JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE CORRUPTION AND CRIME COMMISSION

THE USE OF PUBLIC HEARINGS BY THE CORRUPTION AND CRIME COMMISSION

TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE
TAKEN AT PERTH
WEDNESDAY, 15 JUNE 2011

Members

Hon Nick Goiran (Chairman)
Mr John Hyde (Deputy Chairman)
Mr Frank Alban
Hon Matt Benson-Lidholm

Hearing commenced at 10.15 am

STEYTLER, MR CHRISTOPHER DAVID
Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission, examined:

ALDER, MR MURRAY COLIN
Assistant to the Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission, examined:

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the Joint Standing Committee on the Corruption and Crime Commission I would like to thank you for your appearance before us today. The purpose of this hearing is for the committee to speak with the Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission, Hon Chris Steytler, QC, and the assistant to the parliamentary inspector, Mr Murray Alder, for the purpose of gathering evidence in aid of the committee's inquiry into the use of public examinations by the Corruption and Crime Commission. These two gentlemen, by virtue of their role and experience, are uniquely positioned within Western Australian society to offer us some insight into the CCC's use of public examinations. The committee has very much been looking forward to this opportunity to explore some of the issues associated with the public examination process. At this stage I would like to introduce myself as the Chairman of the committee, and to my left is Mr John Hyde, MLA, the member for Perth, and to his left is Hon Matt Benson-Lidholm, MLC, the member for the Agricultural Region. To my right is Mr Frank Alban, MLA, the member for Swan Hills.

The Joint Standing Committee on the Corruption and Crime Commission is a committee of the Parliament of Western Australia. This hearing is a formal procedure of the Parliament and therefore commands the same respect given to proceedings in the houses themselves. Even though the committee is not asking witnesses to provide evidence on oath or affirmation, it is important that you understand that any deliberate misleading of the committee may be regarded as a contempt of Parliament. This is a public hearing and Hansard will be making a transcript of the proceedings. If you refer to any documents during your evidence, it will assist Hansard if you could provide the full title for the record.

Before we proceed to the questions we have for you today, I need to ask you a series of preliminary ones. Have you completed the "Details of Witness" form?

Mr Steytler: Yes.

Mr Alder: I have.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you understand the notes at the bottom of the form about giving evidence to a parliamentary committee?

Mr Steytler: I do.

Mr Alder: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Did you receive and read the "Information for Witnesses" briefing sheet provided in advance of today's hearing?

Mr Steytler: Yes.

Mr Alder: I have.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you have any questions in relation to being a witness at today's hearing?

Mr Steytler: No.

Mr Alder: I do not.

The CHAIRMAN: Inspector, we have a series of questions for you today, but before we do that, are there any opening remarks you would like to bring to the attention of the committee?

Mr Steytler: Yes, there are.

Mr Chairman, my views on the topic of public hearings held by the commission have undergone some change during my time as parliamentary inspector. I have always thought it wrong for any organisation to operate under too great a cloak of secrecy; openness and transparency are important aspects of accountability. Also, as we saw with the present commissioner's predecessor body, secrecy breeds suspicion and mistrust. But these things have to be balanced against the harm that can come from publicity. The critical feature is, I think, that the commission conducts its hearings as part of its investigative function. That is to say, it conducts its hearing—or at least it should conduct its hearings—at a time when suspicions have not yet crystallised into conclusive evidence of guilt. That means that there will inevitably be a considerable risk of damage to reputations that subsequently proves to have been unwarranted. Experience shows that reputations are far more easily damaged that rehabilitated. It would be a triumph of optimism over experience to think that the section 86 process provides an adequate mechanism for the rehabilitation of reputation.

The risk of unwarranted damage is exacerbated by the more limited scope of procedural fairness afforded to witnesses appearing before the commission than would be the case in a court. Witnesses are sometimes given very short notice; they sometimes learn what is being inquired into only during the course of the examination; persons under investigation have limited rights of cross-examination; and the commission has extraordinary powers that are not available to prosecutors or even to police. All this is justified by reference to the fact that unlike a court, which adjudicates on guilt or innocence, the commission's hearings are investigatory. But that being so, it seems to me that two consequences should follow: the first is that if there is a genuine investigation in progress, it will ordinarily be necessary to conduct it in private, for the reasons already given; the second is that if the commission already has what it regards as strong evidence of guilt, there will usually be no need for a hearing at all, public or private. Evidence of that kind can and should be passed to police, or to the relevant prosecuting authority, to be used in a criminal prosecution where the person accused will have all of the usual procedural safeguards.

None of this is to say that there can never be public hearings. There might, for example, be a situation in which particular practices are acknowledged or a particular incident is acknowledged, but the commission wants to hold hearings as regards the question of whether or not those practices or that particular incident amount or amounted to misconduct; and, if so, how a repetition might be prevented. But absent that kind of situation, it would be a very rare case in which a public hearing could be justified in the public interest. As this committee knows, the act requires that examinations be held in private, unless, having weighed the benefit of public awareness and public exposure against the potential for prejudice or privacy infringements, it considers that it is in the public interest to hold them in public. Given that there are various means by which the commission can, as it does, publicise its activities—including by way of publication of a report at the conclusion of its hearings—the need for publicity will seldom, if ever, be a sufficient reason in the case of an ordinary investigation into a question of whether a particular person has or has not done something which, if proved, would amount to misconduct.

[10.22 am]

I believe that the act provides what should be an appropriate balance, but it is important that the balance should be struck appropriately in practice. As I have said, it should be a very rare case in which the public interest is found to outweigh potential prejudice and privacy interests. Also, the commission should not lose sight of its power under section 140(4) to close an examination for a particular purpose. I suggest that this power should be availed of in every case in which the holding of a public hearing would give rise to a credible risk to the safety of an individual. Consequently, it

seems to me that there is no need for any major change to the basic structure contemplated by sections 139 and 140, but I do suggest that consideration be given to two changes. The first is that the words "it considers" in the phrase "it considers that it is in the public interest to do so" be replaced by the expression "it is satisfied that". Legally, the distinction may be one without a difference, but it does serve as a reminder that positive satisfaction is required. The second is that it might be worthwhile to stress in the legislation two particular considerations that must be taken into account without derogating from the ability to have regard for any relevant consideration. Particular considerations that might be stressed are the risk of damage to reputation and any credible risk to the safety of any person. That is all I wanted to say by way of opening.

The CHAIRMAN: One of the things you mentioned in your opening statement is that if the matter is presently under investigation by the CCC, hearings ought to be in private. Did I hear that correctly?

Mr Steytler: As the norm, yes.

The CHAIRMAN: You then indicated that if the evidence—that is the word I am using and I do not know if you used that phrase—is obvious, then the matter ought to be referred to the police for some criminal prosecution. On the face of it, I do not disagree with that. My only concern is that there would be some circumstances in which a matter might be obvious in some respects but maybe it does not meet the criminal standard of proof, so there may be some benefit to having a public outing of the truth at the lesser civil standard rather than the criminal standard. Can I get you to comment on that?

Mr Steytler: Yes; I understand the point. I must say that I have some reluctance to agree with it because these are extraordinary powers that the commission exercises. Extraordinary powers are designed for extraordinary circumstances, and the extraordinary circumstances are investigation of the truth, not necessarily the proof of criminal guilt. I would suggest that the commission should not be doing the latter under the guise of doing the former.

The CHAIRMAN: You mentioned that currently occurs as part of an investigative process and that one of the concerns you have is that it happens before the establishment of guilt. We could also say that it happens before the establishment of the truth, and that that is the correct phrase to use in the criminal justice context, not necessarily in the investigative process.

Mr Steytler: That is true.

Mr J.N. HYDE: In terms of recent practice by the CCC under your watch, and perhaps previously, would you like to discuss or give examples of particular public hearings or parts of public hearings that you think should have been held in private? If we look in a historical context, a lot of the criticism of the commission's public hearing practice in the media, and certainly by your predecessor, Malcolm McCusker, arose in 2006 and 2007 following the Smiths Beach inquiry and other associated lobbying activities. Have you perceived any change in practice by the CCC since that time?

Mr Steytler: I can give the answer to that perhaps in two parts. The Smiths Beach inquiry did throw up a number of hearings which might have been held in private that were heard in public. I can understand why they were held in public. There were indications of possible corruption and, as a result of airing those indications, a good deal of other evidence did, I think, come forward, so there was some benefit in that sense. Equally, some of the hearings that took place damaged particular witnesses who were tarred by association or had allegations put to them which were subsequently proved to be unfounded. That showed—to me at least—that the commission tended to take an all-or-nothing approach to public hearings and it did not assess the public-private question by reference to particular witnesses, and in my opinion it should have done. A more recent example comes out of the death of a witness, which achieved some publicity at the time. I have said to this committee that it seems to me that that was a plain situation in which section 144 should have been

made use of and in which the witness should have had his inquiry held in private and should have been told at once that that was going to be the case. It also seems to me that that inquiry provides an example of the kind of inquiry in which there was no basis for having a public hearing or indeed any hearing. By the time the commission's preliminary investigations had concluded and the hearings had started—I was told this after the event, rather than before the event by the former commissioner—the commission had what it believed to be overwhelming evidence. If that was the case, it seems to me there was no need for a hearing of any kind and that evidence should simply have been made available to the prosecuting authorities. As to whether there has been a change, I think that there has. As far as I am aware, there have been only two sets of public hearings in the last year or two, and that indicates a significant drop off in the number of public hearings.

[10.30 am]

Mr J.N. HYDE: On a related matter, you spoke about if there was overwhelming evidence that a conviction may be likely, why not go straight to trial or straight to charging people involved. Can we look at the other side of it, the deterrence value? There was the recent issue of the people who were buying student visas in terms of immigration and the IELTS tests at Curtin and possibly other places, that by having the publicity of a public hearing the deterrence would have been quite significant, and probably since the publicity that the trial received in a limited way, that deterrence has been very strong.

Mr Steytler: There is no doubt, Mr Hyde, that what you say is correct, but the advantages of publicity have to be weighed against the disadvantages, and there are various ways of getting that publicity. One of the ways is by publication of a report. I appreciate that that does not have the same impact as the daily reporting of evidence laid out in an inquiry, but it seems to me that where, as I have said, you have clear evidence of particular conduct—there is no real dispute, let us say, that the conduct happened and the only question is its proper characterisation or the best means of putting a stop to it in future—then in those circumstances the benefit of public exposure would outweigh the private detriment, but in most other cases I would suggest it would not.

The CHAIRMAN: Can I follow up on that, Inspector, and just ask: is it a possibility, if the concern is about the reputation of individuals, that where a public hearing is enacted the use of an order for the suppression of names be made more frequent?

Mr Steytler: Yes, I think that is a valid comment, with respect, Mr Chair. I think that suppression orders could be made use of more frequently than they are. That would enable the media to be present, if they chose to be present, or anyone else who wanted to hear the evidence. They would simply be barred from publicising particular aspects of it.

The CHAIRMAN: The other aspect I wanted to pick up on is the notion that the norm ought to be that hearings should be in private, especially where an investigation is ongoing. One example where an investigation was ongoing and yet the hearing was made public was the tasering incident, the Mr Spratt matter. The commission obviously has not yet handed down its report. I understand that will happen in the not-too-distant future. The reason I raise that is that the investigation was ongoing at the time and yet a public hearing was used. Again, I have heard very little criticism from any quarter that the use of the public hearing in that instance was inappropriate. Is that then simply an example of one instance where you can have a public hearing and have an ongoing investigation?

Mr Steytler: In my opinion, yes, and that would be because that is an incident of the character where the incident is acknowledged. It was there on videotape for everybody to see. The only question was its proper characterisation—whether it formed a wider process and how best to put a stop to it.

The CHAIRMAN: What you are saying is that the evidence in that situation was compelling. It was obvious, I think is the phrase we have used a few times this morning. Is it then also a matter where publicity might be warranted rather than moving immediately to a referral to the police for

criminal charges, because it is one of those matters I was referring to earlier? Something might be obvious, but is it obvious enough that it might be sufficient to satisfy a criminal charge?

Mr Steytler: I would say a public hearing is justified there because it was not only a question of categorising the incident, which was not very difficult perhaps in that case, but also of determining what procedures were in place in respect of incidents of that kind—whether they could or should be improved and what recommendations should be made. Those were all valid reasons for holding an inquiry.

Mr J.N. HYDE: Further to that, could it also be an argument that the CCC and its predecessor was set up to carry on the work of the royal commission and was supposed to have a major focus on police and the operation of police? It could be argued that in weighing up private versus public, having police action that had been attempted to be covered up, there is almost a duty to be exposing that activity in a public hearing and that perhaps as well as the police officers, a similar argument could be made to the operation of members of Parliament. Not that those two groups are in a privileged position, but they are in a different position to, say, a normal public servant doing his or her job.

Mr Steytler: The balance that the act requires to be struck is always public interest against private detriment. In that circumstance there is a far greater public interest than there would be in the case of an investigation into private wrongdoing. The doings of those who govern us and those who police us are very much in the public interest. I would agree that in that circumstance there is a greater public interest, and that would therefore weigh more heavily in the balance.

The CHAIRMAN: Inspector, have you had an opportunity to consider the transcript of the committee's public hearing with the acting CCC commissioner on this matter on 18 May?

Mr Steytler: I have.

The CHAIRMAN: I would summarise the position of the commission by way of the comments of the acting CCC commissioner to be that the act in its current form is sufficient and that there is no need to have any amendments to it and that the current statutory provisions regarding the commission's discretion to open examinations to the public and the matters that need to be considered are also adequate. Is it fair to say that, given your comments this morning, you would disagree with that?

Mr Steytler: I would agree with it academically in the sense that, if the act was applied in the way in which I believe it was intended to apply, then it would be adequate, but it is not always the way it has been applied. That is why I think it should be amended to make it plain.

The CHAIRMAN: So, for example, the two matters that you have raised this morning are the need for the commissioner when exercising the discretion to specifically consider the risks, the reputations and the safety of witnesses. No doubt, if I put that to the commission, they will say, "That is what we already do." I think what you are saying this morning is that, nevertheless, let us make it abundantly clear to all concerned that that must be done.

Mr Steytler: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Inspector, during the evidence that we took from the commission on 18 May it was drawn to our attention that, since its establishment in 2004, the CCC up until May of this year had conducted private examinations in relation to 49 matters and public examinations in relation to 15 matters. Is it fair for us to make any observations in relation to that ratio, or is that unfair?

Mr Steytler: I think it is difficult to draw any conclusions from the ratio, because each matter depends on its own circumstances essentially. I would have thought that the ratio ordinarily should have been significantly less public hearings than have been had.

The CHAIRMAN: Certainly I think we would all agree that, given the provisions in the act, the number of public examinations should always be less than private examinations.

Mr Steytler: Yes. Well, that is the intention of legislation that you are studying.

The CHAIRMAN: But whether that ratio of three to one is what was intended or not is difficult to assess. As you say, we need to look at the individual cases. We have examined some of those this morning. Some are saying, "Well, it was appropriate," and certainly you have held the view, in at least one case you have mentioned this morning, that it should not have been a public examination.

[10.40 am]

Do members have any further questions on this issue? If not, I want to take this opportunity, Inspector, while we have you here this morning, to note a report that has been handed down in Queensland recently. The report is dated May 2011, and it is entitled "Simple Effective Transparent Strong: An independent review of the Queensland police complaints, discipline and misconduct system". Have you seen that report? Are you familiar with that report?

Mr Steytler: Yes, I have.

The CHAIRMAN: For what it is worth, it is noted in that report that the CMC in Queensland's dual role of investigating organised crime under its crime function, and also having a misconduct function, could be seen as an inherent conflict of interest. I remember reading that and thinking that was similar to some discussions that we have had in the past. Would you like to make any comments in relation to that Queensland report, and in particular the ongoing push to see the Corruption and Crime Commission investigate organised crime?

Mr Steytler: Yes, I do. If the commission is to work with the police investigating organised crime, then I believe that its misconduct function in respect of the police should be placed in other hands. That function is arguably the most important function that the commission has. In practice, what the commission does now, in the vast majority of cases, is send complaints back to the police for internal investigation, subject to limited oversight by the commission. I have told this committee that I am presently inquiring into the commission's practices when addressing complaints concerning the use of excessive force by police. The statistics reveal that the commission almost never investigates those complaints independently, the Spratt matter being the only exception in respect of complaints made during the last two or so years.

The commission is in the process of preparing a submission that it says will place the relevant statistics in context; so I do not want to make too much of them at this stage. But there is already a concern that some serious complaints against police are not being independently investigated. Once the commission begins to work with police in the course of investigating organised crime, the position will inevitably worsen, both as a matter of perception and a matter of reality. The outcome will satisfy neither the police nor the general public.

The committee has read this report to which you have referred, which was prepared in respect of the recent review of the Queensland police complaints, discipline and misconduct system. That report refers to criticism that the CMC's responsibilities in respect of major and organised crime not only divide its focus as an integrity commission, but give it an inherent conflict of interest in detecting wrongdoing by police, because increasingly its core functions have become those of crime fighter, and it is that role, which requires it to work closely with police, that potentially compromises the commission's independence. The same thing will happen here.

For reasons that I have previously given this committee, I do not regard it as feasible for the commission to isolate its misconduct division from its organised crime division, either as a matter of reality or as a matter of perception. As the committee is aware, perception is, of course, central to general public confidence.

The CHAIRMAN: Inspector, if I hear you correctly, on reading the Queensland report, it does not change your view that the CCC ought not to be given an expanded role in investigating organised crime; if anything, it only further consolidates your view?

Mr Steytler: That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN: I am mindful that it is one thing to identify problems; it is another thing to come up with solutions. What this committee has previously suggested is that the Corruption and Crime Commission does perform a role in terms of its organised crime function, but it is a very narrow role that it performs. The role that it performs is that it receives, on application from the police, requests for things like coercive hearings, and the use of extraordinary powers. In that respect, it performs a gatekeeper role. That is a helpful role, as I understand it from the police, but the police continue to be frustrated by the wording in the legislation that restricts the circumstances in which the police can apply. So would it be fair to say that if you broadened that definition, you would still be empowering the police, in a greater fashion than currently exists, to investigate organised crime?

Mr Steytler: That is correct. You would then have a situation that largely mirrors that of the Australian Crime Commission; and you would still have a proper gatekeeper role being played. I think that would by far be a preferable situation to what is currently proposed.

The CHAIRMAN: The other aspect is that it has been suggested that someone other than the police needs to investigate organised crime, and that should be the CCC, because it can perform an assisting role. But the question then is: what will happen to its misconduct function? Someone has suggested that that could be done by the Public Sector Commissioner. But presumably that would be an unacceptable outcome in terms of oversighting the police.

Mr Steytler: Yes, it would. I also think it would be a mistake to remove its misconduct function altogether.

The CHAIRMAN: In your oversight capacity of the CCC, inspector, have you had any cause to consider the role of the CCC in educating public servants?

Mr Steytler: Yes, I have. My best assessment of that is that it performs that role well. That to me is one of its most important functions, and generally it does it well.

Hon MATT BENSON-LIDHOLM: I misunderstood the Chair's questioning a bit earlier. There is an issue that I would like to follow up with you, inspector. That is the issue of recourse for people who believe they have been adversely affected by public hearings. In particular, I want to go back to events post the Smith's Beach and lobbyist inquiries. Do you understand that there have been any significant changes by way of the commission's procedures offering adequate recourse for people who have suffered at the hands of the commission in relation to public inquiries?

Mr Steytler: No, I do not believe that there have been significant changes there. I think it is very difficult for someone whose reputation has been severely damaged to get any recourse. Once damaged, it is easy to give a report saying nothing, or else making positive findings. But the problem is that damage to reputation tends to survive those events.

Hon MATT BENSON-LIDHOLM: Do you have any suggestions as to how that situation might be rectified, or any particular suggestions in relation to this joint standing committee?

Mr Steytler: My suggestion is essentially that the commission should not damage reputations in the first place unless there is an exceptionally strong basis for it.

Hon MATT BENSON-LIDHOLM: Thank you.

Mr J.N. HYDE: I want to go further on the Chairman's comments. I think the Queensland report is quite damning. Given that our CCC act was based very much on the CJC–CMC experience in Queensland, the philosophy and the evidence that is coming out of this is that devolution back to police for looking after police misconduct and complaints has been a total abject failure. Many people in Queensland are saying they feel they are returning to the pre-Fitzgerald inquiry days. Of course the Fitzgerald inquiry established that you need to have a separate body to be focused on looking at police misconduct, the perception of police corruption, and real corruption. Are we

getting to the stage in Western Australia at which perhaps we do need the CCC to be looking at this field and to be trying to analyse whether devolution has worked? Obviously with the Spratt issue, and other issues, public and not public, the devolution to Caesar investigating Caesar, in terms of allowing the police to look into their own misconduct, does not appear to be working. The philosophy is fine if you are talking about a public servant or a local government officer who is taking pencil sharpeners—it is very important to the organisation that it have control of its own conduct and misconduct. But building on what you said earlier about the police, given their special position in society in looking after the rest of us, we cannot really rely on that situation any more.

[10.50 am]

Mr Steytler: The process of devolution has been, as you say, heavily criticised in Queensland and I think one critic went so far as to describe it as essentially a trial by a jury comprised of friends and relatives of the accused, and there is something to be said for that. As you know, I am currently conducting an inquiry into complaints concerning the use of excessive force by police and the commission's handling of them. It has become apparent to me in the course of that inquiry, and even before then, that the vast majority of complaints are sent back to the police to investigate. Now, there were 381 complaints, in the last two years or so, of the use of excessive force by police and of those 381 complaints made during that period, one was investigated independently by the commission. The commission, as I have said, is in the process of putting together a submission that it says will put that information in context and give an explanation about why there is that context. Nonetheless, while I appreciate that the commission has difficulties with funding and with priorities, and all of these things have to be looked at in terms of what might be competing priorities, that is by any standard an alarming statistic. My own experience has shown that some of those cases, at least three that I am aware of, have been serious cases. I think that that is an unacceptable situation and if funding is the problem, the commission needs to be better funded.

The CHAIRMAN: Inspector, I am sorry to chop and change the agenda for this morning. There is one other matter I wanted to bring to your attention. I note that in the reports of the former parliamentary inspector Malcolm McCusker, QC, into the CCC investigations and findings of misconduct by public servants Mr Paul Frewer and Mr Mike Allen, the inspector suggested an alternative approach to the public examinations which were undertaken. Specifically he said that if misconduct is suspected, a private examination should be conducted and if subsequent thorough investigation indicates grounds for a possible finding of misconduct, the matter should be referred to the appropriate department for the purpose of conducting an internal disciplinary investigation. If the department considers that there is no case to answer for the individual, then that person is obviously spared any unnecessary prejudice. If the opposite is true, however, the then inspector said that the department could decide that disciplinary action was appropriate and then the result and the commission's part in it could be reported in Parliament. Would you concur with that or do you have any variance to that suggestion?

Mr Steytler: No, I think that there is a lot of sense in that suggestion. I suggest that the commission would say that it has not got as much faith in departmental inquiries as the inspector had, but it is not something that I have any personal experience with, that is to say departmental inquiries, so I do not think I could make any comment on that. But otherwise, it seems to me that it would be an appropriate mechanism to be used.

The CHAIRMAN: In one sense, what has been suggested could be argued as being duplicative in that the commission would have to do a fair amount of, I think the term was "thorough investigation", before then referring it to the department. Presumably upon thorough investigation, if misconduct is likely to occur, it may be simpler just to report that.

Mr Steytler: It would be in that circumstance.

The CHAIRMAN: Which I guess is consistent with what you have said previously, that the norm ought to be if an investigation is ongoing, the matter should be held in private.

Mr Steytler: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Members, any other questions this morning? Inspector, do you have anything further you want to add this morning?

Mr Steytler: Nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN: In summary, I would be interested in your thoughts as to whether the following would be a fair representation of your views this morning, specifically on this issue of the holding of public examinations. I understand you to hold the view that as a norm, hearings should be in private, especially where an investigation is ongoing. You also hold the view that the CCC should have the discretion to hold a public hearing. You further hold the view that the act could be amended, including, but not limited to, a provision for the commissioner to specifically consider the risk to reputations and the safety of witnesses. Further, you hold the view that suppression orders could be made more use of.

Mr Steytler: Yes, the only thing that I would add is the further amendments requiring the commissioner to be satisfied if public interest outweighs private detriment.

The CHAIRMAN: On that note, Inspector, I will proceed to close today's hearing. I thank you for your evidence before the committee today. A transcript of this hearing will be forwarded to you for correction of minor errors. Any such corrections must be made and the transcript returned within 10 days from the date of the letter attached to this transcript. If the transcript is not returned within this period, it will be deemed to be correct. New material cannot be added via these corrections and the sense of your evidence cannot be altered. Should you wish to provide additional information or elaborate on particular points, please include a supplementary submission for the committee's consideration when you return your corrected transcript of evidence.

Hearing concluded at 10.55 am