

**COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND JUSTICE
STANDING COMMITTEE**

**INQUIRY INTO THE METHODS EMPLOYED BY WA POLICE
TO EVALUATE PERFORMANCE**

**TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE
TAKEN AT PERTH
WEDNESDAY, 6 MAY 2015**

SESSION ONE

Members

**Ms M.M. Quirk (Chair)
Dr A.D. Buti (Deputy Chair)
Mr C.D. Hatton
Ms L. Mettam
Mr M.P. Murray**

Hearing commenced at 9.35 am**Ms JANET EVANS****Intelligence Analyst and Researcher, examined:**

The CHAIR: Good morning. Thank you for hanging around while we sorted out some business. I am Margaret Quirk, the Chair of the Community Development and Justice Standing Committee. On my right is the Deputy Chair, Dr Tony Buti, who is the member for Armadale. On my left is Libby Mettam, the member for Vasse. On her left is Mick Murray, the member for Collie–Preston and on his left is Chris Hatton, the member for Balcatta. Having left my glasses at home, I will ask Tony to deal with the preliminaries; indeed, his eyesight is better than mine!

Dr A.D. BUTI: On behalf of the Community Development and Justice Standing Committee, I thank you for your interest and appearance before us today. The purpose of this hearing is to assist the committee in gathering evidence for its inquiry into methods employed by the Western Australia Police to evaluate performance, specifically performance measures related to law enforcement and road safety. The committee members have already been introduced to you. The Community Development and Justice Standing Committee is a committee of the Legislative Assembly of the Parliament of Western Australia. This hearing is a formal procedure of the Parliament and therefore commands the same respect given to proceedings in the house itself. Even though the committee is not asking witnesses to provide evidence on oath or affirmation, it is important that any deliberate misleading of the committee may be regarded as a contempt of Parliament. This is a public hearing and Hansard will be making a transcript of the proceedings for the public record. If you refer to any documents during your evidence, it would assist Hansard if you could provide the full title for the record.

Before we proceed with the hearing, I need to ask you a series of questions. Did you receive and read the information for witnesses briefing sheet provided to you?

Ms Evans: Yes, I did.

Dr A.D. BUTI: Do you understand the notes on the sheet about giving evidence to a parliamentary committee?

Ms Evans: Yes, I do.

Dr A.D. BUTI: Do you have any questions in relation to being a witness at today's hearing?

Ms Evans: No, thank you, I do not.

Dr A.D. BUTI: Please state your full name and the capacity in which you appear before the committee today.

Ms Evans: My name is Janet Mary Evans. I currently hold the position of senior intelligence analyst at the Australian Crime Commission, but I am appearing because of an article I wrote on intelligence-led policing in the book titled *Policing and Security in Practice: Challenges and Achievements*, which was edited by Tim Prenzler.

Dr A.D. BUTI: We have a series of questions to ask you, but before we start, would you be interested in making an opening statement?

Ms Evans: I want to thank you for inviting me to attend. I would like to acknowledge both Sarah and Niamh's professionalism in dealing with me before the hearing. I would like to know how you would like me to address you if you ask individual questions.

The CHAIR: Whatever you prefer; we will keep it informal.

Ms Evans: Okay, great! Thank you.

The CHAIR: I will start with a general question and a bit of background. This inquiry, as you know, is looking at performance indicators for the police. We tend to get the phrase “evidence-based policing” a lot and when we drill down, we are not quite sure what the evidence is on occasions. It is a bit of a buzzword but sometimes there is not a lot behind it. Can you comment on that as a general proposition or talk a bit about what you consider evidence-based policing means?

Ms Evans: Thank you for asking me that question, Margaret. Evidence-based policing can be seen as a theory or as a methodology, whereas, in contrast, intelligence-led policing is a philosophy. The difference between the two in the context of policing is that the philosophy of intelligence-led policing means that it is integrated into every aspect of the policing culture whereas evidence-based policing and its counterparts, such as problem-oriented policing or the SARA model are methods by which intelligence practice can be carried out. Evidence-based policing is a method that can be used along with a gamut of others. I have a document that I can forward on to you written by Lawrence Sherman, who is known as the father of evidence-based policing. I think that might help you form an understanding of the method or the theory.

The CHAIR: In terms of intelligence personnel attached to law enforcement or policing agencies, it seems to me that the proportion of people involved in gathering intelligence is a little under done compared with operational staff. Is there any move afoot or has your area seen some progress towards increasing the number of analysts or intelligence personnel to assist?

Ms Evans: In the current financial climate there is not really a move to increase those numbers, and that certainly was the feeling of intelligence managers and others in 2009. In my experience it is really beneficial to have the right balance of intelligence officers and operational staff. I think that really comes out of being intelligence-led. Because intelligence is part of the philosophy of the policing organisation, intelligence is appropriately resourced. I do not just mean an intelligence unit. I think if you have a philosophy of intelligence-led policing, that means that your traffic police are collecting intelligence of behalf of other parts of the agency. So if they stop someone, they are going to be asking more probing questions; they are not just stopping them because they have done something on the road. That information that they collect needs to be saved somewhere so that it can be accessed at a point in time when it may be useful. If you have a culture of intelligence-led policing, I think that the scope for every officer to be an intelligence collector is available, but I think that if you pay lip service to intelligence-led policing, then you have an intelligence unit, you use intelligence-led language but not everyone is exposed to the culture of an intelligence-led organisation.

The CHAIR: How useful is intelligence after an event to go back and analyse why certain things happened? There is a tendency to use intelligence obviously to lay charges or make arrests, but how useful intelligence afterwards to analyse what happened? I am thinking of the road safety area when you are looking at the road toll and you want to work out how things happened.

Ms Evans: I think it is incredibly useful. I had an application for some research funding when I was working at the Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security at Griffiths University, along with the Queensland police traffic area. I was working with two analysts there and the proposal we put forward which, unfortunately, was not funded, was to do exactly as you proposed; that is, use all the information that is available, so not only the traffic accidents, but other reports that coincide with traffic hotspots, so other information that would support whether an intersection is particularly dangerous. The thing that comes to mind is intersections at schools. There may be a high incidence of problem between 8.00 am and 9.00 am and again between 2.30 pm and 3.30 pm, but at other points in time there are no problems with those intersections. That information is not known unless you keep very good records of when an incident occurs, who was there, what kind of population, complaints to area and the particular time of the day or night.

Dr A.D. BUTI: With regards to intelligence gathering and the work that you have done, have you done comparative work between the various jurisdictions in Australia; and, if so, how does Western Australia compare?

Ms Evans: I have done some in that area. I interviewed 19 directors or experts in intelligence agencies across Australia. Those interviews were done by telephone and lasted in the region of about three hours each to get a real good understanding of what is happening in each jurisdiction. I am unable to comment directly on the information that WA provided to me because of an ethics agreement with each of the participants. What I am able to say is that Western Australia compared very similarly with all the other police jurisdictions. So in terms of the number of analysts, I can remember that approximately 60 per cent of the jurisdictions had approximately six per cent of their policing population with an intelligence function and that tended to be pretty much across the board. This was in 2009.

The CHAIR: I will let Tony continue, but just on that issue: we visited New York a year ago and looked at their CompStat system. It seemed to me they had a much larger volume of people analysing and drawing intelligence out of the field. Do you know anything about that generally?

Ms Evans: I do. In terms of the global picture, I think that Australia does have substantially less intelligence, particularly analysts, but intelligence personnel in relation to the overall number of staff. Certainly, when I was the head of intelligence analysis at West Midlands Police in the UK, our aim was to have one analyst per 100 officers. For every 100 officers employed, there would be the intention of having one analyst. Those analysts covered a very broad range of functions and roles over in the UK. Some were very specialised, so in the professional standards area; some of them worked exclusively on murder inquiries, some worked for districts or particular policing interests.

The CHAIR: I was just going to say I have worked in law enforcement, but my other colleagues have not. Maybe if you can explain what you mean by analysts so that they understand and we are all on the same page.

Ms Evans: Absolutely. I will give you an example that everyone can relate to. If you imagine you are going to do your weekly shopping. Writing out your shopping list would be what the analyst does. They look in every single cupboard. They make sure that they have all the information that is available and look at the menu plan. They collate all that information together and then they distil your list; those are your options for purchase. Your analyst would derive a report or product that would inform your decision-making in your shop. The analysts themselves would not actually go and do the shopping. They would give the list to an intelligence officer. The intelligence officer would turn up at the shop and pick up all the groceries. They will do as good a job as the list indicates. They will collect against what the list has given them. That information would then be brought back to the police station and could then be used in terms of analysis or could be used for other measures. In the shopping example, you might have two measures. You might have a quantitative measure; that is everything that is purchased and used to create a meal. You might have a qualitative measure: is every member of the family satisfied with the meal? The analogy allows some expansion on the role of the analyst. If you have an analyst who, in my family's case, is a seven-year-old, who is explaining the shopping list, they do not [inaudible] items on that list. So, if you have an analyst who is not skilled up who has not got what it takes to in fact analyse the information, collect the right information and make appropriate judgements based on that information, you do not get a lot of chocolate on your list. If you have a sophisticated analyst, they have got a lot of opportunities to provide you with a good list. They also need some tools. In the shopping list example, they will need a pen and paper because while they would be able to deliver the list to the officer who is going to go out into the field, all of our memories are short. We, on average, are able to hold six or seven items in our minds. If you have got that list written down, then you perform so much better than if you just translated that list verbally. Those tools come in handy

for someone who is making a shopping list, are sophisticated systems. These are systems that [inaudible] not only store it, because most people probably would not store it, but access that information is very [inaudible]. The information from different systems needs to be able to be brought together into one system where decisions can be made on that information far more easily. I cannot stress enough how important it is to have an analyst that is capable. I would like to pass on to the committee an article that I wrote for the *Journal of Police and Society*, which actually looks at this question about what in fact a good or effective analyst needs to have in their gamut of skills.

[9.50 am]

The CHAIR: Thanks. I think that is a great analogy.

Ms L. METTAM: I am probably covering something you have already said before, but just to clarify: as a senior intelligence analyst, what can you observe about WA Police?

Ms Evans: I would like to make this statement not in my position at the Australian Crime Commission but, rather, in my own capacity, because I do not think I can speak on behalf of the commission. I would like to make a comment on something personal. I had a number of reasons to engage with WA Police, since I moved to Australia, in the early 2000s. Certainly the engagement that I had is they were good people who are [inaudible]. I can think of a couple of occasions, particularly one where I was developing a risk assessment tool for the Australian Crime Commission and someone from WA made contact with me because they wanted to develop a similar risk assessment tool. That was quite progressive because some of the other jurisdictions were not really looking at risk. They were not really thinking about ways to evaluate that. They sought my opinion on the tool that they were trying to develop. In addition to that, I have had some conversations with some of the senior intelligence managers in WA, and one in particular stands out to me who has a really good understanding of the role of research in policing. That, for me, is also particularly rare in Australia. My experience in the UK was that quite often there were police with fairly high level research degrees, which meant that they understood research in a way that perhaps someone who has only an undergraduate degree does not understand the application of research. Certainly, I worked for people with PhDs in psychology who were chief superintendents, so they had a very good understanding of the way in which research and policing intersected. But this particular person that I am mentioning from WA has a really good knowledge of how research works and knows how to integrate research findings into police practice. I think that in terms of Western Australia, they have some unique talents that perhaps are not represented in other states and territories as well.

The CHAIR: That translates into whether or not that person is adequately supported and listened to, if you like, though, does it not?

Ms Evans: It absolutely does. I think on that, coming to another point which I think is incredibly important and that is you really need [inaudible] support for intelligence. There are a number of problems that still, I guess, interfere with that. One of them is that probably over the last 20 years that I have been working in intelligence, I have seen intelligence units really underrated. There are a number of reasons for that. In some of the interviews that I have conducted with police, I have asked them what their perception is of intelligence units. I will just give you some of the terminology. They call people who work in intelligence the broken biscuits. They say that you get moved to intelligence if you are sick, lame or lazy. Those are the kind of negative connotations that go on. So, most police officers avoid going into intelligence because it is almost like something negative. It is like police officers who had to work in some of the corruption commissions. They are seconded there. That is often not a good look for other police officers. Equally, having worked in intelligence, it is not always a good look to have sort of the intelligence badge. It is not everyone but it certainly is quite pervasive. If that is the case, as you move through the ranks, you get to a very senior level and you manage to avoid working in intelligence, you know nothing of what they do. The number of people who say, "I think we need to put more resources into intelligence" is

very small. You really need to have someone who has good intelligence experience or someone who understands an intelligence-led philosophy to have this senior management position.

Globally, at the moment the very best example I can think of how this works well is New Zealand Police. A few years ago the head of New Zealand Police brought on Mark Evans—no relation to me. He was a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. He was a very experienced intelligence manager. He was brought on and it was said explicitly that he had the support of the commissioner. There was no “we support intelligence”. Every single document he produced was underwritten by the head of New Zealand Police. That really changed the culture in New Zealand. Mark has done a number of things in New Zealand that really means New Zealand is at the forefront of where intelligence and policing heads.

Mr C.D. HATTON: As some committee members mentioned to you earlier, we did some travelling last year to New York, to look at CompStat. We were fortunate enough to see how their intelligence works there. We went to Manchester as well, to look at their model in policing. We are adopting some of those models with our front-line policing. We were in London last year, too, at a conference on evidence-based policing. We have our heads around a certain amount of what is happening in other places and what is happening with evidence-based policing. But you go back to the 1990s when you were working in Midlands and so forth. You came across to Australia, I think, in 1999 or thereabouts. Are we a long way behind what you have been doing in the 1990s here in Australia? We had some police officers from Western Australia, high ranking ones, who were in London last year at conferences in Cambridge on evidence-based policing. I assume there is more than one person who is really into this intelligence and evidence-based policing in Western Australia. I still do not quite understand; are we a long way behind in Australia from your 20 years ago experience to now? Are we lagging badly maybe?

[10.00 am]

Ms Evans: I think there is a lag. I do not know if it is a dreadfully bad lag. I can give you some anecdotal information. In 2005 I spoke to a very senior person at Queensland police and said, “What would it take for me to be the head of all the intelligence analysts at Queensland police?” His response was, “Not in your lifetime.” I said, “Well, why not?” He said, “Because you’re a civilian.” One of the things that certainly the UK and, to some degree, the United States are doing, is they are developing career paths for analysts and intelligence officers. To get to the position that I had in 2000 at West Midlands Police in Australia was said to be impossible and would not be attained. I think things are moving on. It is not that we are static in Australia; I think there definitely is progress. I think that one of the things that we all need to be wary of is that the culture of policing needs to change around intelligence. When I speak to police officers in Australia, it is not that they do not understand what intelligence-led policing is. It is not that they are Luddites; they are quite well informed. Quite often, there is a level of rhetoric there. They understand very well the terminology and they are able to speak very eloquently about what intelligence-led or evidence-based policing is, but getting those principles integrated into their police work is very difficult because they are tied [inaudible] to support at the highest level.

Mr C.D. HATTON: That has answered it. Thank you very much. Can I just mention one more thing to do with the culture of the intelligence model and also the resourcing into that. With the vicious versus virtuous intelligence, when you have the wrong model and the right model, whether you have the culture to support it or not, is there also the culture that we need in the community to support the police? Is that another aspect? The reason I mention that is because you mentioned here that policing has become performance oriented and it actually improves resourcing, or should do, in directing the resourcing to the right place. Has it been a measure of that—that it actually does improve the resourcing and manage the finances of those resources? Have there been any measures?

Ms Evans: There are not very good measures. In fact, it is my personal Holy Grail to understand how we effectively measure intelligence. I might just give you a couple of examples. Some aspects

of intelligence are relatively easy to measure. You may, for instance, have a particular problem at a particular location and you can measure how often the problem occurs. You then put in a measure to some kind of activity to change that problem and a week following implementing your measure, you count up how many occurrences of the crime has happened and you are able to demonstrate that there has been a decrease or it would stay the same. Your measurement is fairly easy. Currently in my role at the Australian Crime Commission, I am working on the understanding of how organised crime [inaudible] be viewed. That piece of analysis will complement it. That will take maybe two to three years of policy analysis to integrate the recommendations of that strategic assessment into practice, if they decide to take on the recommendations in the report. Once the policymakers have made that decision, it will take three to four years for action to be taken. So the measure of subsets of the intelligence report that I am currently writing, I estimate to be somewhere in the region of 10 to 15 years from now. Understanding how successful intelligence is really depends on the problem that you are trying to address. It is not something we can look at quite easily. Some things are much more difficult.

In addition to that, I think that policing culture really is about counting. Police like to know that there was \$10 million worth of cash seized or there were 4 000 arrests made in relation to a particular fight. That might be an interesting way of working out whether you are doing a good job or not. But I think that is more dealing with the immediate response to police activity rather than trying to understand what your global objective is. You might be looking at harm reduction—wanting to reduce harm to the community. I am not entirely sure how you measure that. You can come up with a lot of ideas about how you can possibly measure but I do not know what most of [inaudible] on the job. I think that is going to be a very difficult proposition for policing.

The CHAIR: I think the idea of using intelligence analysts is well developed in organised crime but less so in something like road safety or traffic. Would you agree with that?

Ms Evans: I would.

The CHAIR: There is a lot of research in road safety. Is there a need for it to be better integrated or communicated or put in a form that can then be a product that is an easy application for traffic enforcement?

Ms Evans: I think so, and Margaret, I think this hits on a number of really kind of important aspects of policing; that is, that police often have analysts who are doing good work, but there are also research people at universities who are carrying out really great work in relation to the policing and those findings can be incorporated into police activity. But there tends to be a disjunct between the way in which police consume information and the way in which academics deliver information. It is one of the things that I have been sort of banging on about for about 10 years. It is about how academics need to change the way in which they are able to deliver that information that they produce. They want you to be other academics; they do not want you to be the police. The police often are—I do not know what the term is—put off by pulling out an academic journal because it is written in a way that is confusing in its use of terminology that they are not used to. It talks about statistics that they are not familiar with, and I think that there really needs to be a bridge between academic research and the way in which police get to digest that material.

The CHAIR: Either that or the police tend to be a bit selective in what they take out of those articles. In other words, the article says X or Y—that is what we are doing; therefore, we are doing the right thing—but it might be out of context or whatever.

Ms Evans: That is right.

Ms L. METTAM: How do you think intelligence-based policing could or should be built into the KPIs for Western Australia Police?

[10.10 am]

Ms Evans: A really good example in my own experience was at Lancashire Constabulary. They used the idea of CompStat. They had the chief constable go around each of the districts at a regular interval, I think it was over six months. He would sit down with the head of that district and talk about what the problems were, how they had analysed the problem, how they had responded to that analysis, and how they assessed what the police had carried out or what the police had done. It was really interesting because on the first occasion it was very confronting. It was not a method that had really been used before. But over time it became run of the mill, so you would use your analytical work to demonstrate what had been done in terms of policing. I can give you a positive example and a negative one. The positive example is your analyst is constantly scanning the environment. They find a particular problem. They analyse that problem. They take the analysis to a group of police officers who action it—so they respond. Once the response is completed, information is brought back to the analyst and they assess whether there is a change. So it is literally problem-oriented these days, so there is scanning, analysis, response and then assessment. The positive way to do this is your analyst finds the problem, they get the police to respond and then they assess whether success has been achieved or not. That tells you a couple of things. It tells you whether the proposed strategy was the right one for the problem. It also allows you to understand how policing resources were applied to the problem. You can then talk that through with the most senior managers. You can say, “This is the problem and this is what we did. This is what we found: a regular two per cent reduction over the crime”, for example. Then the chief constable can say, “What are you proposing to do next because the two per cent reduction does not meet your target?” Then you can develop other strategies or ways to respond. The negative way in which I have seen this used is the meetings where the head of the district anticipates what questions are going to be asked and they then say to the analyst, bearing in mind it is probably one of the first times they have spoken to the analyst for the entire year, “What can you tell me that I can tell the chief constable and satisfy his need to know why it is that white vans are used in crime?” So the analyst then buries their head in all of the information that is available, tries to work out if white vans were used in crime and where they were used, and what could we possibly state was our strategy against these particular white vans. That is then spoken about in the meeting but is not about action. There are ways—I will try to get the right term for this—in which senior district managers can comfort themselves in response to more difficult questions by using the analyst almost as a mediator.

The CHAIR: So in terms of performance indicators for something like traffic, we need to suggest not only quantitative but qualitative, and the qualitative stuff would be evaluated by the intelligence analysts.

Ms Evans: That is right. I think that the intelligence analysts could add some analysis, both quantitative and qualitative. So they may be able to harvest information that is beyond the statistics. They could incorporate that into a series of recommendations about a particular traffic problem most definitely.

The CHAIR: An example I can think of is a proposal, for example, that drivers under the age 25 cannot drive high-powered vehicles, and that actually got quite a lot of currency. But when you look further, most of the infractions by those young people were in four-cylinder vehicles anyway. It is that sort of disjunct between the folk law and the actual evidence that I —

Ms Evans: That is right. I think that one of the real benefits of an analytical product is that it incorporates all the possible information that you have at hand. It often indicates also where you have got information gaps. It offers opportunities for additional connection. It may be that other questions need to be asked when the young person is stopped; or it might be that when a young person is stopped, some information needs to be obtained in relation to when they obtained their licence. There are a lot of opportunities there.

The CHAIR: Often, as you would appreciate from working within various organisations, the feasibility of a strategy goes down to cost and the budget and resources. How useful is intelligence in being able to contribute to, say, a cost–benefit analysis of one strategy over another?

Ms Evans: I have been asked to do that in a couple of roles that I have had before. The way in which an analyst would carry out that work is to analyse the problem and decide what the problem is. Often a manager will come to an analyst and say, “We have got a problem with a particular aspect of traffic missing.” An analyst’s role is then to try to help the manager understand the scope of that problem, how big it is, what was the cause and what kinds of analysis have been done on the task and what kinds of research are available to suggest possible ways of tackling the problem. It is not the analyst’s job to tell the manager not to tackle the problem, but to provide information so that the manager can make the best decision based on all the information.

Mr C.D. HATTON: I just want to say, Janet, that we probably should not be here to say that things are not being done well or being done to a certain level with policing across Australia. Obviously, the police have their briefs every day to go and tackle problems that they see as priority problems, and with the frontline policing that we are introducing into Western Australia with teams of police, one would assume they have a certain amount of intelligence. Are you sort of suggesting or would you suggest that it needs to go to a higher level in the analysis of that or that it can be done better?

Ms Evans: I am not sure I understand the question. Could you ask me again, please?

Mr C.D. HATTON: I would assume that analysis is going on in the police force already, and has been forever. But are we really needing a higher level of analysis in our jurisdictions, including Western Australia? And are you convinced that that would improve the policing?

Ms Evans: I think what I am convinced of is when you analyse a problem and you analyse possible solutions or options for action in relation to that problem, you are in a much better position to take action than if you have not analysed the problem and looked at all the possible solutions. I think that currently that is done in quite a patchy way. I think that often intelligence analysts are tossed in a support capacity rather than in a leading capacity. I am not saying that intelligence analysts are sort of the panacea of policing; I am just saying that they play an integral part. What quite often happens in policing, in my experience, and I have seen it fairly recently, is analysts are told to find the answer to one particular question. The question might be: has this person ever committed a crime before? So they go to the databanks and they look up that information and that information is then presented. I think that as an analyst that should be at quite another level, but because there is not a career structure for them in the analytical profession, almost all analysts get tasked like that and you really should have people who have already a sound understanding of how research works. You should have people who have a high level of confidence and ability to communicate because they are often dealing with people who are very senior. In my experience, you need analysts who can go in and search the database for particular pieces of information to help the officer who is out on patrol, for example. But you also need to have analysts who can analyse a particular target or a group of targets. You also need an analyst who can analyse a particular problem. You need people who have strategic skills so they are thinking about not only what the police’s issues are, but also about what the health department issues or the education department issues are and how that influences policing. You certainly would not want to, for example, change your policing boundaries because that suited the way in which crime fell if they did not match, for example, the education and the health boundaries because then, when you try to incorporate all that information together, you are not comparing apples with apples. If you are going to change your policing boundaries, you need someone who can think quite broadly and bring all that information together and provide you with the kind of decision that is well analysed and assessed.

Mr C.D. HATTON: Thank you.

The CHAIR: Thank you very much for your time and I will get my colleague to give you the formal statement.

Dr A.D. BUTI: Thanks, Janet. This is a closing statement that we read to all witnesses. Thank you for your evidence before the committee today. A transcript of the hearing will be forwarded to you for correction of minor errors. Any such corrections must be made and the transcript returned within 10 days of the date of the letter attached to the transcript. If the transcript is not returned within this period, it is deemed to be correct. New material cannot be added via these corrections and the sense of your evidence cannot be altered. Should you wish to provide additional information or elaborate on particular points, please include a supplementary submission for the committee's consideration when you return your corrected transcript of evidence. Thank you.

Hearing concluded at 10.21 am
