crawford, and it was represented by the three tiers under the national security overlays—the event organiser, the jurisdictional police and the federal government agencies. Decisions in relation to what was accepted was passed to that committee and it was certainly verified by higher levels within each of the organisations. In relation to the accreditation background checking, there are three risk areas that we would look at. There is safety, there is security and there is reputation. The reason that we did a higher level of checking is not so much for the safety and security checks but it is the reputational checks. As a government, if we had a focus on outlaw motorcycle gangs and then we did a background check and it was never about your motorcycle gang, or that person may or may not have got a recommendation for accreditation based on their criminal checks but also on intelligence checks. So we have the reputational risk in as well as the safety and security. That is why it is a more difficult barrier to overcome for someone if they have to get through a police intelligence check as opposed to a police criminal check.

Mr Z.R.F. KIRKUP: Moving away from the guard force and the like that we use with respect to your subcontractor and security arrangements, we tend to look at the protective arrangements that were put in place. I know that you guys used anti-drone devices or something like that and I think it was quite widely publicised—I could be wrong—and some work in relation to biometrics and the like. I am keen to understand what that looked like for this event and whether that has been utilised subsequent to the event and what sort of use it was throughout the games.

Mr COLEMAN: Biometrics, so facial recognition, is in early stages of development. It followed on from a COAG decision in late last year—earlier this year in relation to the development of that process. It was not developed to its full potential, and as I understand is still not developed to its full potential, in time for the games. We did use a limited band of the national capability that is being used as well as some local capability. But as I said, that capability is still in development and I think, from my very limited knowledge of it, it will be some time before it is a capability that can be used with any great confidence at a major event such as the Commonwealth Games. In relation to countering drones, I cannot talk to you about what we did in any detail because there is some secret information which I am not entitled to disclose. Certainly, we worked in conjunction with Australian

government agencies and a private company to provide a counter-drone capability, which we used successfully.

Mr D.T. PUNCH: I would like to go back to the guards' selection again, if I may. In your assessment and checking of the people who were finally selected to act as guards, did you have a sense of the percentage of people who you would describe as people entering the workforce from a stopgap point of view—I think that is a term you mentioned earlier—as opposed to those who had made a long-term career out of the industry and had built some experience up as a consequence? Was that distinction reflected in the contractual requests that were put to the contractor initially in terms of the initial selection of potential guards? Was there a preference for experienced guards?

Mr BAADE: Yes, so there are two answers to that question. The first one is: why did we need to recruit new guards? That was a target from a legacy perspective. The requirement from government was to employ 30 per cent of the guards from a local area. What that meant was we knew that 1 800 guards were required to be employed from the south-east quarter and we definitely would not be able to find 1 800 permanently employed guards and have them come to the games so we knew that we would be recruiting brand-new guards. That is one aspect of how you come up with new guards for the first time to come to the games. Most games go through that phenomenon where you are looking for the permanently—for the long-term unemployed, I should say, to be recruited as guards. I think this follows with both of those models, because it is a really important part of the safety and security overlays to have experienced guards. But that is just the nature of the industry. It is very difficult to get that many guards that are all experienced and able to turn up. Our model was looking at a blend of around 30 per cent of guards that were coming to the games as relatively inexperienced. If you go above that, it starts to get a little bit problematic because the level of supervision for those guards has to be appropriate. So we had certain performance criteria in place that we would not exceed that level of 30 per cent, because we have to maintain that confidence with Queensland Police Service.

Mr D.T. PUNCH: So there was a balance between a policy requirement around local employment, local contracting, and the workforce needs that you had from a safety and security point of view?

Mr BAADE: That is right. Interstate, a lot of contractors were putting on people who were entering the industry, which is a good thing for them because they are finding a new source of employment. We made sure through that skills database that we did not exceed an acceptable percentage. We dealt with LandView through this Security Executive Steering Committee.

Mr D.T. PUNCH: I think you mentioned that something like 87 000 checks were made?

Mr COLEMAN: It was around that figure. I do not have the exact number in front of me. It started off with a requirement of about 125 000 checks, but around 87 000 is the number that it ended up being.

Mr D.T. PUNCH: Over what time period would that have been?

Mr BAADE: We started checking about six months out from the games.

Mr D.T. PUNCH: It was a pretty intensive process.

Mr BAADE: What happens there is that different client groups start to apply for access or accreditation. But the real push started around November–December and the final push was in January. November, December and January is when you get the bulk of those—probably 70 per cent of that 88 000 were done in that time frame.

Mr D.T. PUNCH: Was there sufficient time to do an in-depth background check to meet your normal requirements?

Mr BAADE: Yes. We pretty much kept on target on our predictions all the way through, and we had surge capacity if we were going to overrun it.

Mr COLEMAN: What we did, to answer your question, we did it though the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission forming CrimTrac to develop an electronic system of information transfer. The system we used for the G20 in 2014, while it was a computer-based check, a lot of the end results about looking at the suitability of someone came down to boxes of paper and people actually reading through it. With the ACIC we developed a system of being able to check and come up with hits from all of the jurisdictions on individuals, which was done by computer and not by people, so it was a much more robust system. It is an excellent legacy for us moving forward into the future. We work with our national partners because we also conduct the national security checks on all of these individuals as well. That has certainly put pressure on our federal partners in relation to the numbers that were required, but they actually assigned additional resources to that task and were able to meet the thresholds that were established, or the service level agreements established by GOLDOC, for turnaround times. Those turnaround times in the first instance when we started in August last year were 28 days to answer back to us, but in the last couple of weeks we had 24 hours, which for a national security check is very difficult, if not almost impossible, to maintain. We had some agreements in place about how we would manage those last-minute checks.

The CHAIRMAN: Would a more nationally-coordinated approach involving the commonwealth as well have resolved some of these specific issues that you had in meeting those time frames, or was your event so different to the everyday scenario that just dealing with it and forgetting about all the learnings and moving back to the way states usually do things in their own jurisdiction is probably a better way to go?

Mr BAADE: You are right in that the nature of the Commonwealth Games is a standout event. It is very, very different to have a static workforce where you maintain the workforce at a certain level continuously. In the case of the games when you have a workforce of around 50 000 people, not everyone knows they are going to be working for the games until two months out, and sometimes only four weeks out. You experience this massive workload over a very short space of time that you simply cannot avoid. If you start checking people 10 months out from the games, by the time you get to the games those people have sometimes picked another area to go to, or they did not make the team, or they are no longer interested in the games—they have either sought other employment, or they are just not interested. You have to leave it to a certain point at which you are sure that they are going to be coming to the games, because there is a cost involved in everything. If you start checking too early, you end up rechecking people or going over that standard number. Yes, it is a standout event and it is not the same as any other circumstance, so you cannot do it any other way.

[11.30 am]

Mr A. KRSTICEVIC: You were saying that no more than 30 per cent of the guards were new to the industry and that they all met a certain level of competency. Some venues are more sensitive than others. It is a bit like a police officer with 30 years' experience knowing a lot more in a venue or a situation than someone who has just graduated from the academy. With security guards, is there an issue about the fact that they have met the training, but it is about knowing and experiencing those things? Was consideration ever given to the level of experience of a guard to determine whether there was a venue of a higher risk that needed a guard of a greater experience? On that note, is there a need in the industry somewhere to be able to identify differences between new people and ones who have actually got the runs on the ground?

Mr BAADE: In some of our main venues, which are the high-risk venues, the guard count per shift was around 150 to 200 guards and the police count was not far off that either. We had a large number of police always in and around the venue and working directly with the guards. Our model was very blended in that we also have police out and about working with the guards, talking to the guards, watching the guards and helping the guards. There was a high level of experience out there with both police and long-term experienced guards. That ratio really did not have a negative impact on safety and security. As a matter of fact, it probably had a positive impact on people entering the industry for the first time. A lot of them walked away with a feeling that this is something they want to continue to do.

Mr COLEMAN: We made sure that there were no inexperienced security guards assigned to key tasks. A lot of the key locations have experienced guards taking charge of those areas. We asked Danny to ensure that at all of his venues where there were key locations, there was not a new workforce in those locations—that it was an experienced workforce, or at least new workers blended with experienced workers at those locations. It was more about task than venue in itself.

Mr BAADE: That is something we could achieve because we had control of the workforce. That entire 3 800 people was the workforce that we had control of. We could move people to a specific location without having to negotiate with the prime contract holder.

Mr Z.R.F. KIRKUP: Gentlemen, just back on protective security measures again, recently we have had our new stadium finished. Obviously we have not had as many people as the Commonwealth Games have drawn in but I am keen to understand any lessons learned or any measures that were put in place in a protective capacity, such as physical and temporary barrier issues, built-form issues. As part of this committee's inquiries, that has been a focus of law enforcement and government specifically in other jurisdictions that we have visited. Was there anything there, not just beyond the technological that you looked at and that we spoke about before, but in that physical sense that was looked at, and anything that you think would be of value to other jurisdictions to learn from, given the effort and attention paid to it?

Mr COLEMAN: The Queensland Police Service took responsibility for the risk assessments at all of our venues. We had people trained in the counterterrorism security coordinator role, which is a standard role that UK police services use. A number of us went overseas and were trained in that. Our counterterrorism security coordinators, our SECOS, were responsible for doing the venue risk assessments. The SECOS then worked with two planners, one for the police and one for Danny's team, and we built the fence on our venues around a depth-in-defence model. If you go back 20 years, the defence line was the first point of contact for defence around a venue. When we looked further and wider than that, we looked at the defence line just being part of a depth-in-defence model. My recommendation for anyone planning, particularly if they are doing a new build, is to do the security mitigations as permanent builds because the cost of adding additional temporary overlays in each venue, particularly those venues where you do a home and away season a dozen times a year, if not more, certainly adds to the ongoing cost of running venues. We are going through a process in Queensland at the moment looking at the way we run [inaudible] in Queensland and the cost associated with that. We looked at the depth-in-defence model which means that instead of having just a defence line, we reduce speeds, we close roads, we have CCTV cameras, we have our automatic numberplate recognition processes, we have controls, we have a fence line, we have access control, we have a search regime and we have internal controls.

Everything we have built is around depth-in-defence. We did not want to be surprised by an adversary at our doorstep. If there was going to be an adversary, we wanted to pick them up further away. Queensland developed an Australian-first for a policing behavioural observation capability

called BOSAR. We used it widely in the games and it is now a feature of our planning around major events in the future. The Behaviour Observation and Suspicious Activity Recognition was developed by the NYPD counterterrorism unit and came to us via the Massachusetts State Police and we have just received authority to train police services in other states in the capability. Through the ANZCTC and with my deputy commissioner, that is one of the things we intend to do. The whole depth-in-defence model is the recommendation that I would have. Do not just look at the physical infrastructure around protecting your new stadium. Where can you start protecting the stadium away from it—100 metres out, 500 metres out, a kilometre out?

Mr Z.R.F. KIRKUP: Did you look at what would be the optimal distance away? Obviously it is constrained per environment, but do you suggest that 250 metres as the fence line starts is the most optimal? Is there an average you can give us when you started to intervene and put up those defence mechanisms?

Mr COLEMAN: You are right in everything you say. The biggest problem is the built environment now and trying to retrofit security around the state. Probably the first figure we worked off was that we wanted a stand-off distance from crowds if we could of 100 metres—a 100-metre blast stand-off. We wanted the fence line at least 100 metres away from where the people would be sitting in the stadium. That was all but impossible at probably half the venues. Again, we looked at what other mitigations we could put in place because we did not get that 100-metre stand-off. At some of our venues our depth-in-defence started 100 metres out; for others it started 500 metres out. It depended on the built environment we worked to. Certainly from the point of view of our behavioural observation officers, we were pushing them blocks out from the venues, looking at what was approaching along with what is called the last mile, when people move from the major transport hub to the major access point of a venue. We looked not only at people in the last mile close to a venue, but those people approaching the last mile. It is impossible for me to give you a number. It would depend on the situation at each venue.

Mr Z.R.F. KIRKUP: In relation to the behavioural observations officers, is that something that has been offered to, say, Western Australia? Obviously, that was uniquely developed for the Commonwealth Games. Do you know if that has been taken up here?

Mr COLEMAN: I can tell you this: we did a whole lot of research about what was available. We chose BOSAR as the most suitable for crowded places. The Australian Federal Police have a training system that is designed for airports. BOSAR is more around crowded places and public areas. I had a meeting with my deputy commissioner only this morning. We are now in a position to offer that training to other states. Most other states know about it. Some states are pushing hard for it. My deputy intends to take it through the ANZCTC and offer that. Obviously, Western Australia might want to send a team over and train a team of trainers so that you guys can then become self-sufficient in the capability. I was the only one to do the course internationally; I did mine in Boston. When I did the course, I had 35 years of policing experience and it taught me something. We are finding that with the training that we are conducting here. It is only a two-day course. It is a three-day train-the-trainer course and a two-day user course. We are finding from the police who we are training here that it is probably the most beneficial course that they have ever done. That is the sort of general feedback we are getting. It will be made available to Western Australia. If the Western Australia police want to take it up, we will happily send a team over to train their trainers so that they can become self-sufficient in the capability.

The CHAIRMAN: As Western Australians we would hope that the ANZCTC comes up with a funding model as well, so we can get some additional funds, given how we are treated by federal–state financial relations generally.

A question I have is around your regulation model for security firms in Queensland. You have what is best described as a co-regulation model in which a security firm not only has to hold the licence—I believe they go through licensing with your Office of Fair Trading—but they also need to obtain and maintain membership of an approved security industry association. This is probably a question for you, Mr Coleman: what level of protection does this provide over and above the traditional model of just obtaining a licence from a regulatory authority?

Mr COLEMAN: Unfortunately that is not an area of expertise that I hold, so I actually cannot comment in relation to that particular question. I do not think there would be value in anything I said because I do not know enough about it.

The CHAIRMAN: Of course, here in WA licensing of security firms is done by police. It is obviously different in your state because it is done by Fair Trading.

Mr COLEMAN: Fair Trading does the licensing and the only part we do is the background checks on the individuals.

Mr Z.R.F. KIRKUP: Have you had much communication with Western Australia on the implementation of this type of technology? Has it just been done through the CTC or have you been approached separately? I am just trying to understand that sort of relationship. Has it only funnelled through ANZCTC?

Mr COLEMAN: At this point in time nothing has been funnelled through the ANZCTC. We have worked closely in a range of different areas with our interstate colleagues. I travelled to Perth to look at what your communications centre was doing in relation to information management systems. We did a whole lot of work with all the states, including Western Australia, around projection, and we travelled around. A lot of the information in relation to things like BOSAR and the other work we are doing has been on that personal relationship built in the planning for the games. I met with my deputy commissioner only this morning. We have only just been given the go-ahead to offer the training out. I was in Melbourne last week doing some work in relation to the stadium's Queensland job. Assistant commissioners there are asking me when we are going to be able to deliver BOSAR to them. It is more about relationships built in the planning process, that police agencies across Australia become aware of what we have been doing. We are only too happy to help out where we can and spread the knowledge we have.

The CHAIRMAN: We could probably keep asking questions, but we are constricted by time because we have to be in Parliament in about 10 minutes.

Thank you for your evidence today; it is much appreciated. A transcript of this hearing will be forwarded to you for the correction of minor errors. Any such corrections must be made and the transcript returned within 10 working days. If you do not return the transcript, we will just deem it to be correct. You cannot use the corrections process to introduce new material and you cannot change the nature of your evidence, but if you would like to provide any additional information or elaborate on anything that we have discussed today, please feel free to do so in a supplementary document. Thank you for your time. It has been a great assistance to our committee and to Western Australia.

Hearing concluded at 11.44 am
